“Certificates of Confiscation.”
Three decades ago, that was what some people said bonds really were. The
interest the bond paid would not be enough, they said, to offset the
declining value of dollars as inflation added up. The “real” —
after-inflation — bond yield would be negative.
That was just as the great bull market in bonds began. Bonds were great
investments, and the bond bears turned out to have been dead wrong.
Now we have come full circle. The government is selling bonds that are
absolutely, positively guaranteed to not pay enough to offset inflation
over the coming years. It is even possible that someone who bought a new
Treasury security that will be issued on Monday will end up getting
fewer dollars back than he or she invested — interest and principal
combined — between now and when the bond matures in 2017.
The securities are inflation-protected Treasury notes.
If inflation ticks up significantly over the coming years, investors
will get back more dollars than originally invested. But not enough to
come close to keeping up with inflation. If there is no inflation, they
will get back less than they invested.
When those securities were auctioned last week, buyers agreed to accept a real yield of negative 1.496 percent.
It takes a lot of pessimism — about the economy and the future of the
United States — to think an investment certain to lose money is an
investment worth making.
The great bear market in bonds, both corporates and governments, lasted
35 years, from 1946 to 1981. The bull market lasted about 30 years. A
new bear market almost certainly has begun.
If that is true, those seeking a little income now by going out the
yield curve will come to rue the decision. They will get the promised
interest, but as market interest rates rise, the price of those bonds
will decline and decline and decline.
On Oct. 26, 1981, which can be dated as the bottom of the great bond
bear market, the yield on 30-year Treasury bonds rose to 15.21 percent.
On that date, a Treasury bond issued in 1970 and scheduled to mature in
2000 was quoted at less than 56 percent of face value. It had a coupon
of 7.875 percent, but that was not deemed enough to compensate investors
for the risk.
At market extremes, it is often worth analyzing what has to be true for a
given investment to be a good, or bad, value. Back in 1981, you had to
assume that inflation would not only remain in double digits for
decades, but that it would also continue to rise, for a newly issued
Treasury bond to turn out to be a bad investment. Yet many investors
assumed it would be. After all, a lot of people on Wall Street in 1981
could not remember a time when bonds were good investments.
A few weeks before rates peaked, Seth Glickenhaus, an experienced bond
trader and head of Glickenhaus & Company, an investment advisory
firm, spoke the conventional wisdom when he said, “Anyone who buys a bond today to hold for more than five years is out of his mind.”
Michael Gavin, the head of United States asset allocation for Barclays,
pointed out this month that over the past 30 years an investor who
stayed invested in American, or British, 10-year government bonds would
have earned more than 5 percent a year over inflation.
“It does not require advanced market math to understand that returns
like these are no longer remotely plausible,” he wrote. “But they say
that fish don’t know that they live in water — until they are removed
from it — and we wonder if some of the many market participants whose
entire professional experience has been conditioned by the financial
backdrop created by the bond market rally might underestimate some
consequences of its termination.”
Even if rates stay where they are for the next five years, and investors
collect the interest coupons, he said, “bonds will be transformed from
wealth creators into wealth destroyers.”
Or at least they will be unless there is severe deflation. For that is the only situation that will allow today’s new long-term bonds to turn into good investments.
Is that possible? To think it is likely, you pretty much have to assume
that economic growth is a thing of the past in both the United States
and Europe. It is not an optimistic outlook.
James Grant, the editor of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer — and a bear
on bonds for some time — argues there are parallels between 1981 and
now, at least in conventional wisdom. “Central banks are harmless, said
the bond bears in 1981; in a social democracy, inflation is
ineradicable,” he writes in the current issue of his publication.
“Central bankers are harmless, charge the bond bulls of 2012; in an
overleveraged economy, inflation is unachievable.”
One reason bond yields are so low now — at least in markets like Britain
and the United States — is the fact that after the Greek fiasco
investors have come to fear default more than currency depreciation.
That had led to a rush to default-proof bonds, which means bonds issued
by countries that can print the currency they borrowed. (It may be that
Treasuries will not always be default-proof because a Tea
Party-influenced Congress will refuse to allow the government to pay its
bills. But so far markets assume the politicians will not be that
stupid.)
It is interesting to look at the relationship of stocks and bonds when
the bond market is near extremes in valuation. Those moments tend to
come when economic uncertainty is high and fears are widespread. In the
past, such fears have proved to be wrong.
In 1946, there was a consensus among many economists that a new
depression was likely. After all, the 1930s depression did not end until
armies put unemployed people to work. Now that the war was over and
armies were shrinking, would not the economy retreat again?
Bond prices turned down — and yields up — in the spring of 1946. Stocks
sold off that fall, and it was not until 1950 that the stock market got
back to where it was when the bond bear market began.
Then stocks enjoyed a phenomenal period. One reason interest rates were
rising was that economic growth presented good investment opportunities.
The stock market was a very good place to put money throughout the
1950s and into the mid-1960s, occasional recessions and bear markets
notwithstanding.
During the last 10 or 15 years of the bond bear market, however, the
stock market gyrated but went nowhere. In 1981, as the bond bear market
was ending, the Dow Jones industrial average was lower than it had been
15 years earlier. The economy was in recession and optimism was hard to
find. There was a consensus that the United States had lost its
competitive edge and could not compete with Japan. Share prices did not
hit bottom until the summer of 1982.
But in 1982 the golden age of American stock and bond markets began. For
nearly two decades, both were usually good places to invest, and the
United States economy did well. But the technology stock bubble’s
bursting in 2000 signaled an end to an era in the stock market. A share
of Fidelity Magellan — one of the most successful mutual funds of the 1980s and 1990s — is now worth less than a share was worth 13 years ago.
As 2012 ends, pessimism is high. Some economists talk of a prolonged
period without economic growth in the industrialized world, as the
United States and Europe fail to compete with China and India. Investors
find a bond guaranteed to lose value — but not to lose all value — to
be worth buying.
It is no wonder that major corporations now are issuing long-term bonds
even though they don’t appear to have any need for the money. As
economic growth picks up in coming years, those companies will appear to
have been prescient. The buyers, on the other hand, will seem to have
been as foolish as were those who disdained bonds 30 years ago.
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