

The richest one percent of this country owns half our country's wealth, five trillion dollars. One third of that comes from hard work, two thirds comes from inheritance, interest on interest accumulating to widows and idiot sons and what I do, stock and real estate speculation. It's bullshit. You got ninety percent of the American public out there with little or no net worth. I create nothing. I own.
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PIMCO's Bill Gross was asking Where’s Waldo? in his investment outlook for September 2007.
If we can bail out Chrysler, why can’t we support the American homeowner? The time has come to acknowledge that there are precedents aplenty in the long and even recent history of American policy making. This rescue, which admittedly might bail out speculators who deserve much worse, would support millions of hard working Americans whose recent hours have become ones of frantic desperation.
Get with it Mr. President and Mr. Treasury Secretary. This is your moment to one-up Barney Frank and the Democrats. Reestablish not the RFC or the RTC, but create an RMC – Reconstruction Mortgage Corporation. If not, make some modifications in the existing FHA program, long discarded as ineffective. Write some checks, bail ‘em out, prevent a destructive housing deflation that Ben Bernanke is unable to do. After all “W”, you’re “the Decider,” aren’t you?
Mr. Practical, whom I seldom disagree with simply because he is too practical, commented on the situation and came to a conclusion that I 100% agree with: More Bailouts Could Bring Disaster Down the Road.
In my humble opinion Mr. Gross is right about only one thing: that Mr. Bernanke is unable to eventually stop a destructive housing deflation. At least now the pundits are admitting that a housing deflation is at the heart of the economic problems. That is a watershed event.
But for the “government”, which I thought was using taxpayer money (except for the $9 trln in debt it has borrowed), to bail out malinvestment is only to increase the problem. If you don’t punish your child for playing with matches, he may one day burn the house down.
Bailout for Who?
After reading Mr. Practical, inquiring minds might be wondering "Who does Bill Gross really want to bail out?"
That's a good question so I started looking for possible clues in Morningstar's snapshot of PIMCO Total Return Fund (PTTRX).
This is what I found:
I see the top bond guru in the world returned a three year average of 3.83% in his "Total Return" Fund. One could have parked money in a money market fund, CDs, a bank, or short term treasuries and done better than that.
Digging deeper I see the top five holdings of the Total Return Fund are as follows.
1) Fannie Mae (FNM)
2) Fannie Mae
3) Fannie Mae
4) Fannie Mae
5) Fannie Mae
As shown in the following table:
Digging still deeper I see this breakdown:
Of the U.S. Government breakdown I see the Total Return Fund is grossly overweight agencies (Fannie Mae) versus Treasuries. This is really irritating. Shame on Morningstar for being willing to label Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as "U.S. Government".
There are scores of so called "Government Bond Funds" out there chasing minuscule returns above treasuries when Fannie Mae (and brother Freddie Mac (FRE)) are not even government backed. For more on this idea as well as a recommendation that everyone look into just what is in their Money Market and "Government Bond Funds" please see Flight to Safety.
The Total Return Fund does not present itself as a "government bond fund" but everyone by now should be wondering how the so called best bond trader in the world could get himself into this position.
And even worse is the fact that 40.20% of the Total Return Fund is invested in mortgages which, from the above tables, it would appear that most of that is not even "quasi-government guaranteed".
The logical conclusion is that Bill Gross is overweight mortgages and wants a taxpayer bailout of PIMCO. Is it any wonder then that he is asking President Bush to "write some checks, bail ‘em out, and prevent a destructive housing deflation that Ben Bernanke is unable to do"?
The only thing Gross forgot to mention in his September Outlook was the return address on those checks needs to read "Bill Gross @ PIMCO".
Via Jim Stack's Investech, comes this interesting view of how prior Bear Markets compare relative to the most recent 9% correction.
Jim does something a bit different -- he depicts these prior Bear Makets starting from the most recent July 19 highs:
"Shown on this page are some the most significant bear markets of the past 40 years. In historical terms, they range from the brief and mild (1990) to the long and severe (1973-74 and 2000-02)
As you step through each, try to imagine what it would be like riding the market down – where the DJIA would be by year-end, and how your strategy might be affected if/when the DJIA broke 10,000. This will help you understand your own tolerance for risk in the current market climate, and what each would look like if it started at DJIA 14,000 on July 19, 2007"
Now consider that since that July 19 peak of just over 14,000, the Dow has yet to breach even 13,000 to the downside.
What is so fascinating to me, given the relative mildness of this pullback, is how much noise we have heard from the crowd -- Sturm und Drang -- as if this was Def Con 1. I like the way Dan Gross describes it, calling out the "motley collection of gazillionaires, conservatives, and industrialists begging the Fed to cut interest rates."
Thanks, Jim -- great stuff.
By Martin de Sa'Pinto, Senior Financial Correspondent
Wednesday, August 29, 2007 2:57:04 PM ET
GENEVA (HedgeWorld.com)—Some of the investors who sprinted for the exit when quant funds began to reveal heavy losses after the first week in August may now be wishing they had waited just a little longer. Many funds that saw a wave of redemptions following these losses have now bounced back, and though they may not have fully recovered from the disastrous start to the month, those investors who stuck around are starting to breathe a little easier.
A number of quant funds suffered badly in the first days of the month, and particularly from Aug. 8–10 as a sell-off swept the equities, commodities and low-grade credit markets. The mass selling was initially triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, which put huge downward pressure on the prices of other debt securities, related and otherwise. Spreads widened and liquidity dried up. In the face of an increasing number of margin calls, these funds eliminated their most liquid positions in order to raise collateral for their funds, since in many cases it was nigh impossible to lighten their portfolios of the debt securities whose deteriorating market value had caused the problem in the first place.
The widespread damage this market turmoil inflicted on hedge funds using quantitative trading strategies was a result of funds in similar trading positions being whipsawed by what many of them called "unprecedented volatility." Clifford Asness, managing and founding principal of AQR, a $38.5 billion manager, called it a "de-leveraging of historic proportions" in a letter to investors in the firm's quant funds. AQR's Global Stock Selection High Volatility Fund was reported to be down 12.5% earlier this month Previous HedgeWorld Story.
On Aug. 13 Goldman Sachs revealed that its two major quant funds—the multi-strategy Global Alpha fund and Global Equity Opportunities, a long/short equity fund—had accumulated year-to-date losses of 27% and 30%, respectively, of their value Previous HedgeWorld Story. Worse still, more than half of Global Alpha's losses had occurred in the first 10 days of August, while unconfirmed reports said that losses at the long/short fund, known as GS GEO, had brushed 50% year-to-date and then recovered somewhat before Goldman told the market of the difficult start to the month. The investment bank, along with some outside investors, then injected $3 billion into GEO—though Global Alpha did not benefit from any cash injections. In spite of the leverage employed at GEO and the possibility of redemptions, the firm claimed the injection was not a bailout, but rather an attempt to exploit an opportunity.
In a letter to investors dated Aug. 21, James Palotta, vice chairman of Tudor Investment Corp., the investment adviser to the Raptor Fund, noted that an "uncharacteristically sharp" drawdown over two and a half months had left the fund down 8% year-to-date as of Aug. 15. He also noted that in the case of the firm's equity holdings, "in nearly every case, the magnitude of decline appears disconnected completely both from underlying equity value-creation stories (which have limited, if any, dependence on access to credit markets) and from visible, secure, increasing company cash flow profiles." Raptor, which has returned an annualized 19.2% since inception in late 1993, is just one of several consistently outperforming funds to have seen heavy losses in the first half of August.
"Some trend-followers might have problems with these volatile equities markets," Jürg Bühler, a principal at Cayman Islands-based Dighton Capital's UTG Funds SPC, told HedgeWorld in the midst of the market rout. "Most trend-followers have been losing money since the last week in July. Some asset classes have gotten highly correlated, which would not normally be the case. Volatility is rising, risk premiums are going up and fat-tail risks are appearing."
So what should managers and investors do when there are dislocations of this nature? For the investors who injected cash at Goldman GEO, such situations certainly represent an opportunity for quant funds, and indeed for hedge funds in general. "One reason hedge funds make money is because they provide liquidity when the market needs it," Mr. Bühler said. "When people are selling into a market where there is no liquidity, it can create an incredible buying opportunity for hedge funds."
The Aug. 8–10 period, which saw $200 billion liquidated from the market in just three days, is a case in point. "It's a market dislocation—something that's cheap gets cheaper," Mr. Bühler continued. "You need to build a diverse enough business to ensure you can provide liquidity when these things happen."
In fact it is starting to seem that those fund managers who kept faith in their strategies through the early-August turmoil are the ones who have come back most strongly since. On Aug. 9, the Wall Street Journal reported that Renaissance Technologies' $26 billion Renaissance Institutional Equities Fund was down 7.4% for the year through Aug. 8, after losing 8.7% in the first eight days—six trading days—of August alone.
While explaining, in short, that crowded trades were the main factor behind the losses, Renaissance officials said in a letter to investors that "we remain confident that over time the Basic System will match the return of the S&P and, enhanced by our predictive signals, should exceed it." That is to say, the fund would maintain faith in its system which had, after all, performed pretty well until that time. And the tactic seems to have worked: A source close to the situation confirmed Tuesday [Aug. 28] that RIEF performance as of last Friday was up and that the fund would likely close the month either flat or up Previous HedgeWorld Story.
JP Morgan's Highbridge quant funds also suffered early in the month. Highbridge Statistical Market Neutral, a mutual fund that is open to retail investors and does not employ leverage, was down about 7.2% month-to-date by Aug. 9, but had recovered to a loss of around 2.66% for the month—negative 0.88% year-to-date—by the close on Aug. 27. However, a large amount of retail money was withdrawn from this fund in the intervening period, with redemptions totaling around $350 million for the month. The fund now has assets of around $1.45 billion from about $1.78 billion at the start of trading on Aug. 10. Most of the drawdown occurred around Aug. 10, and so the fleeing investors did not benefit from the bounce.
Highbridge Statistical Opportunities, a similar fund that uses leverage and is not open to retail investors, was also hard hit in early August. Several reports put losses at 18%. Although Highbridge does not comment on the performance of its funds, a person close to the firm said this fund too had experienced a "nice bounce" and was "continuing to see an upward trend."
Investors at AQR's Global Stock Selection High Volatility Fund were, by and large, not spooked by the market turmoil earlier this month. Indeed, it seems that AQR's largest hedge fund has actually had net inflows month-to-date. It also has recovered from its negative 12.5% performance as of Aug. 10 to negative 3.5% as of Aug. 27, leaving it up almost 3% year-to-date, said a person familiar with the fund. It's actually turning into a pretty good month for AQR: The firm's non-quant hedge funds are enjoying a solid month, with the Global Asset Allocation fund up more than 2.5% and the Global risk premium fund up 2.78%, this person said.
The flagship of the world's largest hedge fund operator, Man Group's AHL Diversified, which looks to exploit price trends in futures and foreign exchange markets, reduced positions in order to preserve capital during the broad market retreat. Man is ready to redeploy that capital when solid trends are re-established. The AHL Diversified fund slid 6.9% in the last week of July alone, when trends first began to break down, leading to an overall loss of 3.9% for the month. Even so, the fund slipped further during the August turmoil, losing another 6.9% by Aug. 10. This fund, too, has staged something of a fight back; month-to-date performance stood at negative 2.83% on Aug. 27. As of that time the fund was in positive territory year-to-date, with returns of around 4.75%.
"We're trading on over 100 markets, including indices, cash and commodities," said one portfolio manager at Vienna, Austria-based Superfund, on Aug. 10. His firm advises trend-following strategies that manage a total of $1.6 billion. "The subprime effect has nothing to do with soybeans, but it has affected the markets anyway. For trend-followers, the market drop like the one we saw was the worst thing that could happen, because trends have been broken."
But in the midst of the market storm, this manager said that his firm would be not be changing tack, in spite of losses exceeding 7% in July and a difficult start to August. "In this sort of highly unusual situation, you can either change your system to short-term or day trading or try to manage downside volatility. We're focusing on volatility," he said.
This person added that his firm was confident in its system, and would therefore not be looking to "fix" it because of highly unusual developments in the market. "If you stick to your system, you will make money," he said. "As soon as you start to change your system, you'll lose money." There has been no performance update from Superfund since that time. However, the experience of Goldman, Highbridge and others in the latter part of August suggest that the Superfund manager may have a good point.
Published: August 30 2007 03:00 | Last updated: August 30 2007 03:00
A liquidity crisis in the commercial paper debt market could force "firesales" of as much as $43bn (£21.3bn) in assets, according to an analysis by the Royal Bank of Scotland.
A swath of off-balance sheet vehicles run by banks and asset managers that buy bonds backed by mortgages and other debt are facing forced sales of assets to fund their short-term liquidity requirements.
Such vehicles have faced a dramatic funding crunch in the short-term commercial paper market after investors fled to safer instruments.
At the same time, the valueof their assets has fallen, as investors concerned over the US subprime crisis have also shunned asset-backed securities.
"By our estimates, somewhere around $43bn is the [face] value of the assets that those vehicles, which have publicly disclosed issues, might have to sell-off," said Tom Jenkins, banking and financials analyst at RBS.
This has raised worries that selling by structured investment vehicles (SIV) and their cousins, SIV-lites, could help depress the value of assets held by peers.
Analysts at Unicredit said the price declines due to the forced sales of assets could trigger sell-offs at other SIVs "in a domino-style action."
Rhinebridge, a $14bn SIV managed by Germany's troubled industrial bank IKB, has so far sold $176m of its assets to finance its debt requirements. Cheyne Finance, a vehicle managed by hedge fund Cheyne Capital, was forced to begin selling its $6.6bn portfolio after a downgrade by Standard & Poor's, the ratings agency.
Mr Jenkins said it was difficult to gauge what the market value of assets disposed of in a "firesale" would be.
RBS estimates the bulk of the assets held are AA or AAA rated, and the vehicles could recover up to 95 cents on the dollar. Riskier investments, such as those in the lower-rated tranches of a subprime-backed collateralised debt obligation, might attract less than half of that.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007
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An economics professor and a grad student are walking along the sidewalk, and the grad student spots a twenty dollar bill on the sidewalk. He says, “Hey professor, look, a twenty dollar bill.” The professor says, “Nonsense. If there were a twenty dollar bill on the street, someone would have picked it up already.” They walk past, and a little kid walking behind them pockets the bill.
If anyone you know is an efficient market proponent, all you have to do is point them to the closed-end fund space. Fear and greed play out in that arena as discounts and premiums (to NAV). Currently, there are a few opportunities popping up that are interesting.
ETF Connect has a great feature that lets you sort by discount and premium.
CUBA continues to trade at a large premium +40%, but finding any shares to short could be problematic.
DHG is managed by one of the best names in the business, and was getting pummeled to worse than a -20% discount and seems to have settled to around -10%. It is a l/s fund that is about 30% leveraged, and has a higher management fee of 1.42%
SNF is a Spanish CEF that trades at a 20%+ premium. A simple strategy would be to short SNF and buy the Spain ETF (ETFs rarely trade away from their NAV).
The Spain CEF highlights a characteristic you want to see when searching for CEFs at discounts/premiums - the price oscillates around the NAV on both the positive and negative side (some funds chronically trade at a discount with no catalyst for closing that gap). James Altucher has some good coverage of closed-end fund arb in one of his recent books (Supercash), and also touches on a CEF portfolio for his Mom at Stockpickr. SNF has traded at over 100% premiums and greater than -20% discounts. Take note of the five-year period in the 90's when it traded at a constant discount.
Chen & Steers Closed End Opportunity Fund (FOF) is interesting in that it has a fund of funds model to invest in other closed end funds. This could be a great option for someone looking to buy a diversified portfolio. It holds 94 other funds, many of which are trading at discounts. In effect, you get a double-dip on the discount effect (and also a double dip on management fees which tally to ~ 2%). Currently it is at ~ -3% discount, and if that ever gets larger, the fund could be an interesting option.
Brett Arends has a good article over on TheStreet.com on some other CEF's that are particularly attractive. He has another article out on an emerging debt fund trading at a discount that results in a 12% dividend yield.
Below is a table I whipped together of some various CEFs. The bottom section is some of the bigger buy-write funds. Data is from 8/27 close.
At some point, despite all the hysteria, the markets will bottom. Rarely does each market segment hit bottom at the same time, however. After junk bonds dropped 3% in July, the worst monthly performance since the post-Internet bubble, Enron-induced panic of 2002, some savvy fixed-income pros say it's time to buy, Bloomberg reports today.
To refresh your memory, the amount of extra yield over Treasury bonds that junk investors demanded leaped from a record low of less than 2.5 percentage points in early June to over 4.5 points in recent days. While the market is certain to be buffeted by some continued fall-out from the credit crunch, corporate balance sheets remain in good condition -- certainly better than the junk market has valued them, managers at firms like Loomis Sayles and Nuveen Investment Management say.
The economic fundamentals will always matter more for bonds that for stocks because, ultimately, issuers pay hard cash in interest and principal or they don't (excluding the minor niche of wacky deferred pay junk bonds, of course). It doesn't matter if wireless carrier Alltel (Symbol: AT) remains out of fashion with investors, for example, if you pick up its 7% notes due in 2016 as long as the company stays on its feet. The stock price might suffer but a bond holder will collect a yield equal to about 10% annually as long as Alltel pays.
In addition to putting some dough in one of the funds mentioned by Bloomberg, there's also the iShares iBoxx High Yield Corporate Bond exchange-traded fund (HYG) that I've previously mentioned as a short-term shorting idea. And closed-end funds, as discussed last month, let you pick up diversified portfolios of junk bonds at a substantial discount even to today's depressed prices. Of the 33 corporate bond closed-end funds listed on ETF Connect, mostly of the high yield variety, discounts range as high as 14%.
Recently, the gap in yields between 3 month Treasury bills and 3 month commercial paper widened significantly. This is because traders and investors were doubting the ability of corporations to meet their funding needs. The resulting run for the safety of T-bills depressed their yields, creating a gap last week of 1.92%.
To put that into perspective, I went back to 1980 (N = 1444 trading weeks) and found that this was the widest gap during that time. Indeed, the second widest gap was 1.43%, registered during the market panic in October, 1987. The median gap since 1980 has been 1.09%, as commercial paper has traditionally yielded a bit more than Treasury bills to compensate for an additional dollop of risk.
When commercial paper yields much more than Treasuries, however, the market is pricing in far more than a dollop of corporate risk. Since 1980, we have had only nine weekly periods in which commercial paper yields have exceeded those of T-bills by 30% or more. Here are the dates in descending order of yield spread:
20070824 |
19871030 |
19871204 |
19871218 |
19820924 |
19871211 |
19981016 |
19820917 |
19821001 |
Forget kurtosis, leptokurtosis and platykurtosis. The best risk arbitrage trading strategy to use during this credit crunch is guts.For the first time in years, merger arbs have a chance of making money.
Before the market turmoil, it wasn’t worth placing a bet on a leveraged buy-out. Spreads were so tight that returns weren’t much better than banking the money.
Traders can now make a high double-digit return in a couple of months. Goldman Sachs estimates that buying 22 pending LBOs could generate an average annualised return of 36 per cent - if those deals go through. That’s alpha.
Take the battle for ABN Amro - the biggest deal going. Almost every hedge fund is playing it and some of the sums invested are staggering. One well-known City fund has at least $800m tied up in the deal. If it fails, hedge funds will be crucified.
But if the deal completes, it will be the biggest opportunity for arbs to profit since Vodafone’s hostile takeover of Mannesmann in 1999.
The spread on ABN - which widened to 20 per cent at the start of the crisis - is now about 11 per cent.
So why isn’t everyone doing it? Because they are terrified that three things could happen if credit markets become worse: a black hole in ABN; one of the investment banks underwriting the financing invokes a material adverse change clause; and regulatory intervention.
ABN was trading at about €34.50 on Friday - if these fears materialise and the bank bid collapses, the stock could halve. Losses would be catastrophic and the managers responsible will be pedalling to work on push bikes.
But if the biggest banking merger of all time goes through, some genius arb will be pulling up to the office in a different coloured Ferrari each day of the week, and risk arbitrage will have meaning again.
This entry was posted by Lina Saigol on Tuesday, August 28th, 2007 at 7:00 and is filed under M&A, Capital markets, Hedge funds. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.
By George Will
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Exactly a century ago, panic seized financial markets.
The collateral for perhaps half the bank loans in New York was securities whose values had been inflated by speculation. Then on Saturday night, Nov. 2, 1907, a 70-year-old man gathered some fellow financiers at his home at 36th and Madison in Manhattan. The next morning, a New York Times headline proclaimed:
"BANKERS CONFER WITH MR. MORGAN, Long Discussion in His Library Not Ended Until 4 O'Clock." Both the Times and The Washington Post ("BANKERS IN CONFERENCE: Money Stringency and Remedial Measures Discussed in Morgan's Library") noted that bankers shuttled between meetings at Morgan's mansion and the Waldorf-Astoria in a newfangled conveyance — an automobile. Working 19 hours a day, and restricting himself on doctor's orders to 20 cigars a day, J.P. Morgan seemed so heroic that the president of Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson, said the financier should chair a panel of intellectuals who would advise the nation on its future.
Six years later, however, under Wilson as the nation's President, the Federal Reserve System was created, ending the era when a few titans of finance could be what central banks now are — the economy's "lenders of last resort." Central banks have been performing that role during today's turmoil in the market for subprime mortgages — those granted to the least creditworthy borrowers.
The ill wind blowing through that market has blown two goods: The public mind has been refreshed regarding the concept of moral hazard. And the electorate has been reminded of just how reliably liberal Hillary Clinton is.
Moral hazard exists when a policy produces incentives for perverse behavior. One such existing policy is farm price supports that reduce the cost to farmers of overproduction. Another is the policy of removing tens of millions of voters from the income tax rolls, thereby making government largesse a free good for them.
And this would be such a policy: the Federal Reserve lowering the cost of money whenever risky lending to a sector of the economy (e.g., housing) makes that sector desperate for lower interest rates. Many banks, hedge funds and other institutions have pocketed profits from their dealings in the subprime market. The losses are theirs, too.
Clinton leapt to explain the subprime problem in the terms of liberalism's master narrative — the victimization of the many by the few.
In a speech favorably contrasting a "shared responsibility" society with an "on your own" society, she said, in effect, that distressed subprime borrowers are not responsible for their behavior. "Unsavory" lenders, she said, had used "unfair lending practices." Doubtless there are as many unsavory lenders as there are unsavory politicians. So, voters and borrowers: caveat emptor.
But this, too, is true: Every improvident loan requires an improvident borrower to seek and accept it. Furthermore, when there is no penalty for folly — such as getting a variable-rate mortgage that will be ruinous if the rate varies upward — folly proliferates. To get a mortgage is usually to commit capitalism; it is to make an investment in the hope of gain. And if lenders know that whenever they go too far and require inexpensive money the Federal Reserve will provide it with low interest rates, then going too far will not really be going too far.
In 2008, as voters assess their well-being, several million households with adjustable-rate home mortgages will have their housing costs increase.
Defaults, too, will increase. That will be a perverse incentive for the political class to be compassionate toward themselves in the name of compassion toward borrowers, with money to bail out borrowers. If elected politicians controlled the Federal Reserve, they would lower interest rates. Fortunately, we have insulated the Federal Reserve from democracy.
The Federal Reserve's proper mission is not to produce a particular rate of economic growth or unemployment, or to cure injuries to certain sectors of the economy. It is to preserve the currency as a store of value — to contain inflation. The fact that inflation remains a worry is testimony to the fundamental soundness of the economy, in spite of turbulence in a small slice of one sector.
Ron Chernow, in his book "The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance" (1990), says Morgan's 1907 rescue was the last time private bankers "loomed so much larger than regulators in a crisis. Afterward, the pendulum would swing decidedly toward government financial management." Happily, Chairman Ben Bernanke's Federal Reserve remains committed to minimal management, which is what government does best.
Fund Spy
Last week Gregg Wolper capably argued that despite all of the hand-wringing over the anomalous aspects of the summer subprime sell-off (try saying that 10 times fast), many of the market's chief behavioral patterns have remained intact. Bonds have outperformed stocks, high-quality bonds have beaten junky ones, and stocks and bonds from developed markets have trumped those from more exotic locales.
Within certain fund asset classes and categories, however, you can identify some performance patterns that could challenge your assumptions about what's safe and what's not. Some of the securities and fund types that fared well in previous market sell-offs have struggled mightily, while other securities and funds you might've filed under the "higher-risk" category have held up pretty well.
Russ Kinnel has already touched on the poor recent performance of ultrashort funds--which heretofore had seemed to be the tamest part of the fund world. What follows is a review of some of the other notable--and nasty--surprises for fund investors over the past month. The bottom line? It's a mistake to extrapolate too much from how investments have fared in previous market downturns, because every down market has different catalysts and affects some securities more than others. If you stay diversified and avoid overheating sectors, however, you'll stand a good chance of faring well in future downturns. That's because in this last correction--as in others--the areas that had recently enjoyed the biggest performance runups have proved the most vulnerable.
Value Has Underperformed Growth
For some investors, particularly those newer to the market, it's an article of faith that growth funds, with their high average price multiples and trend-beholden companies, are riskier than value funds. After all, the typical large-growth fund lost 25 percentage points more, on an annualized basis, than did the average large-value offering during the bear market from 2000 through 2002. However, growth stocks and funds haven't always gone down more than value, particularly when market participants are worried about economic growth. That was the case recently, as growth funds in every market-cap band outperformed their value counterparts throughout July and most of August. There are a couple of key reasons for this performance pattern. First, investors have feared that troubles in the housing market could cause a broad economic slowdown, and growth companies are generally more attractive in such an environment. Second, financials stocks, though they've staged a comeback very recently, have been at the epicenter of the subprime crisis, and such names are mainstays for most value funds. (We observed a similar performance pattern amid the Long-Term Capital Management crisis in 1998, with growth stocks outperforming financials and financials-heavy value funds.) That doesn't diminish the case for value stocks and funds, but it does reinforce that they won't star in every down market.
Small- and Mid-Cap Value Have Struggled the Most
In a related vein, the recent travails of small- and mid-cap value stocks and funds may have also been somewhat surprising to some investors. After all, these categories were champs during the last bear market, with funds in this group posting sizable gains even as the broad market struggled from 2000 through 2002. Small- and mid-cap value stocks and funds have gotten crushed during the recent correction, though, for reasons that in hindsight appear pretty logical. For one thing, some of these funds, such as Hotchkis & Wiley Small Cap Value (SCMVX), owned some of the housing- and mortgage-related names that are at the heart of the current mortgage crisis. In addition, small- and mid-cap value stocks as a group have appeared vulnerable amid the credit crunch, because small concerns could have trouble securing the financing they need to survive. Finally, it all comes back to valuation: While small- and mid-cap value stocks were exceedingly cheap coming into the broad market sell-off in 2000, they were arguably pretty richly valued relative to their growth prospects at the outset of this correction. For that reason, we've been urging investors to lighten up on small value for a few years now.
Income Focuses Haven't Helped
Dividend-focused stock funds will tend to behave better on the downside than non-dividend-payers: Not only is an above-average dividend yield often a signal that a stock is cheap, but the ability to pay a dividend can signal a company's financial strength. Moreover, those dividend payouts can provide at least a small cushion in down markets. However, it's worth noting that during the recent correction, the performance of dividend-focused funds--which I'm defining here as any fund with a 12-month yield higher than the S&P 500's--was right in line with non-dividend-focused funds in the same categories. Here again, financials are the key reason behind the seeming anomaly: Stocks in the sector often pay above-market yields, but they've been roiled amid worries that the mortgage crisis and perhaps a generally cooling market could crimp earnings for banks, thrifts, brokerages, and asset managers. Real estate investment trusts--also prominent in many yield-focused funds--have struggled recently, too. In addition, some of the funds with high dividend yields are run by dyed-in-the-wool contrarians who have likely been buying amid the wreckage, thereby exacerbating their short-term performance problems. There's still good reason to believe that income-focused stock funds will have better defensive characteristics than funds that don't care about dividends, but don't expect that to be so in every market and with every fund.
Metals: Not So Shiny
Another recent market phenomenon that defies conventional wisdom has been the weak performance of precious metals stocks and funds. When all heck is breaking loose, the thinking goes, you can at least look to metals as a noncorrelated hedge and a stable store of value. Precious metals' defensive attributes were on full display during the bear market of 2000-02, but stocks and funds in the sector have been an extreme disappointment recently, losing 15% over the past month alone. That's the second-worst showing of any category save one, Latin America stock. A couple of explanations loom large. First, gold is often viewed as an inflationary hedge, but lately investors have been more worried about an economic slowdown than inflation. Also, some market participants who had been holding metals were forced to sell to raise cash to meet margin requirements amid sliding stock prices. Finally, the appetite for metals has been particularly strong in emerging markets over the past few years, and investors were spooked that the U.S. housing market swoon could have a dampening effect on global growth and, in turn, demand for metals. Over time, precious metals' correlation with the U.S. stock market has been low, but their recent performance serves as a reminder that the securities are, at best, imperfect diversifiers. Interestingly, commodities funds, which in recent years have emerged as a viable alternative to the traditional precious metals hedge, held up far better during the recent sell-off.
Long-Short Disappointment
A handful of long-short funds have also come up short amid the market's recent tumult, thereby failing to deliver on their promise of all-weather performance. True, the average one-month loss for the category is a perfectly respectable 2.7%, but that average conceals some extremes in performance. On one end of the spectrum are funds like Hussman Strategic Growth (HSGFX), which has stayed well in the black recently thanks to its defensive positioning. On the other end are funds like TFS Market Neutral (TFSMX), whose recent losses have been far worse than those of many long-only funds due to its small-cap focus and bad signals from its quant models. These disparate showings reinforce what we tend to think about the long-short category: There are a very small handful of offerings that earn their keep--such as the Hussman fund--and many more that are overpriced and easy to pass by.
Christine Benz is Morningstar's director of mutual fund analysis. She is also the author of the second edition of the Morningstar Guide to Mutual Funds: 5-Star Strategies for Success. Although she reads every e-mail she receives, she cannot respond to each message individually or provide individualized portfolio advice.
Bill Gross | August 2007 |
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Enough is Enough |
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"The rich are different from you and me," wrote Fitzgerald and I suppose they are, but the differences – they wax and wane with the economic tides. Gilded ages come, go, and are reborn on the monsoon cloudbursts of seemingly intangible forces such as globalization, innovation, and favorable tax policy. For the rich to be truly rich and multiply their numbers, they need help. Adept surfers they may be, but like all riders, the wealthy need a seventh wave that allows them to preen their skills and declare themselves masters of their own universe, if only for a moment in time. That the golden glazed surfboards of the 21st century seem unique with their decals of "private equity" and "hedge finance" is mostly a mirage. Wealth has always gravitated towards those that take risk with other people’s money but especially so when taxes are low. The rich are different – but they are not necessarily society’s paragons. It is in fact society’s wind and its current willingness to nurture the rich that fills their sails. What farce, then, to give credence to current debate as to whether private equity and hedge fund managers will be properly incented if Congress moves to raise their taxes up to levels paid by the majority of America’s middle class. What pretense to assert, as did Kenneth Griffin, recipient last year of more than $1 billion in compensation as manager of the Citadel Investment Group, that "the (current) income distribution has to stand. If the tax became too high, as a matter of principle I would not be working this hard." Right. In the same breath he tells, Louis Uchitelle of The New York Times that the get-rich crowd "soon discover that wealth is not a particularly satisfying outcome." The team at Citadel, he claims, "loves the problems they work on and the challenges inherent to their business." Oh what a delicate/tangled web we weave sir. Far better to admit, as has Warren Buffett, that the tax rates of the wealthiest Americans average nearly 15% while those of their salaried and therefore less incented assistants just outside their offices are nearly twice that. Far better to recognize, as does Chart 1, that only twice before during the last century has such a high percentage of national income (5%) gone to the top .01% of American families. Far better to understand, to quote Buffett, that "society should place an initial emphasis on abundance but then should continuously strive to redistribute the abundance more equitably." Buffett’s comments basically frame the debate: when is enough, enough? Granted, American style capitalism has fostered and encouraged innovation and globalization which are the fundamental building blocks of wealth. That is the abundance that Buffett speaks to – the creation of enough. But when the fruits of society’s labor become maldistributed, when the rich get richer and the middle and lower classes struggle to keep their heads above water as is clearly the case today, then the system ultimately breaks down; boats do not rise equally with the tide; the center cannot hold. Of course the wealthy fire back in cloying self-justification, stressing their charitable and philanthropic pursuits, suggesting that they can more efficiently redistribute wealth than can the society that provided the basis for their riches in the first place. Perhaps. But with exceptions (and plaudits) for the Gates and Buffetts of the mega-rich, the inefficiencies of wealth redistribution by the Forbes 400 mega-rich and their wannabes are perhaps as egregious and wasteful as any government agency, if not more. Trust funds for the kids, inheritances for the grandkids, multiple vacation homes, private planes, multi-million dollar birthday bashes and ego-rich donations to local art museums and concert halls are but a few of the ways that rich people waste money – and I must admit, I am guilty of at least one of these on this admittedly short list of sins. I have, however, avoided the last one. When millions of people are dying from AIDS and malaria in Africa, it is hard to justify the umpteenth society gala held for the benefit of a performing arts center or an art museum. A thirty million dollar gift for a concert hall is not philanthropy, it is a Napoleonic coronation. So when is enough, enough? Now is the time, long overdue in fact, to admit that for the rich, for the mega-rich of this country, that enough is never enough, and it is therefore incumbent upon government to rectify today’s imbalances. "The way our society equalizes incomes" argues ex-American Airlines CEO Bob Crandall, "is through much higher taxes than we have today. There is no other way." Well said, Bob. Enough said, Bob. Because enough, when it comes to the gilded 21st century rich, has clearly become too much. If gluttony describes the acquisitive reach of the mega-rich, then the same gastronomical metaphor applies to today’s state of the credit markets. Stuffed! Both borrowers and lenders may have bitten off more than they can chew, and even those that swallow their hot dogs whole – Nathan’s Famous Coney Island style – are having a serious bout of indigestion. Several hundred billion dollars of bank loans and high yield debt wait in the wings to take out the private equity and leveraged buyout deals that have helped propel stocks to Dow 14,000. And lenders…mmmmm, how do we say this…don’t seem to have much of an appetite anymore. Six weeks ago the high yield debt market was humming the Campbell’s soup theme and now, it’s begging for a truckload of Rolaids. Yields have risen by 100 to 150 basis points in response as shown in Chart 2. Some wonder what squelched the hunger of potential lenders so abruptly, while in the same breath suggesting that the subprime crisis is "isolated" and not contagious to other markets or even the overall economy. Not so, and the sudden liquidity crisis in the high yield debt market is just the latest sign that there is a connection, a chain that links all markets and ultimately their prices and yields to the fate of the U.S. economy. The fact is that several weeks ago, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s finally got it into gear, downgrading hundreds of subprime issues and threatening more to come. "Isolationists" would wonder what that has to do with the corporate debt market. Housing is faring badly but corporate profits are in their prime and at record levels as a percentage of GDP. Lenders to corporations should not be affected by defaults in subprime housing space, they claim. Unfortunately that does not appear to be the case. As Tim Bond of Barclays Capital put it so well a few weeks ago, "it is the excess leverage of the lenders not the borrowers which is the source of systemic problems." Low policy rates in many countries and narrow credit spreads have encouraged levered structures bought in the hundreds of millions by lenders, in an effort to maximize returns with what they thought were relatively riskless loans. Those were the ABS CDOs, CLOs, and levered CDO structures that the rating services assigned investment grade ratings to, which then were sold with enticing LIBOR + 100, 200, 300 or more types of yields. The bloom came off the rose and the worm started to turn, however, when institutional investors – many of them foreign – began to see the ratings downgrades in ABS subprime space. Could the same thing happen to levered structures with pure corporate credit backing? To be blunt, they seem to be thinking that if Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s have done such a lousy job of rating subprime structures, how can the market have confidence that they’re not repeating the same structural, formulaic, mistake with CLOs and CDOs? That growing lack of confidence – more so than the defaults of two Bear Stearns hedge funds and the threat of more to come – has frozen future lending and backed up the market for high yield new issues such that it resembles a constipated owl: absolutely nothing is moving. Bond managers should applaud. It is they, after all, who have resembled passive owls for years if not decades. If, as I pointed out in my opening paragraph, wealth has always wound up in the hands of those that take risk with other people’s money, then private equity and hedge fund managers have led the charge in recent years. Of course they have been aided and abetted by those monsoon forces of globalization and innovation, producing worldwide growth that led to escalating profits and equity prices, often at the expense of labor. But the Blackstones, the KKRs, and the hedge funds of recent years also climbed to the top of the pile on the willing backs of fixed income lenders too meek and too passive to ask for a part of the action. Covenant-lite deals and low yields were accepted by money managers as if they were prisoners in an isolation ward looking forward to their daily gruel passed unemotionally three times a day through the cellblock window. "Here, take this" their investment banker jailers seemed to say, "and be glad that you’ve got at least something to eat!" Well the caloric content of the gruel in recent years has been barely life supporting and unhealthy to boot – sprinkled with calls and PIKS and options that allowed borrowers to lever and transfer assets at will. As for the calories, high yield spreads dropped to the point of Treasuries + 250 basis points or LIBOR + 200. Readers can sense the severity of the diet relative to risk by simply researching historical annual high yield default rates (5%), multiplying that by loss of principal in bankruptcy (60%), and coming up with an expected loss of 3% over the life of future loans. At LIBOR + 250 in other words, high yield lenders were giving away money! Over the past few weeks much of that has changed. The mistrust of rating service ratings, the constipation of the new issue market and the liquidity to hedge the obvious in CDX markets has led to current high yield CDX spreads of 400 basis points or more and bank loan spreads of nearly 300. The market in the U.S. seems to be looking towards this week’s large and significant placing/pricing of the Chrysler Finance and Chrysler auto deals to determine what the new level for debt should be. In the U.K., a similarly large deal for BOOTS promises to be the bell cow for European buyers. But the tide appears to be going out for levered equity financiers and in for the passive owl money managers of the debt market. And because it has been a Nova Scotia tide, rising in increments of ten in a matter of hours, it promises to have severe ramifications for those caught in its wake. No longer will double-digit LBO returns be supported by cheap financing and shameless covenants. No longer therefore will stocks be supported so effortlessly by the double-barreled impact of LBOs and company buybacks. The U.S. economy in turn will not benefit from this tidal shift and increasing cost of financing. The Fed tightens credit by raising short-term rates but rarely, if ever, have they raised yields by 150 basis points in a month and a half’s time as has occurred in the high yield market. Those that assert that this is merely an isolated subprime crisis should observe very closely the price and terms that lenders are willing to accept with Chrysler finance this week. That more than anything else may wake them, shake them, and tell them that their world has suddenly changed. High yield lenders, perhaps if only in their frozen, frightened passivity, are signifying that the wealth must be redistributed, that the onerous oppressive tax in the form of low yields must change, and that finally enough is enough! William H. Gross |
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Past performance is no guarantee of future results. This article contains the current opinions of the author but not necessarily those of Pacific Investment Management Company LLC. Such opinions are subject to change without notice. This article has been distributed for educational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein are based upon proprietary research and should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. Each sector of the bond market entails risk. The guarantee on Treasuries and Government Bonds is to the timely repayment of principal and interest, shares of a portfolio that invest in them are not guaranteed. With corporate bonds there is no assurance that issuers will meet their obligations. An investment in high-yield securities generally involves greater risk to principal than an investment in higher-rated bonds. Investing in non-U.S. securities may entail risk as a result of non-U.S. economic and political developments, which may be enhanced when investing in emerging markets. Collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs") including collateralized loan obligations (“CLOs”) can involve a high degree of risk and are intended for sale only to qualified investors capable of understanding the risks entailed in purchasing such securities. The value of some asset-backed securities (“ABS”) may be particularly sensitive to changes in prevailing interest rates. The value of such securities may fluctuate in response to the market's perception of the creditworthiness of the issuers. Additionally, there is no assurance that private guarantors or insurers will meet their obligations. No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Pacific Investment Management Company LLC. ©2007, PIMCO. |
Marek Fuchs
You can always learn from history, and for the business media, finding a parallel in history is easy-peasy: Just go back to the last time something even remotely similar to what you are going through now happened and peck out a quick 700 words.
The complex threads of history? The nuanced differences between separate series of unfortunate events? The possibility that history might repeat itself, but not that tidily and frequently? What are you, a wuss?
Damn the torpedoes of truth -- full steam ahead. Business journalists, like military generals, are always fighting the last battle. This time it means an almost comically misguided focus on 1998, because what is happening in the stock market and economy today is exactly like what happened in 1998, or so they say.
Oh my aching head, have they been saying it. But I've popped Advil like Skittles, so I'm in proper condition to tell you: They are wrong. If anything, today is the flip side of 1998.
I'll start with Reuters but then make my way over to the Financial Times, which seemed to have turned itself into a 1998-theme party newspaper. (Don't forget to take your Monica rubber mask out of the closet.)
But first Reuters, which keeps both feet planted firmly in the air in an article about where things stand. Check out this headline: "Fears abate but still linger post-Fed." Got that? Fears have abated. But they still linger. (The headline has since been changed to "Fears tempered but not doused by Fed.")
The article comes accompanied with a photograph of the Federal Reserve building in Washington, with storm clouds looming behind it, but the first words of the article are about how everyone breathed a sigh of relief, thanks to the Fed. The entire article is tied in a nasty knot because when you force an historic parallel -- as they are to 1998 -- you tend to trail more questions than answers.
And speaking of questions, my only one after reading this morning's Financial Times is: Were free hamburgers being given out to reporters who mentioned 1998?
Do an archive search of the paper's Web site for "1998" and your computer will go into overdrive and begin to smoke. There are five mentions of the year today, after more in the past several days.
"Analysts look at history to predict response," headlines one article, which gets right to the emerging business media party line in its lead: "To work out what the Federal Reserve will do next to contain the crisis in the financial markets, many forecasters are studying the central bank's response to a similar shock in 1998."
Similar? Ugh. Wait, they are hardly done:
"While no two financial crisis are alike, many parallels with that episode are likely to influence Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman." Umm, last week we were hearing all about how Bernanke studied the Great Depression, so his reaction would be determined by his old class notes, which must be dustier than my Monica mask.
Nah, forget the '30s. The Financial Times is not done with 1998, by any measure. Another article today tells us: "In many cases, the data suggests that the markets are in the grip of a liquidity crunch and pull-back in risk appetite comparable to that of 1998."
Meanwhile, in a separate but equally obsessed-with-1998 article, we are hearing an anecdote about a fund manager who went to visit a client in 1998 to talk about a holding that had gone bankrupt. This tale of 1998 ended happily: "They ended up holding on to the position and making the money back. Today, he is one of the bank's top clients." Awwww ...
Still elsewhere in the Financial Times, we are reading about how the yen enjoyed its sharpest rise last week since 1998 ... and just in case you think the Financial Times and Reuters are alone in living in one particular flash of the past, The Wall Street Journal leads on A1 today with a story, Lessons of Past May Offer Clues to Market's Fate, in which they start by positing that (you guessed it) 1998 (and, for good measure, 1987) "bear striking similarities to the present."
Look: in his next book review, The Business Press Maven is going to deal with The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market's Perfect Storm.
As a point of comparison, this thesis, in a book to be released at the end of the month, which is already being spoken about widely is at least interesting. And going back this far in history takes some talent and thought. But 1998?
Puh-lease. The lazy man's method of historical analysis -- assuming that history repeats in such tight circles -- is bound to mislead. You can see it in forced headlines about how fears have abated but lingered, or anecdotes with simple happy endings.
Kudos, then, to the FT's Gillian Tett, who manages to earn her newsroom cafeteria hamburger by mentioning 1998 without offering investors a false parallel. The headline: "The credit compass offers no direction" represents a copout but I'll give out props for this welcome morsel of dissent:
"But do not be fooled into thinking that this summer's turmoil is a direct replay of the events of August 1998 -- or, at least not in the sense that it can be blamed on the dénouement of just one big victim (as with Long Term Capital Management in 1998)."
There you have it, sort of. The credit crisis of 1998, which only rose to the level of crisis in headlines and never did in substance, essentially involved one high-profile hedge fund run into a ditch by some hustling academics who were acting like they knew it all. Despite the hand-wringing, the failure of LTCM was not a big deal. Hedge funds were less of a thing then and this was only one, with some specific problems. What was a larger problem then was global liquidity, in places like China.
In fact, what we have now is closer to an exact opposite of 1998 than 1998. Hedge funds are a larger force in society and they -- like other financial institutions -- are tethered to the same problem: subprime exposure. But the international economic scene, rather than a sand trap, is a comparative oasis, something that can help pull American business through, whether through liquidity or the purchasing of goods, which has been helping the bottom line of so many companies.
Look -- these are confusing times. And trust The Business Press Maven: in confusing times, you might not immediately have the answer. But you are guaranteed to be misled by pat historical parallels.
Do not party like it's 1998.
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End of the World or Muddle Through? This week I try to explain in simple terms the very complicated story of how we went from some bad mortgage loan practices in the US to the point of world credit markets freezing up. There is a connection between the retirement plans of Mr. and Mrs. Watanabe in Japan and the subprime problems of Mr. and Mrs. Smith in California. We find the relationship between European banks and problematic hedge funds. And finally, we try and see how we get out of this mess. Oddly, I think it is hedge funds (and maybe Warren Buffett) to the rescue, but not in the way you would think. It is a lot to cover, so let's jump right in. (And there are a lot of charts, so while this will print out long, it is only a little longer than the usual in word length.) To say the credit markets are frozen is an understatement. Talking to any number of people who have been in the markets for decades, this is the worst in their memory. Ironically, it is the 100-year anniversary of the Panic of 1907, when one banker (J. P. Morgan) stepped in and provided liquidity to the markets. The central banks of the world are providing liquidity; but as we will see, it is not mere liquidity that is needed. You cannot explain the problems with just one or two items. A perfect storm of this sort takes a number of factors all coming together to work its mischief. Bad mortgage underwriting practices, bad rating agency practices, a destruction of confidence, excessive leverage and then the withdrawal of that leverage, the need for yield, greed, and complacency which then in a Minsky moment (explained below) becomes paralyzing fear - all play their part. An Alphabet Soup of Credit But let's start at the beginning. In the early '90s, investment banks created a new type of security called an Asset Backed Security (ABS). And it was a very good thing. Essentially, investment banks would take a thousand mortgages or car loans or commercial mortgages or bank loans and put them into a security. You could have a Residential Mortgage Backed Security (RMBS) or Commercial Mortgage Backed Security (CMBS) or a Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO) and then a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO). I am going to grossly oversimplify the following description, but the principle is correct. Let's take a look at how a Commercial Mortgage Backed Security is created. If you are a bank or institution, when you make a loan on a mall or office building, you incur a certain amount of risk. If you hold 100 such loans, you can almost be certain that some of those loans are going to be bad. Further, you are limited in the amount of loans you can make by the capital you have in your company. But what if you could package up those loans and sell them? You get your cash back, and then you can keep the servicing fees and make more loans. But who would want to take the risk of your loans? Through a form of financial alchemy, you can take your loans and increase the quality of them to potential investors. Let's say you have $100 million in commercial mortgage loans. You take this pool and divide it up into 5-7 (or maybe more!) groups called tranches. The first group gets the first (as an example) 60% of the principal which gets repaid. That means that 80% of the loans would have to default and lose 50% (80% of the loans times 50% loss is 40% total portfolio losses) of their value before your money would be at risk. If the bank originating the loan is not completely asleep at the wheel, your risk of an actual loss is quite small. So, an investment bank goes to a rating agency (Moody's, Standard and Poor's, or Fitch) and pays them a fee to rate that tranche in terms of risk. Since the level of risk is small, that first tranche gets an AAA rating. Then the agency goes to the next group. Maybe it is 10% of the pool. It would get all the principal repayments after the first group. In this case, 60% of the loans would have to default and lose 50% of their value before your group lost money. The ratings agency might give this group an AA rating. This process goes on until you get to the lowest-rated tranches. There is typically an "equity" tranche which is about 2-4%. That tranche is the last group to get its money repaid. In our example, if 8% of the loans went bad and lost 50% (8% times 50% is 4%) of their value, the equity tranche would lose all their money. Let's assume the average interest rate on the loans was 10%. Because of the lower risk, the investment bank putting the CMBS together might decide to pay the AAA-rated tranche only 7%. Each successive tranche would get a higher rate, as they were taking more risk. The equity tranche is priced to pay in the mid-teens (or more) if all the loans are paid off. Now, insurance companies, pension funds, and other institutions can buy this security that pays an interest rate higher than they could get from a similar government bond. This difference is called the spread. And in the beginning, spreads were high, as not everyone was comfortable with these new-fangled investments. To see what I am talking about, you can look at the chart below, taken from the open education source at MIT. You can see the whole chapter here. Let's also notice something. In order to get someone to buy the lower tranches you have to pay them more. So, the more of the loans you can get the ratings agency to classify as AAA, the more interest you can pay to the buyers of the lower tranches to entice them to buy. This is going to become an important point. (I should note that it also means you can charge higher fees for putting the deal together and selling it to your clients.) Now, this financial engineering is a very good thing. It is one of the reasons for the worldwide economic boom, as it allows capital to invest in all sorts of loans that would normally be considered too risky. And for the vast majority of all these various alphabet securities, the ratings are going to be just about right. AAA CMBS or CLO paper is where it should be. Even AAA-rated prime mortgage paper, which is now selling for a discount, will (in my opinion) turn out to be just fine. Investment banks put together all types of asset-backed paper. Car loans, mortgages, business loans, credit card debt, etc. are all fair game. And you can mix and match risk if you like. The combinations are endless. So it can be quite a complex task to analyze what you are buying. And to a very great extent, that analysis was delegated to the rating agencies. For all practical purposes, institutional buyers would look at the general classification of the security and then at the rating. It was on the screen, so they hit the bid. If you can't trust your friendly neighborhood rating agency, then who can you trust? And most of these securities had ratings from at least two if not three agencies. But (and you know there is a but) there is a problem with subprime-rated paper. In the beginning, subprime loans were made the old-fashioned way. You had to have 80% loan to value and show you had a job and could actually pay back the money. And these loans were packaged up into a subprime Residential Mortgage Backed Security. Eventually, 80% of those loans would get an AAA rating. Now, this means that 40% of those subprime loans would have to go bad and the value of those homes drop 50% before the holders of that tranche of debt lost money. Even with today's loose lending practices, that is unlikely. I think any rating agency is going to be able to justify that initial AAA rating. But then in 2004 loan practices began to change and had got completely out of hand by 2006. In 2005-6, about 80% of subprime mortgages were adjustable-rate mortgages, or ARMs, also called "exploding ARMs." These loans are so-named because they carry low teaser rates that often reset dramatically higher, increasing the borrower's monthly mortgage payments by 25% or more. Let's look back at what I wrote in March in this space. "Let's say I want to buy a $200,000 home. I can qualify for an option Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) with a starter rate of 2%. I can pay interest only for the first year, and then the rate goes to 5%. So, I have an interest payment of $4,000 a year, or $333 a month. But starting the second month, the interest is actually at 5%, so the real interest amount is almost $10,000, and the amount on my mortgage grows by roughly $6,000 the first year. I now owe $206,000 on the home. If I put down just 5% as a down payment, I now owe more than I paid for the house, if you take out 6% realtor fees when I sell! But as the interest rate resets in the second or third year, it can go up to 8%. I am now paying $16,500 in interest, and my monthly payment for just the interest is $1,375. "According to reports from loan counseling agencies across the nation, the main reason homeowners give for falling behind on their mortgage payments is not a change in personal circumstances (such as a job loss), but instead, they are not able to make the increased payments on their ARMs. "The loan application and review process for 'no-doc' loans was so lax that such loans are referred to as 'liar loans.' In a recent report by Mortgage Asset Research Institute, of the 100 loans surveyed for which borrowers merely stated their incomes on loan documents, IRS documents obtained indicated that 60% (!) of these borrowers overstated their incomes by more than half. "The newer mortgage products, such as 'piggyback,' 'liar loans' and 'no doc loans' accounted for 47% of total loans issued last year. At the start of the decade, they were estimated to be less than two percent of total mortgage loans. As a result, homeowners have never been more leveraged: the average amount of debt as a percentage of a property's value has increased to 86.5 percent in 2006 from 78 percent in 2000." Ok, let's run the math. Almost 50% of the loans made last year were made with little or no documentation check, and 60% of those people overstated their incomes by more than half!!! That means 30% of the loans made were to people who were stretching to buy a home and whose actual income would not qualify them for a home anywhere close to what they bought. The following chart from RBS Greenwich shows the amount of mortgages hitting the reset button in the next two years. Research by RBS Greenwich (assuming I read it right) suggests that 20-23% of the subprime loans made in 2006 will go into default and foreclosure. I talked with one head of a mortgage brokerage business in California this week (he has over 800 brokers who work for him) and he thinks that home values in certain areas he services could drop by as much as 50%. Others in my area (Texas) think these defaulting home values will drop by as much as 20%. No one can be sure, as the supply of homes for sale is already very high and likely to get worse. But let's look at what that can mean for a buyer of a lower-rated tranche of a 2005-6 vintage in a subprime RMBS. If 20% of the loans default and lose 30% of their value, the loan portfolio would be out a total of 6%. If defaults were higher, the losses could be more. 8% would not be a stretch. The problem is that the lower-rated tranches comprise as much as 8% of the total pool. And that may be optimistic. The study done by RBS Greenwich reads: "Our cumulative default projection would translate to a cumulative loss of 10%-11.5%." As I showed last week, there are already some 2006-vintage subprime RMBS's that have over 50% of their loans at 60 days past due, with over 25% already in foreclosure or having been repossessed. That is in less than a year, and the interest-rate mortgage resets have not even really kicked in! (To see those charts, you can go here.) Turning Nuclear Waste Into Gold (and Back Again!) But that's not really where the problem is. Let's go to a great chart from good friend Gary Shilling (www.agaryshilling.com). In an effort to make it easier to sell the lower-rated tranches, the investment banks put together a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) composed of just the BBB-rated paper. And then got the rating agencies to give 75% of that paper an AAA rating! So we have turned 75% of BBB waste into gold with the alchemy of ratings. That means that if those RMBS lose just 5% of their value, everything but the AAA portion of the CDO is wiped out. Any losses beyond that start eating into the value of what a rating agency said was AAA! If the Greenwich projections are right (and these are very serious analysts), then all 2006-vintage CDO's will lose their AAA rating when the rating agencies look at them again. The new rating becomes "toast." Who owns this stuff? According to Inside MBS, foreign investors own as much as 16% of the total mortgage securities. Mutual funds have about 16%. Oddly, for all the publicity, hedge funds probably have less than 5%. But they were leveraged, so the losses are magnified. Mrs. Watanabe and the Hedge Fund Connection If you live in Japan and are retired, investing in bonds is not all that exciting at rates that are barely 1%. But you can exchange your yen into all sorts of currencies that have investments that pay much higher rates. And of course, that makes the yen go lower, which increases your yield. You notice your neighbor is making very nice returns, and you open a retail currency account and start trading. 25% of Japanese currency trading is from small retail accounts. If you are a hedge fund, you borrow massive amounts of Japanese yen at 1% and invest in higher-yielding investments and make the spread. Life is good. The trade goes on and on. Hyman Minsky famously said that stability breeds instability. The longer things are stable, the more likely investors are to become complacent and risk premiums drop. Because of the lower yields, investors tend to over-leverage to try and keep up their returns. The markets are then likely to have a "Minsky Moment" of instability, and then risk premiums rise and all sorts of assets are repriced. And that is exactly what has happened. The markets are de-leveraging. The yen carry trade is going away, and hedge funds and Mrs. Watanabe are driving the yen back up in as violent a move as I can ever recall. Look at the chart below of the euro-yen cross. Notice the steady move up in recent months of the euro against the yen, and then a 12% correction in just two weeks! Ouch. Whether it was the Canadian or Aussie dollar, you were down big. And that is forcing a lot of funds to sell anything they can in order to meet margin calls. And since they can't sell their CDOs, they sell stocks, commodities, and anything that is high-quality. That means that assets that do not normally correlate with each now all move together. And the movement is down. Groundhog Day For Hedge Funds One of my all-time favorite movies is Groundhog Day, featuring Bill Murray, where the main character keeps living the same day over and over. One hedge fund manager I know in the credit sector says this whole credit cycle has been like Groundhog Day for certain types of hedge funds. In February some of the lenders began to notice that the credit quality of some of the CDOs they were lending on might not be as good as that rating they had. So they went to the hedge funds and banks and said, "We are not going to offer you as much leverage as before and are going to make you take an extra 5% haircut on those bonds." So the funds sold collateral to make the margin calls. And guess what? They had to take less than face value. And that lowered the value of those bonds on everyone's books. Which means the banks went to anyone holding those bonds and demanded more margin money and gave less credit, which created more selling and fewer buyers. The cost of hedging became expensive. It started a vicious cycle. In May, the Bear Stearns fund blew up, and the rout began in full earnest. The chart below is from www.markit.com. You can look at any of the scores of indices they track, and see that the problems began in February. The above chart is of a BBB RMBS CDO (enough alphabet soup for you?) issued early this year! It is now down to $.33 on the dollar, and it may well go lower. Pools of senior bank loans are selling by as much as a 10% discount. All manner of debt is selling at significant discounts to what it was just 7 months ago. The problem is, quite bluntly, that no one knows what the values of some of the mortgage-backed securities are. And if you don't know, you don't buy. And today, even very well-designed CDOs with no subprime exposure are selling at discounts, if they are selling at all. Senior bank loans are selling at an apparent discount to subordinated debt (which is not selling, so no one knows the value, so the "price" is the last trade). And what about the banks that bought those CDOs? What exposure do they have? Are they in a fund or part of the bank capital? Do you want to lend them money on the overnight markets, for a few basis points more than government securities? The commercial paper market for many banks has simply evaporated. These banks depend on this market for their financing. Last week, the Germans had to completely rescue an older, venerable bank which had a great deal of commercial paper and some off-balance-sheet funds which essentially made the bank's balance sheet negative. If you can't trust a German bank, who can you trust? This has consequences. As of today, the largest mortgage lender in the US, Countrywide, is now only doing "agency" loans (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Even the best of firms, like Thornburg, are having problems. If you want a nonconforming loan this week to buy a home, either subprime or over $417,000, you may have a very hard time. The Rating Agency Blame Game The ratings agencies have put 101 different CDOs on "watch," which is market speak for "we are probably going to change our rating." But that's a little too late. In 2006, nearly $850 million or 44% (up from 37% in 2002) of Moody's Investors Service total revenue came from the rarefied business known as structured finance. In 1995, its revenue from such transactions was a paltry $50 million. Moody's took in around $3 billion from 2002 through 2006 for rating securities built from loans and other debt pools. The same pattern holds for Standard and Poor's and Fitch. In short, the ratings agencies were making huge amounts of money from the investment banks for rating these structured products. And let's make no mistake about it, they were selling their name and credibility. Everyone knew what a AAA rating meant when it came to a corporation or a country. And even though there were disclaimers in the 500-page documents accompanying the CDO sales material, the investment banks were clearly pointing to the ratings as they sold that paper. The entire process hinged on the credibility of the rating agencies. Somehow, no one seemed to think that the default rates from "no-documentation" and "liar" loans would possibly be different. I am sure you can find a paragraph in the offering documents which will make that contention, at least obliquely. Lawyers are good at that stuff. But that is entirely beside the point. Credit markets function because there is the belief that if you lend money you will get it back. Ratings are the grease for those markets. Now they have become sand in the gears. If you are a bond buyer on an institutional desk, do you want to risk a career-ending move and buy a bond that you are not ABSOLUTELY sure it is what you think it is? Do you want to buy 3-month commercial paper for a few points of spread from a bank or corporation about which you are not 100% sure? Just how solvent is that bank? So, you wait and go to US government bonds in the meantime. If you are in Europe, you worry about your money market fund. In the US, you think about your CD at Countrywide if it is over $100,000. Everyone gets nervous, and central banks everywhere have to step in and offer massive amounts of liquidity, as they should. Where Do We Go From Here? This is not the end of the world. I actually think things should sort themselves out by October or so, given no new major surprises. But how do we get back to normal markets? It might be helpful to look at how we got out of the savings and loan crisis in the late '80s. As everyone now knows, Congress changed the rules and allowed local savings and loan thrifts to finance all types of debt. They jumped in with both feet. Many were very bad at assessing risk and went bankrupt. The government had to step in and bail out the depositors. The assets of the collapsed savings and loans went into the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). I had friends who made a great deal of money in that market. They would walk into the RTC offices. There would be two-foot stacks of manila folders, each folder representing a loan. You could go through the files and then make a bid for the whole stack. Quite often, in the file there would be checks from good borrowers who kept sending in their check for the car or boat. Since the S&L was gone, there was no one to cash them. People were paying $.15 cents on the dollar for good loans, and working out the rest. Now, some of the loans were indeed 100% write-offs. But a lot were not. But there were so many that the RTC simply took high bid and went on to the next pile. I also had a friend (whom I have lost touch with) that bought half a dozen older apartment complexes that needed work. He got them for very little cash, put his own work into fixing them up, got them certified as lower-income housing and then got government-guaranteed rent. He was able to retire in a few years. The same process needs to happen in the credit markets. First, we need someone to step in and actually make a market for the downgraded credits. Who is that going to be? Mutual funds? Investment banks? The Fed? No, no, and no. The answer is that it will largely be distressed-debt hedge funds, both those that exist today and the scores that are being formed as I write. There are bonds and loans, various CDO securities, CLO funds, etc. that are seriously mispriced because of the lack of liquidity and transparency. When you can buy a loan today for $.94 that has a 99.9% chance of being good, you simply take the interest and get the extra return for allowing the loan to go back to par. Even modest leverage produces very nice returns. Savvy distressed-debt managers will go in, look at the paper, and buy it. This time, instead of manila folders it will be electronic files. But with a lot of work, someone will be able to assess the value. Of course, the bad paper needs to be written down and off the books. There will be little appetite for a lot of the riskier paper. Also, the structure of many CLOs will help. Most CLOs are formed and have a finite life. But for the first 5-7 years, they take the principal repayments and reinvest those dollars in other loans. CLOs that are getting cash today are finding good values. Warren Buffett Needs to Take Over Moody's Second, the rating agencies need to restore their credibility. Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway owns about 19% of Moody's. I would suggest that Mr. Buffett step in take over the company (much as he did with Salomon years ago) and put his not inconsiderable credibility on the line for all future ratings and the inevitable re-ratings that are going to be done. The Panic of 1907 was solved by the credibility of one man, J. P. Morgan, who stepped in to provide liquidity. The Panic of 2007 is not a problem caused by lack of liquidity. It is a problem caused by lack of credibility. Morgan could (and did) provide liquidity. Buffett can (and should) provide credibility. And someone of similar stature needs to step in at S&P and Fitch. (Can Volker be summoned into the trenches yet one more time?) This is not about whether some person or group at the ratings agencies necessarily did anything wrong, although more than a few lawyers will suggest just that. This is about restoring credibility to the ratings and markets as soon as possible. Without someone new at the head, future ratings are likely to be viewed with the skeptical (and correct) question, "Is this from the same group of people who rated that bond that I bought just a few months ago that is down 50%? Why are they right now? Where is the adult supervision? Who has made sure the process is now working?" The SEC has announced that they will allow mortgage lenders to work out resetting mortgages with borrowers in cases where there is an obvious default about to happen. In many cases, that will mean extending the lower coupon rate another year. That may just put off the problem, but it will keep a home off the market and allow for a more orderly solution. Will a Fed Rate Cut Make a Difference? A rate cut will not make a difference as to the credibility of the ratings, nor will it transform bad debts into good ones. But my view has been for a year that the economy is heading for a recession due to the housing market problems. Given the turmoil in the markets, a rate cut may be in the offing later this year. And given that lower rates will make mortgages cost less, that will help. The significance of today's cut of the discount rate, and the willingness to look at up to 30 days of loans and high-quality asset-backed paper, is not the actual cut but more the boost to confidence. It is the Fed saying to the market, "Daddy's home. Everything is going to be all right." Beyond that, let's look at what Nouriel Roubini says today in his blog about the Fed move to cut the discount rate: "More important than the symbolic 50 basis point cut in the discount rate was the move in today's FOMC statement from the semi-neutral bias of the last few months ('semi' as inflation was still their predominant concern until recently) to a clear easing bias today. Essentially today the Fed telegraphed a certain Fed Funds rate cut at the September meeting and possibly more cuts in the months ahead. "The statement was very clear in signaling an easing bias and a policy cut ahead: 'Financial market conditions have deteriorated, and tighter credit conditions and increased uncertainty have the potential to restrain economic growth forward. The statement also pointed that 'the downside risks to growth have increased appreciably.' And it clearly signaled that the FOMC is 'prepared to act as needed to mitigate the adverse effects on the economy arising from the disruptions in financial markets.' "The stress on the downside risks to growth and the failure of the statement to even mention the 'I' word (Inflation) suggests that, in about a week since the previous FOMC meeting, concerns about inflations as the predominant risk have faded and concerns about growth have sharply increased. For a Fed that until recently was in the soft landing camp (slowdown of growth but still moderate pace of growth) today's statement is a signal that they are starting to worry about a hard landing of the economy. "For the first time in over a year the Fed is now implicitly admitting that they underestimated the downside growth risk: until now the official Fed view was that the housing recession was contained and bottoming out and not spilling over to other sectors of the economy; and that the sub-prime problems were also a niche and contained problem. The sudden shift to a strong easing bias suggests that the Fed miscalculated until now the damage to the economy and to financial markets of the housing recession and its real and financial spillovers." While I am not so sure that the Fed will cut in September, they have signaled that they are aware of the problems, as noted above. As an answer to my opening question, I think we are in for a return of the Muddle Through Economy rather than the End of the World. Credit markets will get back to normal, as there is a lot of money that needs to find a home. It is just looking for a credible home and one that will feature higher risk premiums and spreads. Vacation, Europe and Reading I am off to Europe (London, Denmark, Poland, and the Czech Republic). Other than a speech and a few meetings, I actually intend to take a vacation and do some sight-seeing. In my absence, though, Thoughts from the Frontline will still be coming your way. Next week, it will be written by Barry Ritholtz and the following week by Rob Arnott, so you are in better hands than mine. And Michael Hewitt is going to do the Outside the Box on September 4, about how the credit markets are doing. And thanks to the hundreds of readers who sent in suggestions as to what books to read on my vacation. I made a new folder to save them, as many of you suggested books that I have always intended to read but not gotten around to. Tonight I have to hurry home, as I have dinner with friends and then off to The House of Blues. I see margaritas and tacos in my near future, and some much-needed rest in the next few weeks. All the best, and remember that the world is not in all that bad a shape. We just have to work through a few kinks, and Muddle Through is still moving forward. Your enjoying the ride analyst, ![]() John Mauldin John@frontlinethoughts.com Copyright 2007 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved |