Monday, June 13, 2011

Pimco explains how frogs make butter out of government debt


You may remember Bill Gross’ sage advice to “buy cheap bonds” and his amphibious explainer:
All right fellow frogs, so we’re being repressed and shortchanged in order to allow Uncle Sam to balance its books. Whatta we gonna do about it? “Frogs of the world unite,” as Lenin might have said, and so here’s where I harken back to Mark Twain and my second lesser-told frog story. There was this other frog who instead of being tossed into a pot of hot water was left to cool its heels in a pitcher of cold milk. Unable to jump out, he churned and churned those frog legs until eventually the milk turned into butter and the hardened butter allowed him the platform to leap to froggy freedom! Well, let’s get churnin’, fellow frogs.
Well, courtesy of Pimco’s latest statistical release, here’s the recipe:
Spot the difference between the breakdown at the end of May and that at the end of February, when we first learned Pimco had “dumped” its US government debt.
“Government related” debt is now disaggregated as US Treasuries, agency securities and “swaps and liquid rates”. The footnotes to the table have a bit more detail:
Of course, this “long-short-long position” (H/T Paul Kedrosky) using derivatives is Gross’s way to retain his negative position on interest rates — he’s assuming yields will rise when the Fed stops buying US Treasuries. Bloomberg’s Susanne Walker hastaken a look at recent Pimco filings and crunched the numbers:
Gross has been betting against U.S. debt through short sales, in which the Total Return Fund would borrow and then sell government bonds, hoping to profit by repurchasing the securities at a lower price in the future. The fund’s annual report showed that, as of March 31, it had sold short about $2.2 billion of Treasuries that mature in about 10 years and $5.8 billion of agency debt that comes due in 2041.
In addition, the fund also entered into 10- and 30-year interest-rate swaps with a face value of about $15.2 billion during the fourth quarter of 2010 and first quarter of 2011, according to filings. Based on the terms disclosed in Pimco Total Return’s annual report, the 10-year and 30-year swaps held by the fund have lost about $1 billion in market value since March 31, according to Bloomberg calculations.
In order to obtain the contracts, which are the equivalent of betting against Treasuries, the Total Return Fund paid upfront premiums totaling about $331 million to 12 Wall Street banks, the filing shows.
Not that the strategy has worked out quite yet. According to Bloomberg, the TRF beat 98 per cent of competitors the last five years but only 33 percent in May, due to the decline in Treasury yields.
More margarine than butter, for now.

Investment Advice from George Carlin

Don’t confuse causation with correlation.
“Death is caused by swallowing small amounts of saliva over a long period of time.” ~ George Carlin
If you look hard enough for patterns and correlations, for better or worse, you’ll find them.  However a correlation should not be confused with causation. The winner of the Super Bowl, for example, does not cause a movement in stock prices.
Don’t try to outsmart the investor herd.
“Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that.” ~ George Carlin
This wisdom extends upon the immediately preceding point.  While Mr. Carlin would advise not to confuse causation with correlation, his angle is that many people do confuse them.  There are just enough idiots that believe a Super Bowl win from the old National Football League is positive for the stock market and, as a result, they will buy stocks, hence causing a movement in stock prices.  No matter how much fundamental analysis you do, the psychology (and irrationality) of the herd can make all of your diligent and intellectual analysis useless in an instant.
Try not to live in a hypothetical world.
“What if there were no hypothetical questions?” ~ George Carlin
Most headlines in financial media are posed in the form of a question that no prudent person will spend significant time trying to answer.  Is the Bull Market Over?  Is This a Correction or the Beginning of a New Bear Market?  Should You Buy Gold Now?   Just remember that these questions are designed to get you to read the underlying article and that the media does not exist to provide useful information; it exists to sell advertising.  To accomplish this end, media sources must successfully distract you long enough to read their attractive hypotheticals.
Have a healthy perspective—your own.
“Some people see the glass half full. Others see it half empty.
I see a glass that’s twice as big as it needs to be.” ~ George Carlin
Similarly, and to quote legendary trader Jesse Livermore, “There is only one side to the stock market; and it is not the bull side or the bear side, but the right side.”  Stop arguing your philosophical position with others and place investment trades according to your own position—one that is not easily influenced by preconceived notions or biases.
Don’t take things too seriously.
“People who see life as anything more than pure entertainment are missing the point.” ~ George Carlin
It’s easier (and healthier) to laugh at the idiots in Washington, on Wall Street and in the Federal Reserve than to curse them in the comments section of blogs.  However, if cursing them entertains you, then please proceed to do so…
~~~

Friday, June 10, 2011

Third Point Reduces Equity Exposure



Dan Loeb's Third Point Offshore Fund finished May -0.4% and year-to-date is up 9.7%. Managing around $4 billion, the hedge fund is closed to new investors and has seen 18.8% annualized returns.


Equity Exposure

The month of May was a volatile one for the markets in general and hedge funds were no exception. Third Point ratcheted down exposure to equities as they were 42.6% net long at the end of the month (60.3% long and -17.7% short). The month prior, the hedge fund was 46.8% net long equities, marking a 4.2% decrease in exposure from April to May.

Third Point's largest exposure this time around continued to be the consumer sector at 9.5% net long and basic materials at 8.2% net long.

Credit Exposure

In credit, Third Point was 34.4% long, -7.7% short, leaving them 26.7% net long. This is down from 29.4% net long the month prior. Their largest exposure in this segment continues to be asset backed securities.

Top Positions

Third Point's top holdings at the end of May were:

1. Gold
2. Delphi
3. El Paso (EP)
4. Technicolor (Multiple Securities owned)
5. CVR Energy (CVI)

Earlier today we posted up that David Tepper's Appaloosa Management recently bought more CVR Energy. Also, we highlighted how Delphi will be going public and there are numerous hedge funds involved in that name as well.

In the month of May, Third Point's top winners included: Delphi, El Paso, Short A, Short B, and Aveta.

The hedge fund's top losing positions for the month included: NXP Semiconductor (NXPI), NewPage, Williams Companies (WMB), Big Lots (BIG), and gold.

For rationale behind some of their investments, check out Third Point's investor letter.

Monday, June 06, 2011

Bob Rodriguez: The man who sees another crash


He's the mutual fund manager with the best record in the past quarter-century, and he correctly predicted the last two stock market crashes. So why aren't people listening when Bob Rodriguez says another calamity is looming?

By Mina Kimes, writer
FORTUNE -- You have to see it from Bob Rodriguez's perspective. Twice he has spotted an approaching storm. Twice he has warned the world. Twice he has been pooh-poohed and seen investors abandon the two mutual funds he managed. Twice he has taken steps to shield his clients from the coming crisis.
And twice -- first with Internet stocks in the 1990s, and then with the financial crisis of 2008 -- Rodriguez has been right.
As the latter cataclysm unfolded, the man once mocked for missing out on the hottest markets of his lifetime was anointed as a seer. The Wall Street Journal pronounced Rodriguez one of the "doomsayers who got it right." Barron'slabeled him a "prophet." MarketWatch described him as one of the "four horsemen of the market."
Rodriguez, the CEO of $16 billion money management firm First Pacific Advisors, isn't the type to be satisfied with being right (though he's certainly not above that particular pleasure). He's seemingly compelled to share the hard truth. It's as if he has this terrible gift, and with that comes the obligation to tell the world when calamity is on the horizon.
So when he was invited to address more than 1,000 mutual fund managers at a conference held by Morningstar in May 2009 -- just when it looked as if the crisis had finally abated -- Rodriguez gave himself only a brief pat on the back. Then he launched into a tirade, ripping into all of the parties involved in the meltdown. Fund managers, he said, had "stunk." The federal stimulus programs were foolish and shortsighted, and regulators had lost all credibility. Worst of all, he said, was the ballooning U.S. debt, which had prompted him to stop buying long-term bonds from the "irresponsible and fiscally inept government."
He continued in that fiery vein for almost an hour. When he was done, he stared out into an awkward and complete silence. Then it came: a thunderous standing ovation from the very fund managers he had just excoriated.
Rodriguez is an anomaly in the sunny world of mutual funds, where the typical manager is perpetually optimistic and happy to welcome ever more investors. Indeed, he's almost an oxymoron: a buy-and-hold man with the stubborn, hard-boiled pessimism of a short-seller. While most money managers focus on attracting assets, Rodriguez closes his funds to new investors when he doesn't see opportunities -- which is often (including today).
His resistance to investing vogues has paid off richly over the long run: His stock fund, FPA Capital (FPPTX), has returned 15% annually over the past 25 years, beating every single diversified equity fund, according to Lipper. His bond fund, FPA New Income (FPNIX), has never posted an annual loss. "He'd rather lose his clients than position their money in a way that he feels is inappropriate," says Stephanie Pomboy, head of institutional research firm MacroMavens. "It's almost sad that you can count the number of people who are willing to do that on, probably, one finger."
Like most iconoclasts, Rodriguez often feels as though he is screaming into an abyss. But in the spring of 2009, he thought people were finally listening. Sobriety, it seemed, was back. Leverage was out. Frugality was hailed once again as a virtue. It appeared that the world had finally begun to understand risk.
Rodriguez decided he could take the break he'd been dreaming of for years. Then 61, he turned over the reins of his two mutual funds and embarked on a yearlong sabbatical. Rodriguez trekked with his wife in Patagonia, visited the Galápagos Islands, and took the Trans-Siberian Railway. Instead of obsessing about the news, he plowed through a stack of books (a favorite was Mark Twain's Roughing It), drove in 10 auto races on the Le Mans circuit in North America, and lost 20 pounds. The sabbatical was a time for reflection, a chance to think about the crisis that had just occurred and ponder how he could prepare his company for the changing world.
But when Rodriguez returned to FPA this January -- as CEO only -- he realized that, to his horror and disgust, almost nothing has changed. Risk taking is back in fashion, and the nation's debt load, which he believes is the single greatest threat facing investors today, has soared. Now, once again, Rodriguez is sounding the alarm.
His new prophecy: If we don't fix the budget – soon -- the economy faces disaster. "I believe that within two to five years we'll have a crisis of equal or greater magnitude of what we just went through," he says. "And it will emanate from the federal level."
Either a crank or a man of principle
For a doomsayer, Bob Rodriguez is surprisingly affable. When he gets excited, which is often, he breaks into bouts of wheezing laughter, whether he's talking about financial earthquakes or his fondness for plaid shirts (he wears one most days, he says, because the patterns conceal stains). He makes apocalyptic pronouncements even as he is trailed around his home by a trio of rescued pets: a mutt, Wrigley, and two cats, Purrsia and Callie.
You can view Rodriguez as a bit of a crank or a man of principle -- or both. He has long opposed efforts in California to raise taxes on the wealthy. At one moment in 2006, when such debate was particularly intense, he was quoted in a Los Angeles Times article -- the only millionaire willing to attach his name to his comments -- arguing that such initiatives would drive affluent people out of the state. Almost as if to prove his prediction correct, he left L.A. a few days after the article came out and moved to the Nevada side of Lake Tahoe.
Truth be told, Lake Tahoe provides Rodriguez with a more profound benefit: isolation. Living away from his industry confreres, he says, helps him think independently. A similar impulse motivated him to make his home in bohemian Venice, Calif., back when he was starting out in finance. Even when Rodriguez discusses racing -- he owns seven Porsches -- he raves about solitude, not speed. "When you're racing," he says, "the rest of the world can't get to you."
Rodriguez spends three weeks each month working from his lakefront home, in a small office equipped with a Bloomberg terminal connected by T-1 cables. The location is rustic enough -- with shimmering views of the lake and snow-capped mountains -- that when the cables were first installed, he says, they were chewed through by animals. In his living room on a recent day, after his wife, Sue, prepares a breakfast of French toast and bacon, Rodriguez tells his life story. It is a classic American tale: the immigrant's son who made good.
Rodriguez is a genial doomsayer, prone to bursts of laughter even as he makes his apocalyptic pronouncements.
Rodriguez grew up in a working-class neighborhood in Los Angeles. His father, Joseph, was a Mexican immigrant who plated jewelry for a living (the family's otherwise modest house had gold-plated doorknobs). Though neither the mother nor the father, now both deceased, went to college, they taught Rodriguez and his older brother, Dick, about history and ethics. Joseph used to carry a copy of the Constitution in his pocket and would quiz his sons on it.
Joseph refused to teach the boys Spanish. "He was adamant that we be Americans," Rodriguez says. "He did not want my brother or me to grow up with an accent. It was not a good time to be of Mexican or Spanish heritage." Rodriguez's father proudly hung his certificate of U.S. citizenship in a "place of honor" in the family's den.
Rodriguez was an obsessive boy, especially when it came to money. He began collecting coins at age 6. He would memorize which vintages of pennies, nickels, and dimes were most valuable, and then convince gas station managers to trade with him. (He also collected stamps and insisted that his friends use tweezers if they wanted to pick them up.) When Rodriguez received a school assignment to write a letter to an important person at age 10, he chose the chairman of the Federal Reserve. He was even a (very) small-time banker: Rodriguez slowly accumulated savings, then lent money to his high-school-age brother -- at usurious rates -- when Dick needed cash to go on dates.
When Rodriguez was 12, he had a major operation on his teeth that, for two years, left him with a heavy speech impediment. Classmates teased him -- so he gave a speech on the topic of elocution to show that he could make fun of himself. "Most people, when they're different, they become self-conscious," says Dick. "Bob hasn't been one to sacrifice his ethics or his intellect to fit in."
Los Angeles in the 1950s could be a hostile place for an immigrant's son. Rodriguez recalls riding his bike past NO MEXICANS signs. And when the self-described B+ student told his high school guidance counselor that he wanted to go to college, he says, the counselor said he would be a better fit for trade school. "I told him to go to hell," he bristles.
Rodriguez worked his way through college and business school at the University of Southern California. He sold encyclopedias door-to-door and toiled nights as a file clerk at Transamerica, where he met his future wife. ("I let him walk me to my car," she says, "and I thought to myself, 'Is this guy ever going to shut up?'")
After getting his MBA, he struggled to find a job in finance before eventually becoming a stock trader at Transamerica. He then worked himself up to analyst by taking over sectors, such as forest products, that colleagues dropped. Says Rodriguez's FPA colleague, Steven Romick: "There weren't any 'ez' last names at the firms." He adds, "Bob has always had to prove himself, again and again."
Even today, Rodriguez is one of only a handful of Hispanic mutual fund managers in the country. A fervent believer in the power of the individual, Rodriguez downplays the effect of discrimination in his own life. Still, his thinking is revealing: He says he fell in love with investing in the first place (as opposed to architecture, another early interest) because it was a field where success isn't based on subjective opinions. "I said, 'Gee, there's an exam every day. And whether you're good or bad is independent of somebody else,' " he says. "If they say, 'That's a lousy idea,' and it works out, that's not their judgment -- the market has judged."
Rodriguez's formative investing experience occurred during the stock bubble of the early 1970s. Like many at the time, he says, he thought anyone who posted annual returns of less than 25% was an idiot. Then the market crashed in 1974. Rodriguez owned shares of an RV maker called Executive Industries, whose stock plunged from $22 to less than a dollar. Unsure of what to do, he ventured into the USC library, where he discovered a book that would forever change his investing outlook: Graham and Dodd's Security Analysis. "It helped me understand what was going on with the stock," he says. "It was selling at less than 50% of the cash on the balance sheet." His calculation of the company's fundamental value convinced him that Executive Industries' share price was baseless. He held on and eventually rode it back above $22. From then on, he was a committed value investor.
In 1983 Rodriguez joined First Pacific Advisors, then a burgeoning money-management firm with $1.6 billion in assets, and launched FPA Capital, a stock fund, and FPA New Income, a bond fund. His approach has been the same ever since. In his equity fund he maintains a highly concentrated portfolio of about 30 stocks and holds them for many years, buying and selling on dips and bumps. He spends months researching before taking the plunge; when he was thinking about buying more shares of Michaels, the craft-supply chain, in the '90s, he called dozens of store managers to find out whether the company's turnaround strategy was feasible. (It was: He bought shares in 1996 and watched them triple.)
By the mid-'90s, Rodriguez had achieved one of his goals as a fund manager: His stock fund had finished in the top 10 of its category over the previous decade (his bond fund ranked 11th). His other objective? "I said, I have a simple goal," he recalls, laughing. "I just want to be the best goddamn money manager in the country."
Trouble spotter: Two for two
Bob Rodriguez never liked Internet stocks. As the dotcom bubble swelled in the late '90s, it made him nervous to see money-losing companies trading at higher multiples than cash cows. In 1999 he described the phenomenon as "nothing more than speculation masquerading in the costume of investment." Afraid of a coming bust, he began trimming his technology holdings.
That decision cost his fund in the short term. Rodriguez's stock fund underperformed and shareholders bolted. The fund's assets shrank from $800 million to $350 million. He received an anonymous letter, which he can still recite from memory more than a decade later: "It said, 'Rodriguez: You couldn't manage your way out of a paper bag with both ends open. I am gone.' " Observes Don Phillips, president of fund research for Morningstar: "There was growing pressure during the late '90s from people saying, 'Bob Rodriguez has lost it. For heaven's sake, man, you live in California. Can't you understand tech stocks?'"
But when the bubble finally burst, Rodriguez was vindicated: From 2000 through 2002, FPA Capital returned 29% vs. -38% for the S&P 500 (SPX). After the crash Rodriguez was the toast of the investing world, and both of his funds steadily accrued assets over the next few years.
Then, in 2005, he began detecting signs of trouble again. Rodriguez and his co-manager at FPA New Income, Tom Atteberry, noticed unusually high quantities of defaults in supposedly safe mortgage pools. They quickly dumped those investments and began improving the credit quality of the portfolio. By 2006, Rodriguez was haunted with anxiety. He sold every Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bond his fund owned not long after a particularly vivid nightmare: He dreamed he was on trial, with a prosecutor grilling him as to why he had invested in a pair of companies that didn't even have their financial statements audited.
Even as the subprime-mortgage market was starting to crumble in 2007, most stock managers were still fully invested. Rodriguez, by contrast, had shifted 40% of FPA Capital's assets to cash and invested the rest in oil and gas companies with strong balance sheets. "Many experts believe that the housing cycle is at or nearing a trough or at least is at a stable level," he said in a speech that summer. "We are not of this opinion." He concluded: "We are willing to bet our firm and our reputation to be right." Once again investors punished him. In 2007 and 2008, his stock fund was hit with $711 million in net redemptions.
Like virtually every fund, FPA Capital tumbled in 2008. But unlike most, it had huge cash reserves. As prices cratered, Rodriguez was able to double down on his stocks. The result: The stock fund returned a whopping 54% in 2009, outpacing the index by 27 percentage points.
Rodriguez's self-assurance is striking. When he decides something is true he pursues it wholeheartedly, regardless of whether the call will pay off in five months or five years. His bond fund, for example, has been buying only low-duration, high-quality debt for years. Though that benefited the fund in 2008, it caused it to lag the rally in 2009 and 2010.
That has spurred criticism that Rodriguez has sometimes confused what he thinks should happen in the bond market with what is actually happening. "Bob had a lot invested in the idea that things were going to hell in a hand basket," says Morningstar analyst Chris Davis of the 2009-10 period. Davis credits him for being right about housing market excesses, but adds, "there's evidence suggesting he was too wedded to that idea to see the opportunities in front of him."
Rodriguez scoffs at that notion, pointing out that FPA Capital leaped back into stocks when the market bottomed in 2009; in the past he's done the same with FPA New Income. This time, he refused to invest in a bond market that he believed was distorted by government interference. "If I roll the dice and buy, and high-yields rally like crazy, I'm a star," he says. "On the other hand, if I roll the dice and it comes up craps ... I had a hard time intellectually with that." The fund's risk-averse stance may not have borne fruit in 2009 and 2010, but FPA is sticking with it -- and he thinks it will pay off soon.
The looming debt crisis
Standard & Poor's has just announced that it's downgrading the outlook for U.S. debt, and Bob Rodriguez couldn't be cheerier. It's another sign, he says, that at least some people are waking up to the looming debt disaster. As he paces FPA's offices in Santa Monica on a spring day, he sips coffee from a stained green-plastic mug. It's a 20-year-old souvenir from a company called Green Tree Financial; Rodriguez keeps it because it reminds him of one of his worst investing losses.
Since coming back to work on Jan. 1, he has found himself galled once again by what he sees. Fund managers, emboldened by their mammoth gains, clamor for risk. Junk bonds remain wildly popular. Even more stunning, says Rodriguez, is the government's failure to address its debt. "I know one thing from business," he says, his voice quavering as he tries, mostly successfully, not to yell. "Unless you correct the problems that are already occurring, you don't add on new leverage and new, other responsibilities until you correct the old! All you're going to do is capsize the ship!"
Rodriguez argues that the U.S. debt as a percentage of GDP ratio (currently 64%) is massively underreported because it doesn't count off-balance-sheet entitlements such as Medicare, and debt owed by Fannie and Freddie. If you factor in those liabilities, he says, the actual ratio is greater than 500% and growing. The U.S. must reduce that before 2012, Rodriguez says, because it's unlikely to accomplish anything during the election year. If nothing changes, he adds, investors will start to get nervous about the amount of debt on the U.S. balance sheet. As lenders balk at buying Treasuries, rates will spike, causing borrowing costs to skyrocket across the financial system. "The financial system is held together with a very thin filament called confidence," says Rodriguez. "When you clip that, all hell breaks loose."
The situation isn't irreparable; Rodriguez believes the government can keep rates from climbing too high if it starts making cuts of $350 billion to $500 billion per year. But he has little faith in its willingness to do so. If it were up to him, there would be serious tax reform, with all tax deductions (including mortgage interest) on the table. A former Republican, he describes himself as a "fiscal conservative but social moderate" who has grown disgusted with both parties: "I say, 'A pox on both their houses.'"
So FPA's managers, guided by Rodriguez, are battening down again, trimming risk. FPA Capital now has 30% of its portfolio in cash and 38% in energy stocks because he believes the world's oil supply is declining. Still, even in that sector, he doesn't see many opportunities. (Forget other sectors.) He refuses to buy most bonds or long-term government debt. His restraint has rankled some investors: FPA New Income has begun to shrink again, and a few FPA Capital clients are grumbling.
It takes thick skin to be a contrarian. Rodriguez is used to losing his shareholders' faith, but he seems weary of it. "I don't think you get rewarded in this business for doing the right thing," he says. "It's a love-hate relationship. You could feel bitter about it, but then I ask, 'What would I do differently?' The

Thursday, June 02, 2011

Ground-Breaking Study Reveals Shocking Results About Wall Street Hiring Practices

Gang, something big has come up this morning and we need to discuss it right now. Don’t want to scare anyone but also don’t want to minimize the enormity of this news so let’s just get right to it. Wall Street has been keeping a secret. Look around at your colleagues this morning. The ones who attended schools like Yale, Princeton and Harvard and played sports like lacrosse and squash and use the word ‘summer’ as a verb and describe the color red as Nantucket red and argue the HJs don’t count if you give them to a guy whose named ends in IV and get aroused at the mere thought of an ACK sticker? They might have had an easier time breaking into the industry than those who graduated from lower ranked universities and did not get their WASP on. Yes, really.
After you’ve picked your jaws up off the floor, you’re presumably going to want to fight us on this and shout “It can’t be!” and “You lie!” Sorry to say it, pumpkins, it’s the truth. But don’t take our word for it- someone actually did a study on the shocking phenomenon.
Lauren Rivera — a 32-year-old sociologist who teaches management and organizations at Northwestern’s Kellogg School of Management — has concluded it’s still where you went rather than what you did there that makes the difference…She says “elite professional service employers” rely more on academic pedigree than any other factor. For recruiters, it’s prestige that counts, rather than “content” like grades, courses, internships, or other actual performance. That’s because if you got into a “super-elite” school — which essentially means Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Wharton (University of Pennsylvania), and Stanford — you must be smart. Plus, time spent at those bastions in turn will make you “polished” and attractive to corporate clients. It is, according to Rivera, a largely self-perpetuating hiring process that prizes efficiency: Why spend effort looking for “that one needle in the haystack” at a “safety school” like the University of Michigan or, heavens forfend, Bowling Green, when the run-of-the-mill Yalie’s still a prince. Even “second-tier” Ivies like Brown, according to Rivera, are suspect for the top firms.
The most surprising finding in Rivera’s research — conducted through observation and anonymous interviewing — was about the role of extracurriculars. While going to a super-elite gets your penny loafer in the door, that isn’t enough. Rivera says it’s leisure pursuits that seal the deal. Employers use these as “valid markers” or “proxies” of a candidate’s “social and moral worth,” all the more so for time-intensive sports that “resonate with white, upper-middle-class culture.” Think lacrosse, squash, crew, and field hockey. Skip football, basketball, and soccer. And no sport at all suggests “nerd,” which correlates to future “corporate drone.”
Now that this wild news is out in the open, let’s get into something even crazier- the people who were able to get jobs on Wall Street without such “polish.” If you, for example, attended Columbia and played football, how were you able to land a gig? If you’re bashful about admitting it involved 2 pieces of Scotch Tape, a half empty sugar free Red Bull, a poster of the original Saved By The Bell cast, a used colonoscopy bag and the board game Chutes and Ladders, don’t be- it’s what we were expecting anyway.

Wednesday, June 01, 2011

Comfort is Rarely Rewarded; Maverick Risk & False Benchmarks


“The loser is the trend chasing, comfort seeking investor. The market doesn’t reward comfort. It rewards discomfort.”
- Rob Arnott
In Rob Arnott’s November 2010 piece, “The Glad Game” he asks investors to consider “Maverick Risk” as an important driver of investment outcomes:
There’s conventional volatility in returns, which introduces a risk of poor investment returns. There’s the asset/liability mismatch, which leads to a risk that we cannot cover our future obligations. And, there’s maverick risk, in which investors choose a different path than their peers, exposing them to criticism, especially when performance suffers. All three risks are hugely important. Yet, we typically focus our analytics on the first of these, simple volatility, and our behavior on the last of these, maverick risk.
The idea of “Maverick Risk” is an interesting one. We know that from a human behavioral standpoint, we are conditioned to think of being outside of the herd as “risky.” There is plenty of evolutionary logic behind this idea considering that humans have spent much of their existence as both predator and prey; there is safety in numbers. So as much as we modern humans know the value of “thinking outside the box” or “being contrarian” and as much as we value and revere those in society who are capable of going it alone or using creative or original thought– when it comes down to financial decisions, our lizard brains take over and we seek the safety of crowds. This is true for amateurs and professionals alike. This is well documented in the rapidly growing popular and academic literature on behavioral finance.
GMO takes the idea of “Career Risk” and relates it to idea that it can drive periods of over and undervaluation. As Ben Inker, the head of asset allocation at GMO was quoted as saying in a recent Advisor Perspectives article:
“The market tends to be priced in a way that if you want to try to outperform, you have to take a risk of looking like an idiot,” Inker said.  To outperform, you have to deviate from your benchmark, and that increases the risk of underperformance and, in the extreme, looking like an idiot and getting fired. As a result, markets exhibit herd-like behavior, which in turn encourages momentum and other self-reinforcing behaviors, such as money flowing into whatever strategy has been doing well, Inker said.  That merely ratchets up valuations within better-performing asset classes and sectors, he said, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Of course this can not continue indefinitely. Eventually prices move far enough away from fair value and the risk/return trade off becomes so one-sided, that prices get pushed back towards fair value. Consider this chart from GMO.
The Way the Investment World Goes Around: They Were Managing Their Careers, Not Their Clients’ Risk
Rob Arnott suggests that by embracing Maverick Risk and deviating from the traditional 60/40 stock bond portfolio, one can add several percentage points a year to expected returns above and beyond the expected returns that are available from the valuation of traditional asset classes themselves. This is good to hear as broad equity and bond market indexes are priced to deliver very low single digit returns over the next 5-10 years, with a high likelihood of meaningful periods of negative returns. Consider my post, Expensive Markets Mean Low or Negative Prospective Returns.
The basic approaches that Arnott advocates for range from adding non-core asset classes such as emerging markets, high yield bonds, and ”alternative” strategies to choosing fundamentally-weighted indexes (Research Affiliates Fundamental Index or RAFI is what they sell after all). Importantly, he advocates employing an active, dynamic, and contrarian approach to asset allocation, which presumably does not require investment in each of these asset classes or strategies at all times. It does however require that each of these asset classes and strategies are at a minimum, part of investors’ tool box, our universe of potential investments.
Research Affiliates' Expected Returns for Various Allocations

GMO’s Inker agrees when it comes to power of truly active asset allocation to drive investment returns:
“The good news is that in the investment business there are very few people who do real asset allocation and actually move money around in an aggressive way,” Inker said.  “It’s a tough thing to do and survive. The nice thing about it, and the reason why we do it, is because this means it’s an inefficiency that is not going to get arbitraged away anytime soon.”
GMO knows what they are taking about when the say that it’s a tough thing to do and survive. Their refusal to chase expensive markets in the late 1990′s meant they lost half their assets under management. HALF. 50% of their assets, 50% of their revenues, gone. They were willing to embrace Maverick or Career risk and looked like idiots for doing so. That must have been a somewhat painful experience, but perhaps they were comforted by John Maynard Keynes:
…it is the long term investor…who will in practice come in for most criticism, wherever investment funds are managed by committees or boards or banks. For it is the essence of his behaviour that he should be eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of average opinion. If he is successful, that will only confirm the general belief in his rashness; and if in the short run he is unsuccessful, which is very likely, he will not receive much mercy. Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.
Of course, the bubble burst, GMO saved/made their clients lots of money while most others were comfortably failing (read: losing money) the conventional way, and the assets came back and then some. In his piece, Arnott is quick to point out that
taking these steps is not comfortable. Comfort is rarely rewarded. Investors can move down the path toward this maverick portfolio, careful not to exceed their board’s or their client’s “comfort” threshold. This approach goes against human nature and invites second-guessing whenever it inevitably doesn’t work. Keynes’ oft-cited “reputation” quotation, in its more complete form, bears careful consideration.
This point bears further consideration. GMO clearly did exceed their client’s comfort threshold. That’s why so many left.
If we spend too much time as professional investors calibrating ourselves to our client’s comfort threshold there is significant risk that we will make sacrifices to our process, our investment discipline, and ultimately to our fiduciary duty of acting in our clients’ best interests. It’s not just a little ironic that the line between doing what is right for our clients and doing (or not doing) things that might make them fire us is a blurry one indeed.
Client-Manager Alignment
How do we deal with this paradox? For starters, there needs to be a high level of trust between clients and investment managers. This trust should be based on the obvious considerations like ethics and integrity, but also the more difficult ideal of alignment and understanding of the investment objectives and the process by which we are trying to meet those objectives. This requires open communication among other things.
Seth Klarman is unequivocal when he says “having great clients is the key to investment success.” For those unfamiliar with Klarman, his Baupost Group hedge fund gained an average of 17 percent annually from 2000-2010, a period in which the S&P 500 Index fell 1 percent annually. And while Baupost faced some criticism during the 1990s when the fund had a hard time keeping up with the raging and speculative bull market, the fund has returned 19 percent a year since it was started in 1982 (Klarman was 25 years old), even as it held more than 40 percent of its assets in cash at times.   In an interview, he goes on to describe Baupost’s ideal client as having two characteristics:
1.) If we feel we have had a good year, they agree, regardless of relative performance
2.) When we call, asking them to consider adding new capital, they a.) appreciate the call and b.) add new capital
The second characteristic is important for Baupost because they often invest in illiquid securities or non-traded assets such as real estate. When prices are down, they want to have extra liquidity from clients in order to purchase more assets. Such was the case in 2008-2009 when Baupost doubled their assets under management to $22 billion after being closed to new investors for many years.
The subtext of point #1 is that Klarman’s clients know that his number one priority is to generate positive absolute returns regardless of the market’s direction. To put it another way, Klarman’s self-identified “key to investment success” is having clients who want what he is offering: a strategy that seeks out attractive returns for the risk that he is incurring without the expectation that he will outperform in every market environment.  Indeed, he is clear that the returns they will generate are a function of the opportunity set presented by the market’s valuation and is not afraid to return capital to investors (whether they want it or not) as he did at the end of 2010 if the market is not offering abundant opportunity.
At a recent Grant’s Interest Rate Observer Conference, Klarman professed to “being surprised at how little cash we have.” 28% of the Baupost portfolio was held in cash. While 28% sounds like a large amount of cash (mutual funds currently hold 3.4% of their assets in cash) to most relative return investors– the expensive valuations present in the stock and bond markets have pushed an absolute return-oriented investor like Klarman to buy hotel properties in places like Charlotte, N.C. at a 7-9% cap rate, while keeping 28% of dry powder for an eventual return to attractive valuations in the public markets.
Bringing it all home: What’s your benchmark?
We should all strive to place less emphasis on the conventions of the day and seek to arrive at a fundamental understanding what really drives investment returns so that we can make smart decisions about where we put our money. We can not accomplish this however, without knowing what our future liabilities or objectives are and addressing as Arnott puts it, “the asset/liability mismatch, which leads to a risk that we cannot cover our future obligations.” For most individuals, these “future obligations” come in the form of a desire for lifestyle maintenance in retirement, the ability to leave a legacy, or give back to the world. These obligations tend to be absolute in nature– that is requiring a certain level of assets– independent of how much your neighbor is making on his portfolio or how much “the market” returned last year.
Decisions large and small are off kilter because the looming shadow of benchmark risk overwhelms almost everything else… maybe they should consider a low volatility strategy, even if some “underperformance” in a bull market comes with it, since such a shortfall versus a benchmark is not really a risk that matters relative to other considerations… Many of the benchmarks are, in fact, false ones.  I dare say that the S&P 500 is not a natural liability for many individuals or organizations to fund.  Nor is some broader market portfolio.  These are made-up constructs and should not be the prime guide for decision making.  But the business of investing is tied to them, to its detriment and that of its clients (emphasis mine).
The bull market of the 1980s and 1990s provided the fuel for the relative return performance derby embraced by so many people and organizations today. In a consistently rising market, when nearly all returns are positive, the collective focus shifts towards relative returns and places undue importance of “false benchmarks” such as meeting or exceeding the S&P 500. The last 10 years has demonstrated the importance of remaining vigilant and keeping our eye on the true “natural” benchmark of earning absolute returns without being exposed to catastrophic or permanent losses of capital.

Lunch is for wimps

Lunch is for wimps
It's not a question of enough, pal. It's a zero sum game, somebody wins, somebody loses. Money itself isn't lost or made, it's simply transferred from one perception to another.