Monday, March 19, 2007

Fortress Affiliate Sees Deals in Subprime Mortgages


While the troubled subprime mortgage market has weighed down on Wall Street — Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers both reported that their 1st-quarter revenues were hurt by the sector — others see a buying opportunity. Buyers like Goldman Sachs have said that they see a chance to acquire those assets cheaply, anticipating a rebound, rather than a continued implosion.

Now, it seems that Fortress Investment Group is on that list. TheStreet.com points out that an $8.6 billion Fortress affiliate, Newcastle Investment, announced on Friday that it will acquire a $1.7 billion portfolio of subprime mortgages from an unnamed seller.

In its statement, Newcastle said that the residential mortgages are scattered throughout the United States, with about 28 percent in California, 13 percent in Florida and 10 percent in New York. About 74 percent are adjustable-rate morgages, and most of those have a fixed rate for two to three years. The current weighted average credit score of the borrowers is 644, out of a possible 850.

Kenneth M. Riis, Newcastle’s chief executive, expressed confidence that his firm knows how to avoid the sort of blowups that have plagued the Wall Street firms like Goldman and Morgan Stanley. Both firms opened significant lines of credit to New Century Financial, a onetime darling of the industry that is now fighting to stave off bankruptcy.

“Constrained liquidity and the re-pricing of credit risk in the subprime mortgage market have created a unique opportunity for us to purchase a portfolio of loans at an attractive price with early payment default protection,” Mr. Riis said in a statement. “We underwritten this investment to generate an attractive return on capital using conservative default and loss assumptions.”

Newcastle’s deal may show that Fortress thinks the worst of the subprime mortgage troubles over. A publicly held REIT, Newcastle is managed by an affiliate of Fortress (and is considered one of the $10.7 billion hedge fund’s “castles”). Newcastle’s chairman is Wesley R. Edens, who is also the cofounder, chairman and chief executive of Fortress. Until last month, Mr. Edens also served as Newcastle’s C.E.O.

Reverse colonialisation

Indian investment into the UK is poised to outstrip British investment in the sub-continent, reversing the flow of capital for the first time since the days of the Raj, the Sunday Telegraph reported.

India is presently ranked third, behind the US and Japan, in terms of investment into the UK. The 2005-2006 UK Inward Investment report shows a 111 per cent increase in Indian projects in the UK on the previous year - around $2bn worth - and the creation of over 1,000 new jobs. There are 23 Indian companies listed on London’s LSE, 13 of which are listed on the AIM. London is the most popular overseas exchange of Indian firms looking to raise capital.

And new research by Close Brothers Corporate Finance for The Sunday Telegraph suggests that by 2010, Indian companies will buy up 150 UK businesses, while British companies will acquire just 138 in India.

Close Brothers Corporate Finance managing director Richard Grainger said the still-strong cultural ties between the UK and India encourage investment. “We have a linguistic advantage here and in the US, while in countries like France and Germany there are employment issues around investing.”

Grainger points to Tata’s 2005 acquisition of UK technology business INCAT as a turning point in the investment trend. “That was the first sign of the wall of money coming out of India,” he told the newspaper.

If India’s acquisition spree continues on trend, the emerging market giant will buy 31 UK companies this year, almost double that to 52 next year, then push up to almost 90 corporate raids in 2009. In the same period -British companies will also increase investment in India, but by nothing like the same rate. From 50 acquisitions this year, UK companies are expected to pick up 99 companies in 2009, the Sunday Telegraph reported.

But Grainger had some words of comfort for British companies.

“There is a tipping point where things could start to move the other way again. India is growing rapidly and will soon need serious investment in its infrastructure. I can see at that point that British companies will start buying up assets there to be part of that investment.”

Soothing words, certainly, but would-be investors should note that even buyout behemoth Blackstone found India “challenging,” and other private equity companies have begun to spurn Indian companies. Even Walmart, which owns Asda, is finding its Indian debut more difficult than expected.

Meanwhile, India Inc is so self-assured it’s said to be eyeing Sainsbury’s…

Blink and you’ll miss it - ‘millisecond’ trading arrives

Do you feel the need for speed? Hedge funds and other traders do - and now some of the largest participants in US capital markets will adopt a new system that dramatically cuts the time it takes to trade and communicate with each other, the FT reports.

The system, Radianz Ultra Access, will reduce transaction times to just 1 millisecond from about 10 milliseconds at present. That’s down to a mere thousandth of a second, which might just be quick enough to satisfy the ever greater need for speed amongst sophisticated traders.

Institutions that have signed up to use the system already include the NYSE, Nasdaq, Boston Options Exchange, BATS electronic communications network, and the International Securities Exchange, among others.

Tom Price, senior analyst in the securities and capital markets practice at the Tower Group consultancy, said: “Speed is a competitive differentiator for market participants using advanced trading strategies. The ability to consume massive amounts of data, translate it into opportunity, and get orders to the appropriate execution venue ahead of the competition, is key to success.”

These days, the returns are to the swift.

Sunday, March 18, 2007

Test for bonds tied to loans

latimes.com

http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-petruno18mar18,1,2459550,full.column

MARKET BEAT

For TCW, a big seller of mortgage-backed paper, the question is how its investors will fare. Tom Petruno
Market Beat

March 18, 2007

The housing market boom of the last few years also has been a boom for Wall Street firms that have played a crucial role as conduits — linking home buyers and investors by packaging mortgages and selling bonds backed by the loan payments.

Now, with mortgage defaults surging, it's clear that some of those investors are going to lose money.

And that is shining a bright light on the Wall Street middlemen, including Los Angeles-based TCW Group Inc., which has been one of the biggest names in mortgage investment products.

TCW, parent of Trust Co. of the West, could emerge as a hero or a villain to the hedge funds, insurance companies and wealthy investors worldwide that have been avid buyers of the firm's complex mortgage securities.

The company says it is the global leader in managing collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. These are investments that are backed by pools of loans or other assets. The simple idea: The investors get interest and principal payments from the pools passed through to them. (Related story: The complex challenge of CDOs)

But in reality, CDOs aren't simple at all. They are a creation of cutting-edge financial engineering. That engineering can turn part of a portfolio of high-risk securities into new securities that, in theory, carry low risk but still provide above-average returns.

The acid test for that seeming alchemy now looms. Much of what backs up CDO pools are securities tied to mortgages. And specifically, bonds backed by sub-prime mortgages — loans to people with poor credit histories or high debt burdens — are the core of many CDOs.

TCW manages $48 billion in CDO portfolios for investors. Of that total, $15 billion, or about one-third of the CDO asset pool, is in securities backed by sub-prime mortgages. An additional $3.9 billion of loans behind the firm's CDOs are "Alt-A," or mortgages to people who didn't qualify as top-quality borrowers but were viewed as better risks than sub-prime borrowers.

The question facing TCW and other investors in higher-risk mortgages: Who's going to take the biggest hit from loans that go bad?

"There are a lot of CDO managers that have a lot of toxic waste in CDOs," said Pete Nolan, who analyzes the portfolios for money manager Smith Breeden Associates in Chapel Hill, N.C.

Jitters over the growing troubles of sub-prime borrowers have been rocking financial markets for weeks. Lenders' shares slumped further last week after the Mortgage Bankers Assn. said more than 13% of sub-prime loans had fallen behind on payments, up from 12.6% in the third quarter and 10.6% two years ago.

Jeffrey Gundlach, TCW's chief investment officer, says the firm isn't stunned by what's happening with sub-prime loans.

Gundlach has been pessimistic about the U.S. economy for much of the last year, and has predicted that a weakening housing market would be the final blow to cash-strapped consumers. A recession would more than likely result, he has said.

That view isn't inconsistent with putting sub-prime mortgage bonds into investment pools like CDOs, Gundlach says.

"Our strategy all along has been, let's put together a portfolio that will hold up better when the defaults come," he said.

Said Louis Lucido, Gundlach's team leader for mortgage CDOs: "It's not that we're arrogant, or that we've got a lot of hubris, but we think we've got the position and the talent in place to be able to analyze and manage through this period."

TCW's expectation, Lucido said, is that it will benefit by picking up the pieces of smaller CDO managers that collapse.

Gundlach, 47, has a reputation across the investment business as a sharp mind on mortgage securities. He has led the firm's concerted push into that sector since the 1980s.

TCW, he says, has far surpassed its competitors since the late 1990s in hiring staff and developing computer programs to monitor mortgage securities and other asset-backed bonds.

"It occurred to me we would be able to succeed if we just used the Reagan plan for the Cold War: outspend them," Gundlach said. "We outspent everybody."

The point of that spending, he said, was to develop an infrastructure that could identify the best opportunities in sectors including mortgage securities, and avoid potential disasters.

"One of the biggest distinguishing features for our group is the amount of due diligence we do, and our own rating process for [loan] originators," Gundlach said.

In a memo to clients this month, TCW sought to assure them that the firm all along had "minimized and often avoided" mortgages that it believed to carry excessive risk — for example, loans to housing speculators as opposed to someone who planned to live in a home.

Mortgage CDOs are just one piece of TCW's business. The firm's total of $150 billion in bonds and stocks under management includes accounts of pension funds, wealthy individuals and mutual fund investors.

But its focus on mortgages put TCW in the right position in recent years to feed investors' voracious appetite for investments backed by home loans.

Relatively low interest rates since 2001 on Treasury bonds and other high-quality securities left many investors starved for decent yields. As home sales and prices surged, Wall Street was thrilled to ride in as the boom's financier.

Securitizing mortgages — packaging the loans for sale to investors via bonds — has provided borrowers with the funding they need and investors with securities that have paid them more than many other bonds.

Securitization isn't new, but the market had never seen anything on the scale of the rush to securitize mortgages in recent years.

Collateralized debt obligations became the natural buyers for mortgage bonds. Wall Street previously had used CDOs for investments such as corporate "junk" bonds and manufactured-housing loans. Some of those pools ended badly for investors. But mortgage bonds, traditionally a stable asset, seemed a perfect fit for CDOs.

CDOs offered investors the option of picking the specific levels of risk and return they wanted from a loan portfolio. That's where financial engineering by firms like TCW came in.

A CDO creator could take a pool of mostly sub-prime mortgage-backed bonds and cut it into tranches (French for "slices"). At the top of that stack of slices would be the highest-quality tranches, which offered modest yields but (theoretically) no risk of principal loss.

"The whole deal is set up to protect them," Gundlach said of the top tranches.

The investors in the lower tranches would earn higher yields while also agreeing to absorb any losses suffered by the loan pool, if necessary.

At the very bottom would be the so-called equity tranche holders, who would get paid only if everything worked out well.

Investors wildly embraced the CDO concept: Global sales reached a record $476 billion last year, nearly six times what was sold in 2001.

As a CDO manager, TCW's role is not only to construct the tranches but also to manage the underlying assets. For that, its investors are paying TCW fees of up to 0.5% of assets yearly.

The crucial questions ahead for TCW and other CDO managers: How many of the mortgage loans in their pools will fall victim to default, and then foreclosure? How big will the losses on those loans be? How high up the tranche food chain will the losses reach?

Whatever happens, it won't be overnight. For one thing, CDO pools are designed to be long-term investments, maturing in years, not months. Likewise, it also can take a long time for a home to be placed in foreclosure, and for the lender to find out whether the home value covers the loan or falls short.

For a mortgage player of TCW's size, the risk of a slew of problems in its mortgage portfolios goes beyond the obvious issue of angry clients.

The firm's own money is invested in its portfolios, so its own finances could take a hit.

And for the economy as a whole, serious losses in mortgage securities managed by a firm of TCW's stature could scare bond investors away for an extended period — which could make home loans tougher to get, more expensive or both.

"We're pretty sure we're going to come out on the good side of this," Gundlach said.

More than just his career may be riding on that.

The Bad Boys of Investing Grow Up

The New York Times



March 17, 2007
Market Values

EMERGING markets have a reputation for being the bad boys of investment. They can be volatile and self-destructive, yet there is something seductive about their rough, unfinished quality and growth potential that keeps investors coming back.

But a lot of these markets have shown during the last few turbulent weeks that they aren’t children anymore. They have avoided much greater falls or wilder swings than Western markets have had, a display of maturity that would have been unimaginable a decade ago.

If certain markets — in places like Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Brazil and Chile — have evolved to the point that they are more emerged than emerging, it could make them more appealing, even if they are less exciting.

Specialists in international investing attribute the newfound stability in what might be called post-emerging markets to a leveling up of economic conditions fostered by the expansion of trade known as globalization.

“Most of these countries are in very good shape economically,” said Arjun Divecha, manager of the G.M.O. Emerging Market fund. “They have massive foreign reserves and trade surpluses. Interest rates are pretty low, and indebtedness at the national and corporate levels is pretty low.”

Governments in many countries on the cusp of developed status are doing what may be the best thing they can for their economies: nothing, or at least a lot less.

“Intervention has diminished a fair amount, and capitalism is being allowed to prevail,” Mr. Divecha said.

Thomas Mengel, manager of the Ivy International Core Equity fund, likewise finds that “a lot of these emerging countries are in a much healthier financial position than they have ever been.”

As the markets continue to mature, the valuation discount with Western markets will shrink, enhancing returns, he predicted. “Over the next five years or so, as these countries continue to get more resilient, we’ll see more expansion” in price-earnings multiples, he said, although he cautioned that “short term, things can always change.”

What has changed in the last month is that stocks in post-emerging markets have become cheaper. A few stocks Mr. Mengel said he finds most interesting include Samsung Electronics and Kookmin Bank in South Korea.

He also highlighted companies in markets that have yet to reach the post-emergence stage, such as Sina, the Chinese Internet portal, and a couple of Indian technology businesses: Satyam and Infosys.

Other beneficiaries of the blossoming of once-emerging economies are Western corporations doing brisk business there. Among Mr. Mengel’s favorites are Vossloh, a German company doing extensive work on China’s rail system; NestlĂ©, the Swiss food producer; and the German conglomerate Siemens.

ONE consequence of post-emergence for portfolio managers is that it permits close comparisons between leading companies in those economies and their counterparts in the West and Japan, said Arjun Jayaraman, a fund manager at Causeway Capital Management, a firm specializing in foreign stock markets.

Often, he said, the companies in the newly mature markets look better. Two examples are Samsung Electronics and another Korean company, Pohang Iron and Steel.

“Posco and Samsung are world-class companies,” Mr. Jayaraman said. “Samsung trades at a cheaper valuation than most Japanese companies and is a better company in many respects. It’s a cheap way to get Asian technology exposure.”

Samsung offers better value than Sony, he said. The same goes for Posco when he compares it with Nippon Steel and the German steel producer ThyssenKrupp.

Post-emerging-market stocks are not always the best options, though. Automakers like Hyundai have come a long way, he said, but he still prefers Toyota, a company that he says makes cars better than Sony makes consumer electronics.

Anyone who has survived adolescence knows that problems don’t vanish. You just get a set of new ones. Post-emerging markets and their corporate champions may have become less susceptible to the economic and political disruptions of the emerging world, but they may be more vulnerable to global economic weakness and to pressure from new commercial rivals.

Still, their recent resilience, modest valuations and steep learning curve suggest that they will stand up better than before when the inevitable shocks and disappointments come along.

Beyond the Bubble, With Small-Cap Stocks

The New York Times



March 18, 2007
Strategies

SMALL-CAP stocks are significantly overvalued. In fact, they are even pricier, on average, than they were in March 2000, just before the Internet bubble burst. In contrast, the average large-cap stock is moderately undervalued.

This picture of a highly bifurcated stock market is painted by data from Ford Equity Research of San Diego, which tracks around 4,500 publicly traded companies in the United States. Among companies that have been publicly traded for at least seven years, the firm reports that 55 percent have higher price-to-earnings ratios today than they did in March 2000. The bulk of these pricier issues, however, are in the smaller-cap sectors. Among the very largest companies, the average P/E ratio is now just a third of what it was seven years ago.

If investors focused only on the broad stock market averages, however, they might conclude that the entire market is undervalued. According to Standard & Poor’s, for example, the P/E ratio of the S.& P. 500 currently stands at 17, based on trailing 12-month operating earnings. The comparable ratio at the end of March 2000 was 31.1, almost double the current level.

Though the S.& P 500 includes many large-cap stocks, it also contains smaller-cap issues. Why is the index’s P/E ratio nevertheless so much lower than it was seven years ago?

The answer lies in how the index is put together. The S.& P. 500 is a capitalization-weighted index, meaning that each company’s contribution to it is a function of the company’s size. That would not necessarily skew the average P/E ratio for the index itself, if the average valuations of both larger and smaller stocks were similar. But that’s not the situation today, according to Ford Equity Research: the 50 companies in the S.& P. 500 with the smallest market caps have an average P/E ratio that is much higher than it was seven years ago, while the ratio for the 50 largest-cap stocks in the index is significantly lower.

According to Ford Equity Research, the average P/E ratio among the 50 largest-cap companies is now 19, about a third of the average of 60.7 for the biggest 50 in March 2000. The average market cap for the 50 largest companies is now $123 billion, versus $153 billion in March 2000.

Contrast those numbers with those for the 50 smallest companies in the index: their average P/E ratio is now 30.7, versus 20.3 seven years ago. And their average market cap is now $3 billion, versus $1 billion.

In other words, the smallest-cap stocks in the S.& P. 500 are significantly more overvalued today than they were seven years ago. Yet their higher P/E ratios barely affect the ratio for the index as a whole. That’s because the combined market capitalization of the 50 largest stocks account for nearly half the market cap of the entire S.& P. 500, while that of the 50 smallest stocks add up to just 1.2 percent of the total.

“Investors who pay attention to the P/E ratio of cap-weighted indexes such as the S.& P. 500 therefore need to exercise great care when drawing conclusions about stocks’ relative valuations,” Richard Segarra, director of research at Ford Equity Research, said in an interview. “At best, the P/E ratios for such indexes shed light only on their largest-cap stocks; we should avoid drawing any inference from a cap-weighted index’s P/E ratio about the valuations of its smallest-cap members.”

MR. SEGARRA found that the index’s prevailing pattern also holds true across the universe of stocks that his firm tracks. As a result, an investor who emphasizes market sectors according to relative P/E ratios would have a very different portfolio today than in March 2000. Back then, he would have favored small caps over large caps — and been handsomely rewarded for this choice. The trend is seen in the annualized total returns since March 31, 2000, of three Dow Jones Wilshire indexes: 10.1 percent for the U.S. Microcap Index and 7.2 percent for the U.S. Small-Cap Index, but only 0.5 percent for the U.S. Large-Cap index.

Today, however, according to Mr. Segarra, that investor would favor large caps over small caps. Not only is the average P/E ratio of large-cap stocks only a third as high as it was in March 2000, it is nearly 10 percent below its average level of the last five years. There’s no guarantee, of course, that large caps will outperform small caps over the next five years — but there’s a good argument to be made that they will.

Mark Hulbert is editor of The Hulbert Financial Digest, a service of MarketWatch. E-mail: strategy@nytimes.com.

Saturday, March 17, 2007

Just How Sub Is Subprime?


Barron's Online
Monday, March 19, 2007
0


By JACQUELINE DOHERTY

BULLS LIKE TO ARGUE THAT THE SUBPRIME mortgage market represents only 15% of the total mortgage market, implying that the damage wreaked by delinquent borrowers is limited. But that doesn't account for the trillions of dollars of securities that are based directly and indirectly on subprime mortgages. There are subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), derivatives on subprime RMBS, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that buy subprime RMBS and/or the derivatives on the RMBS. With exposure spread through so many financial products, it may take awhile for the full extent of the problems arising from the Subprime Bust of '07 to surface.

Specialty finance companies that focused on lending to folks with poor credit in the late 1980s would make a loan and hold it on their books. The problem: An individual's mortgage -- especially one in the subprime category -- has a rating of BBB or lower. So the volume of mortgages was limited by financial institutions' capital requirements, balance sheets and willingness to take on credit risk, explains Joseph Mason, associate professor of finance at Drexel University LeBow College of Business.

Financial wizards created subprime mortgage-backed securities in the 1990s. The financial institution could sell a group of subprime mortgages to a trust. The trust finances the purchase by selling debt and a bit of equity. But about 80% or more of the debt the trust sells is AAA rated because it has first call on the payments from the mortgages. If there's money left over, then the lower-rated debt gets paid and finally the equity gets paid -- a bit like a waterfall.

The key: finding investors to buy the 20% of lower-rated debt and equity sold by the trust. For the right price, there was a small group of buyers, like insurance companies or Wall Street dealers, willing to take on the risk.

[subppic]
About four years ago, the rating agencies allowed collateralized debt vehicles to buy RMBS exclusively. They soon became big buyers of the risky, lower-rated parts.

But in recent years a new buyer -- created by Wall Street -- emerged: CDOs, collateralized debt obligations. CDOs are actively managed, but are otherwise similar to a mortgage-backed security. CDOs buy fixed-income assets and sell primarily AAA-rated debt because the cash flows from the assets are prioritized to repay the AAA debt first and the lower-rated debt and equity afterwards. About four years ago, the rating agencies allowed the CDOs to buy RMBS exclusively, and they've subsequently become voracious buyers of the lower-rated portions. The sale of CDOs investing in subprime residential mortgage-backed securities rose from $9.9 billion in 2001 to $114 billion last year, according to Deutsche Bank.








Wall Street has also created credit-default swaps on the subprime RMBS and the ABX indexes that track them. Because the ABX-related derivatives trade over-the-counter no one is quite sure of daily volume, but estimates put it at $200 million to $2 billion a day, with hedge funds big players.

Now the delinquencies on subprime mortgages are rising faster and higher than forecast by the Wall Street and rating-agency models. If the CDOs don't perform as expected, investors may no longer be willing to invest in CDOs that buy subprime RMBS. And if subprime RMBS CDOs go away -- or more likely shrink in volume dramatically -- the biggest buyer of lower-rated subprime RMBS debt goes away. That means higher interest rates and less credit availability for borrowers.

Below is a snapshot of the sub-prime market, its growth, players and key developments.

[subpbig]

Friday, March 16, 2007

Who's to Blame for Amaranth's Losses?

Answer: their investors.

Before you roll your eyes, hear me out on this. I have some very specific experience with this, as I have spent the past 18 months or so traveling around the United States, speaking with my limited partners (i.e., investors) and with potential investors for our hedge fund.

My experience with this is why I have been watching the unfolding debacle at Amaranth Advisors’ with some bemused detachment.

Hedge_funds_rank Now, without revealing any specifics, I will tell you we have had conversations with some very intelligent people who were a pleasure to meet with; Brilliant, fascinating, successful folk with interesting lives and of great accomplishment. However, once we sat down with their financial advisors - lawyers - accountants, things became, well, repetitious. In every meeting, there were some variations on the same conversations; Its like there is some hedge fund due diligence form that makes everybody ask nearly identical questions:

What's your track record? (Good)
How much skin do you have in the game? (alot)
How is Alpha generated (our models keep us on the right side of the major trend, and avoid big counter-trend moves)
What do you think will happen to the economy and the market?
(I don't know, but here's an underappreciated possibility . . .)
What is your Gamma ? Sharpe Ratio? (I neither know nor care; This isn't a B-school exam)

Then comes the exact same question, which I (foolishly) answer honestly:

"What sort of performance are you looking for?"

I usually start with: "It depends upon what the market offers us; If we remain range-bound, it will be difficult to put up great numbers without a lot of leverage or a lot of risk (or both), and we don't do that. We do particularly well, however, in major dislocations or strong rallies."

My initial answer is rarely accepted, and I am forced to go to a 2nd and 3rd option:

"Give us more details on what you want to do. What performance would you be happy with?"

Answer two: "What we want is irrelevant; Its what we can reasonably do while still managing risk, and not overleveraging. Our goal is to outperform the S&P500 with less risk, and in the event the SPX is negative, still have positive expectancy (i.e., be up when the indices are down)."

"So you are a relative (rather than absolute) performance fund?"

Answer 2b: "Well, most funds actually are, despite their claims of absolute performance regardless of market conditions. Consider the mediocre performance numbers from most funds recently when the market's been range-bound. Its been pretty weak, and that's no coincidence. There are only a handful of true absolute performance funds with great long term track records (and if you are talking to me, its because you cannot get into them)."

Now comes THE QUESTION. This is the one that gets people into trouble:

"We are looking for a number. What should we expect from you in the first 2 years?"

What they want to hear is "I am going to do 30-40% annually, fully hedged."

I don't say that, because it isn't true. (God bless Jim Simons, who actually can honestly say that). That's what too many investors are looking for; its nothing more than the greed factor at work. They don't say it explicitly, but its true: We want you to outperform the long term S&P500 benchmark by 300-400% annually (and we don't care about mean reversion). We really don't care how you do it. We want outsized profits. WE WANT THE LATE 1990S AGAIN.

Money raisers and some GPs have long ago figured this out. You have a few choices: you can answer the investors' questions honestly -- or to quote Ray Davies, you can give the people what they want (or think they want):

"We expect gains of 35-45%, with minimal risk or leverage. Our black box algorithms have been backtested, and generate better numbers than that, but we would rather under-promise and outperform."

2_and_20_1 Of course, that statement will be nonsense for 99.8% of the people who utter it. The vast majority of funds will not out-perform the indices dramatically year after year. We were fortunate -- we ended up with investors who understood this; Then again, we are a small fund, and not a $9B giant.

There are some funds that aim to fill this niche. They use lots and lots of leverage, play the highest beta moves, load up on derivatives, put up good numbers for a stretch. Eventually, they do one of two things: They take on some risk management -- lower their volatility plays, reduce leverage, aim for more sustainable gains.

Or they blow up.

Not all of them, but enough. Something like 25% of all hedge funds every couple of years dissolve, go away, reform, pop up elsewhere. That's not a coincidence, either.

~~~

So Amaranth put up great numbers for a while. And now we know how they did it: They took extraordinary risks, using lots of leverage on the highest beta trades. And when one went against them, it blew up, and they lost a few billion dollars in a week.

Don't blame them. Their investors demanded huge returns, and they turned a blind eye to the inordinate amount of risk required.

Who is to blame?

I think you have a suspicion as to who I think is the cause of Amaranth's losses . . .

Hedge funds expect soaring subprime defaults, lender insolvencies

Harbinger Capital Partners and Paulson & Co., two hedge-fund managers who profited when subprime- mortgage defaults surged, told investors that delinquent loans will soar and more lenders will disappear, Bloomberg reported.”We believe we are in the early stage of a correction in this market and that the market will eventually implode,'’ Paulson & Co., which manages $11 billion, said in a letter to investors last week. Paulson said bad loans held by the riskiest borrowers will “skyrocket'’ and “most, if not all, of the independent originators will go bankrupt.'’

Banks “will shut down their origination platforms,'’ and the business of pooling subprime loans into packages of securities “will all but disappear,'’ Paulson’s letter continued. “While the bonds have fallen significantly, we think they have much further to fall.'’

Harbinger, whose $6bn distressed debt fund returned 8.1 per cent last month, also said it will continue to bet on rising loan defaults.

“We believe that the market will continue to be tested in the weeks and months ahead, as the subprime situation unfolds amid a choppier market backdrop,'’ Philip Falcone, Harbinger’s founder and senior managing director, said in his letter to investors.

If hedge funds are calling it…

Thursday, March 15, 2007

Schneeweis: Monthly hedge fund data might be leading us astray

14 March 2007

Thomas Schneeweis is an academic. So he views the primary benefits of managed accounts not as operational, but as analytical. He argues that daily and weekly return data (usually only available via a managed account) is superior to the more common monthly data used in the hedge fund industry. Schneeweis tells All About Alpha that monthly data hides all sorts of things from, for example, volatility during the last week of every month, to a high correlation to intra-month shocks. (Ross Miller of SUNY Albany shows the power of daily data in his recent paper on Fidelity Magellan’s uncomfortably high market correlation.)

Since monthly data points are generally in short supply (most hedge funds have been around for less than 100 months), all available data points are usually used to calculate things like beta, volatility and, of course, alpha. But as Schneeweis points out, the composition of the S&P 500 has changed over the past 5 years. So why examine 5 years of hedge fund correlations?

Furthermore, kurtosis, skewedness and even beta can be influenced for years by one or two outlying historic datapoints. More frequent data means more recent data – and with it, a more accurate snapshot of current portfolio positioning. Schneeweis told the gathering:

“If you use monthly data and you count August 1998 in there, it affects your data for the next 3 years (if you’re using 3 years to come up with your beta). Monthly data continues to influence your view on things long after that view is no longer valid.”

He comes armed with research to back up this concern. According to a study conducted by the Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets (CISDM), daily and monthly return streams for the same fund can yield very different correlation, volatility, skew and kurtosis. For example, the HFRX has a 0.77 correlation with the S&P 500 using monthly data, but only a 0.53 correlation using daily data. He shows similarly dramatic differences between skewedness and kurtosis depending on the types of return streams used. His point is that monthly data is not necessarily wrong, it just needs to be interpreted with a wide confidence interval. Since there are more weekly return data points, the confidence interval will be tighter for weekly return streams.

Schneeweis cautions that while daily data is certainly the most sensitive to current positioning, it might actually contain “too much noise”. As a result of this and other concerns, Schneeweis prefers weekly data to both daily and monthly data. Said Schneeweis:

“I know we love monthly data. But daily data has important implications for how we measure risk. You really do need more frequent data to analyze a manger’s record…I like weekly data the best.”

The implications of this are tremendous. For example, it could easily happen that an investor picks a fund with certain risk characteristics (based on monthly data) for a managed account and then finds that the risk characteristics (based on the weekly data available from the managed account) is actually quite different.

Playing Hunches at Harvard

The New York Times



March 15, 2007

In mid-January, Mohamed El-Erian, head of the $30 billion Harvard Endowment, made a $1.6 billion bet that markets around the world were overvalued, and he sold off stocks representing 5 percent of Harvard’s total portfolio.

With the Dow Jones industrial average down about 3.5 percent since then, his hunch paid off. “We had been in a global Goldilocks world,” said the Cambridge University-trained economist who came to Harvard a year ago after seven years of running the Pacific Investment Management Company Emerging Markets Bond Fund.

“We felt that valuations were stretched and that they had gone up too quickly and we were reminded of May of 2006 where there were similar signals that people were stretching for returns,” he added. “The world has become increasingly connected, so we made the adjustments across the board.”

It is just one example of how Mr. El-Erian, 48, is setting a new course for the endowment after succeeding his highly regarded predecessor, Jack Meyer. Mr. Meyer was fond of saying that he had no clue which way the stock market would go, and generally did not change Harvard’s asset mix to try to time the market. (He preferred betting on opportunities he spotted in fixed-income securities.)

If only Mr. El-Erian just had to worry about market moves.

He and the board of the Harvard Management Company, which oversees the endowment, are also discussing the controversial issue of pay packages for top managers. And he is on a charm offensive, trying to be more visible among administrators at Harvard, an effort, in part, to make the university more comfortable with the endowment’s strategies.

Those strategies are still being refined — including just how much money Harvard should manage itself and how much it should hand over to outside managers.

Though a number of major endowments do not trade stocks in-house because of the perils of market timing, Mr. El-Erian says he believes that Harvard, which invests in an array of interrelated assets, has an edge understanding what may affect their values.

Even Mr. El-Erian’s small decisions can have an enormous impact. Last year, Harvard counted on the endowment, the largest in the nation, for roughly $1 billion, or about a third, of its annual $3 billion budget. The biggest chunk of the endowment funding goes for financial aid.

Given the intense scrutiny of Harvard’s every move, it can still seem a mystery why Mr. El-Erian made the shift in the first place. Certainly it was not for the money. Although Mr. El-Erian will not discuss it, several people who know him say he made tens of millions more at Pimco, where he oversaw $28 billion in emerging market debt.

And he is breaking a basic rule of career management — that it is better to follow someone in a job who did poorly rather than someone who did well (and Mr. Meyer did very well, earning an average return of 15.9 percent a year over his nearly 15-year tenure running the endowment).

Mr. Meyer’s performance was second only to David Swensen of Yale, who has produced annual returns of 16.3 percent over 21 years. A slender man who talks with a slight European accent, Mr. El-Erian said during a recent interview in his office overlooking Boston Harbor that he took the post because it was a new challenge that still lets him continue doing what he loves: investing, but in an academic context. And the mission is clear — to make money for Harvard and to let it think “in bold terms,” he said.

Another appeal of the job is that he does not have to see new clients or worry about capital withdrawals. The endowment is huge, comparable only in the nonprofit world to the $33 billion foundation started by Bill Gates that Warren E. Buffett has agreed to help finance. It is much bigger than Yale’s $18 billion fund.

Mr. El-Erian faces enormous pressure to deliver returns across a range of asset classes — often where he has no previous expertise. And the managers of the Harvard funds are expected to provide world-class returns, yet face criticism when their pay is compared with that of the professors and administrators.

Harvard has to disclose how much it pays its top financial managers. In fiscal 2005, Mr. Meyer earned $6 million, and two other managers earned about $17 million each.

Those figures — which had been higher in earlier years — drew sharp criticism from others at Harvard that the team was earning unseemly amounts, given academic pay levels.

Mr. Swensen, the Yale investment chief who made $1.6 million last year and does not have any in-house managers, said he was not surprised at the friction. “Paying some people $35 million where others earn $35,000 tears at the fabric of an institution,” he said.

At Harvard, the tension between the university and the endowment has come at a price. Some of its best money managers have left to start their own firms. And last year, partly out of exasperation with his critics, Mr. Meyer quit, taking roughly 30 of his 150-person staff with him to start Convexity Capital Management.

In fiscal 2006, ended June 30, Mr. El-Erian, who was at Harvard only for half the fiscal year, earned $2.3 million. For now, the new team’s compensation will continue to depend on how much money is managed in-house and what their returns are over a period of years, rather than just a single year.

Harvard will still have a significant portion of its money managed by people working for Harvard. They will continue to take home far more money than the academics — if they earn billions for Harvard. “The easiest thing would have been: let’s not rebuild the internal management team,” Mr. El-Erian said.

But he added: “Manager selection is absolutely critical, and a lot of good outside managers don’t have room anymore,” alluding to hedge funds and private equity funds that are either closed to new money or will let a new investor put in only a limited amount of capital.

Mr. El-Erian, who is married with a 3-year-old daughter, starts his day on the trading floor at 6 a.m. and spends afternoons interviewing new recruits. A challenge has been that “we cannot press a pause button on the stock market while we get our act together,” he said.

He points out that if Harvard chooses to leverage its bets, it has such a strong balance sheet that it can borrow at favorable rates. Its long-term horizon also lets it consider investments that might not pay off for years, and exposure to a panoply of asset classes can help it gain insights into economic developments.

The result may be that some managers leave, “but that means they are successful and the endowment has benefited,” Mr. El-Erian said. Mr. El-Erian seems eager to help bridge the gap between the endowment and the university. Harvard’s vice president for finance, Elizabeth Mora, said that under previous management “it was not the culture of the place to be as integrated with the university.”

“Mohamed makes it an active part of his itinerary. He came over on Friday and addressed the administrative heads of all the schools, giving a presentation on the endowment and the structure of the management company.”

His family’s background offers some insights into what has drawn him to the academic world.

Born to an Egyptian father and a French mother, Mr. El-Erian was educated in the United States, Egypt, France and Britain and got a degree in economics at Cambridge University and a doctorate at Oxford.

He recalled that his father, a law professor who joined the Egyptian diplomatic corps and spent the early 1970s in France, “insisted that we be exposed every day to a range of international newspapers that covered the entire political spectrum because it was a constant reminder that there are many ways to think about the same issue.”

Though Mr. El-Erian had hoped to become a professor, he was forced to get a job when his father unexpectedly died at the age of 60, leaving his 23-year-old son to support his mother and a 7-year-old sister.

He joined the International Monetary Fund in 1983. When he left 15 years later, he was deputy director in the Middle East department, providing emergency aid to governments and advising policy makers.

“Then Pimco came along and decided to take a gamble,” Mr. El-Erian said. “I said that I had never traded a bond in my life and Bill Gross said, ‘We can teach you that.’ ”

When he left, Mr. Gross, the chief investment officer, wrote of Mr. El-Erian in his monthly Investment Outlook note: “No one could have, or has, done it better since he crossed the threshold from the I.M.F. to Pimco.”

Mr. El-Erian turned in a compound 19 percent return for Pimco’s $3 billion emerging markets fund over nearly seven years, making it the third-best- performing fund in its sector, according to Morningstar. He oversaw an additional $25 billion in other managed accounts.

He was willing to be iconoclastic in his trading. In 1999, convinced that Argentina was running oversize deficits and the economic climate was changing, he sold $2 billion of Argentine debt, even though Argentina represented 20 percent of the J. P. Morgan benchmark fund. Mr. El-Erian’s assessment proved right two years later when Argentina suffered a $100 billion default.

Though several endowment experts and academics say privately that Mr. El-Erian’s experience may be too narrow, Harvard Management’s board said it believed that his international expertise would give the university an edge.

“The investment problem is becoming more and more global, rather than thinking about the classic U.S. asset classes,” said John Y. Campbell, a Harvard economics professor who is on the management company’s board. “Once you frame the problem that way, it is clearer why Mohamed seemed like an outstanding candidate.”

Now Mr. El-Erian wants to apply that international expertise to a broader array of markets. Last year, he hired experts in foreign exchange and from the International Monetary Fund to study the stability of various governments overseas.

“If you are interested in real estate in Brazil, for example, in addition to the best real estate opportunities, you have to have a view about the neighborhood,” he said. “There is the question of currency risk, but also the question of whether Brazil is going to stay stable.”

At least one of Harvard’s crucial external managers is cutting back the amount of the university’s money it will handle. In 1998. for example, when John Jacobson left Harvard Management to start Highfields Capital Management, a hedge fund that invests in United States equities, Harvard put $500 million with him.

By last year, that figure was $2 billion, or 20 percent of Highfields’ capital. Without the Meyer relationship and with concerns that no single investor hold such a large stake, Highfields returned $1.5 billion to Harvard last year, forcing the endowment to find new managers.

As Mr. El-Erian works to invest Harvard’s money, he joins a sector of the money management field where some endowment chiefs have become investment stars, working in a fishbowl where the competition, and pressure, are intense.

How long does he plan to stay? “I just arrived,” he responded.

The Chinese do it in reverse

While big-ticket IPOs in New York and Hong Kong for Chinese banks and insurance companies may monopolise headlines, in recent years another class of Chinese company has been quietly tapping the international capital markets, reports Business Week.

Enterprises that don’t have the heft or profits for a splashy initial public offering are finding they can get a coveted overseas listing through a reverse merger.

How does it work?

According to Business Week, the Chinese business typically will be acquired by a US shell company (or special purpose acquisition vehicle - SPAC) that is worthless, except for one thing: it’s publicly traded. The American board then resigns, the Chinese board takes over, changes the company’s name, and issues new stock to hedge funds and other new investors, raising millions of dollars in fresh capital. One example is Sinovac Biotech, a Beijing-based maker of vaccines, which executed a reverse merger in 2003 and subsequently raised $12m.

For more and more Chinese companies, a reverse merger is faster and less onerous than an IPO, the magazine says. The process might take just a few months, according to Peter Zhou, managing director of American Union Securities, a New York firm which helped broker 10 such deals since 2005 and is currently working on another nine.

Some 150 Chinese companies have taken the reverse-merger route since 2005. “The Chinese are realizing that there’s a lot of money here,” Zhou told the magazine.

But not everyone is pleased with these developments. As one lawyer explained, few Chinese executives realise Americans generally shun such shells, as they typically trade over the counter. “Nobody follows them, there’s no market in the shares,” Neil Torpey, a Hong Kong-based lawyer said. “So after having gone through a lot of time and expense and effort, the underlying purposes aren’t realized.”

So why do Chinese companies bother? Business Week offers two reasons:

  1. “They have few other options - small companies in the country’s rust belt or in industries that aren’t sexy are unlikely to draw the interest of the venture capital and private equity investors swarming over China. Plus there’s a two-year wait for a listing on the booming Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges.”
  2. “There’s less interference from investors. Reverse mergers are usually followed up with a private placement. The hedge funds that typically buy these shares are content to allow management to continue operating unfettered, whereas private-equity outfits would typically demand a greater say in decision-making, along with board seats.”
This entry was posted on Thursday, March 15th, 2007 at 8:56 and i

Wednesday, March 14, 2007

Here’s the hoax Citigroup email

“Subject: Rumour/ Rumour : New York, NY (Reuters) - The US’s top bank,

Rumour/ Rumour : New York, NY (Reuters) - The US’s top bank,
Citigroup (NYSE: C), has cited, in a filing with the US Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), that they have underestimated their exposure
to the subprime lending market.
Liabilities incurred by Citi are, according to the company, expected to
be “a nineteen-fold increase over previously reported expectations”.
Previously, the company had anticipated $300mil in exposure to the
subprime market.”

This cod Reuters story first did the rounds on Wall Street on Tuesday, before cropping up in London on Wednesday morning.

Dow Jones issued a short news story on the “rumour” on Tuesday saying Citigroup denied the report, following that up with a further news item on Wednesday, quoting Reuters saying this was not a Reuters report.

The hoax report does not really bear more than a quick glance. Even when set against the tortuous prose employed by some news wire journalists, the hoaxer is not a scribe. “The US’s top bank…has cited…that they have undestimated …”?? Oh, and no news outlet on earth shortens million to “mil.” That’s trader talk.

Does it matter? Probably not. Citigroup’s stock took quite a bashing during Tuesday’s sell off in New York, but then it would have done with or without the hoax report.

Some day, though, someone with a bit of writing ability, employing some attention to detail, might produce something believable…

Monday, March 12, 2007

Veryan Allen: Alpha and the 2 and 20 crowd

Hedge Fund

12.3.07

Alpha and the 2 and 20 crowd

A friend went to a famous restaurant recently. As she told me of the soup to nuts gourmet experience and enjoying the vintage Petrus and d'Yquem, I couldn't help wondering if some would argue she was ripped off. There was an even more famous restaurant nearby, that satisfied hunger pains just as well, served more people and whose track record was much longer. More importantly a typical meal tab there was approximately 1/100th of what the other restaurant charged. I informed her about the cheaper food elsewhere but she replied that, whilst aware of those lower food fees, the difference in quality was fairly reflected in the menu prices between 3 Star Michelin-rated and McDonalds restaurants.

No-one is forced to invest in hedge funds anymore than forced to eat at a top restaurant. People do so because the after-cost product is superior. It takes great skill to become a top chef and great skill to become a top money manager. Alpha and better risk-adjusted performance is worth paying for. The fees involved derive simply from widespread investor demand but limited fund supply. Good hedge funds are rare but there are decatrillions of global money looking for a reliable return higher than bonds but with LESS risk than long only equity. Competent hedge funds more than justify their fees. Competent fund of hedge funds and other intermediary allocators justify their second layer of fees for those investors without the time and expertise to do it themselves.

There has been renewed attack on hedge fund fees recently. In one paper Mark Kritzman concludes that after fee performance for hedge funds reduces their value to an investor. So what? We all know the AVERAGE hedge fund isn't very good and does not merit its fees. Even the new Berkshire Hathaway annual letter makes a jibe about 2 and 20 crowd not being worth it. The accusatory paragraph comes a few pages after revealing they made hundreds of millions trading those apparent weapons of mass destruction called DERIVATIVES. But these fee arguments throw the baby out with the bathwater. As Warren Buffett correctly wrote last week, "derivatives, just like stocks and bonds, are sometimes wildly mispriced". Surely those able to identify those mispricings should be able to charge whatever fees the market will bare and investors are freely willing to pay. I would have omitted "sometimes" though or changed it to "always".

Reliable alpha producers, after fees, CAN be identified ahead of time and that performance IS of great value to investors. It usually takes a bear market for investors to realise this. No-one disputes that if a fund makes 22% gross, the client would be better off if the fees were 0 and 0 instead of 2 and 20. It surely does not take an empirical study to determine that 16% to the investor is not as good as 22%. Surely what matters is that the 16% performance offers a new, diversified excess source of return. 80% of mutual funds are likely to underperform their index and, likewise, 80% of hedge funds are unlikely to be alpha generators. There is also no doubt paying 2 and 20 for asset or strategy beta is a waste of money, BUT 2 and 20 for alpha is a bargain.

2 and 20 has become the industry standard for many reasons but the main one is due to investors. Rightly or wrongly, lower fees get associated with lower quality fund products. I have heard these "fees are too high and are bound to drop" forecasts for years but they never pan out. I once asked a group of experienced institutional investors in hedge funds which of the following fee structures they would prefer for an otherwise identical fund. A) 2 and 20 B) 0 and 25 or C) 0 and 50 above a 10% hurdle. Most said they would choose A. They feared B and C would make a fund take too much risk and not correctly compensate a high quality investment team. The fee structure of hedge funds will not change because there is no incentive to change and professional investors look at the after fee returns. Whatever the critics and hedge fund replicators think, 2 and 20 (and above) is here to stay.

Alpha is like gold. There is lots of it out there but is hard to extract. The AVERAGE gold miner probably won't find much gold and the AVERAGE fund manager won't find much alpha. Those who figure out a way to mine alpha deserve the higher fees since it is worth its weight in gold. Alpha is theoretically in vast supply but the extraction costs are expensive. This is where these "limited supply of alpha" people get it so wrong. Gold is rare because no-one, yet, has invented a way to economically extract gold from sea water. Alpha is rare and expensive because very few will ever reliably find a rich seam of it, or develop a sustainable way to mine that seam. But plenty of alpha is out there and investors will ALWAYS be prepared to pay a rich premium for the highest quality alpha product.

Friday, March 09, 2007

We all fall down; Buttonwood

(From The Economist, provided by LexisNexis)
Publication: The Economist

Why investors were not as diversified as they had thought
DON'T put all your eggs in one basket. Investors are taught at stockmarket elementary school that the secret to avoiding financial disaster is to make sure they diversify their portfolios.
But when markets plunged on February 27th shelter was pretty hard to find. First China fell, then European markets, then Wall Street. Emerging markets suffered. Corporate-bond spreads widened (in other words, their prices dropped). Oil declined. Even gold, a supposed "store of value", took a hit. Only the yen and government bonds gained ground.
This marching-in-step has been described by Henry McVey, a Morgan Stanley strategist, as a "market of one". Diversification did not bring the benefits that investors might have expected.
Perhaps it should not be too surprising that, according to Merrill Lynch, over the past five years the Russell 2000 index of small American companies has a 94% correlation with the S&P 500, the main Wall Street index. More alarmingly, international stockmarkets have not offered any diversification either: they have shown a 95% correlation. Yet more startling are the figures showing that hedge funds have recorded a 94% link with shares. Even property has been following Wall Street 81% of the time.
Why should this be? The obvious explanation is the much-touted "excess liquidity" that has been driving up one asset price after another. There is a healthy debate about how to measure this liquidity, or indeed whether the term has any real meaning. But most people agree that the savings surpluses in Asia and the oil exporters have played an important part in fuelling financial markets. JPMorgan estimates that global liquidity increased by $3.9 trillion between 2002 and 2006, of which around 50% came from Asia and 40% from the oil producers.
The bulk of this money went at first into risk-free assets such as Treasury bills and bonds. That drove down the yield on such assets. So other investors were then naturally tempted to look elsewhere for higher returns.
Meanwhile, pension funds have been trying to reduce the bets they have made on shares. This combination has unleashed a "chase for yield" as any asset with an above-average income (or which offered the prospect of above-average returns), has been driven up in price. More speculative investors have been tempted to borrow at the risk-free rate and invest in risky securities, one version of the talked-about "carry trade".
As more money has chased these risky assets, correlations have risen. By the same logic, at moments when investors become risk-averse and want to cut their positions, these asset classes tend to fall together. The effect can be particularly dramatic if the asset classes are small (as in commodities). A few sellers can have a big impact on prices.
This makes it hard to say which asset market is leading the sell-off, whether it is China tripping up Wall Street, or the yen/dollar rate pulling down corporate bonds. Investors are rather like those circus acts who spin plates on top of poles; once one plate starts to fall, the performer must rush to attend to it, risking that others will fall while his back is turned.
The growing importance of hedge funds also makes a difference to correlations. Hedge funds have two important characteristics: they aim to produce absolute returns (in other words, they hate to lose money), and they borrow to enhance returns. That combination makes them quick to cut their bets when prices move against them. In the old days, when pension funds dominated the market, they could (in theory) ride out fluctuations, because of their long-term horizons.
The result, suggests Tim Bond, a strategist at Barclays Capital, is a market with long periods of subdued volatility, as asset prices slowly rise, interspersed with violent corrections, as in May 2006 and the recent sell-off.
How, then, can investors find true diversification from the stockmarket? One answer is to look for assets, such as weather derivatives, that have not yet been discovered by the herd. Another is to use the oldest trick in the book and buy Treasury bonds, the safest of safe havens. Over the past five years Treasury bond prices have tended to move in the opposite direction to shares.
This was not always so. During the 1990s, when inflation and short-term rates were falling around the world, stockmarkets and government bonds tended to move together. That pattern changed after the dotcom bubble burst, as investors fled for safety.
The recent outperformance of Treasury bonds shows that the markets are really worrying about economic growth, rather as they did in 2000-02. Were inflation the scare, investors would be buying commodities. So before investors diversify, they should choose which risks they are trying to avoid.

Thursday, March 08, 2007

The Whole Ineichen Interview

All About Alpha Exclusive: An interview with Alexander Ineichen, author of “Asymmetric Returns”

7 March 2007

With their perfectly-timed trains and neatly-arranged homes, the Swiss are big fans of symmetry. This makes UBS’s resident hedge fund guru Alexander Ineichen all the more of an anomaly. His book Asymmetric Returns has been garnering a lot of attention not because it espouses order and regularity, but because it so vocally challenges the status quo, refutes conventional wisdom and, well, questions symmetry itself.

Before addressing a record crowd at an AIMA Canada event in Toronto earlier today, Ineichen (rhymes with Heineken) sat down with AllAboutAlpha’s Alpha Male to discuss issues including: 130/30 strategies, alternative beta, ”peak alpha”, the CAIA designation and recent attacks on the CAPM.

AM: You are a founding board member of the Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst (CAIA) designation. Has the dramatic growth of the CAIA designation surprised you?

The growth of the program has exceeded my expectations. The institutionalization of hedge funds has always been a major theme of my research and it has also helped power the growth of the designation. The CAIA is a unique program that includes material not covered by the CFA. I’m often asked if it’s a substitute for the CFA. My response is that if you’re unmarried, then go ahead and do a CFA, but if you’re married and have kids, then the CFA may be just too much work.

AM: What did you learn after writing your first book Absolute Returns that compelled you to write this latest book?

Absolute Returns was based almost entirely on my UBS research reports “In Search of Alpha” and “The Search for Alpha Continues”. But Asymmetric Returns is based largely on new research conducted between 2003 and 2005. The motivation was to explore whether alpha and beta alone captured what we do the in hedge fund industry. A piece I wrote in 2005 called “A Critique of Pure Alpha” argued that alpha and beta don’t fully capture the value proposition of alternative investments.

Alpha is a term from the 1960’s. It relies on a linear model that is now somewhat outdated. Now we think, model and manage in a non-linear environment. While alpha and beta are convenient, I think perhaps we need to move on. Asymmetric Returns attempts to define this space beyond the CAPM.

AM: It seems to be in vogue these days to attack the CAPM. Behavioral economists such as James Montier of Dresdner Kleinwort and academics such as Tuomo Vuolteenaho of Harvard have recently argued that high beta does not necessarily translate into high returns.

I saw that debate between Peter Bernstein and James Montier. I think Bernstein is spot-on when he says CAPM shapes the way we think about markets and about managing money. I’d argue that the whole idea of benchmarking comes from that sort of thinking. But we now need to move on. I’d argue that there is something beyond these ideas from the 1960’s. I attempt to address this by writing a book - but it contains just one point of view. It’s certainly not going to replace financial textbooks. But we need to move beyond orthodox finance which argues that markets are perfectly efficient and random. That is so untrue it hurts.

AM: You make an interesting observation in your book. You say that the US equity market is perhaps the least efficient market in the world. How so?

Yes. That comment was a little tongue in cheek, but an argument can be made that a bubble represents the “ultimate inefficiency” because it cannot be easily arbitraged away. It’s like Keynes used to say, markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent. I believe you can view the tech bubble of the 1990’s as a massive market inefficiency. But inefficiencies in smaller markets can be arbitraged away much easier and faster.

AM: You said in the book that “there is no skill involved with managing large cap equities” because those funds tend to hug the index and provide mostly beta with very little alpha. How do you respond to those large cap managers who admit to a high r-squared but point to portfolio holdings that are still materially different from the index?

I articulated that argument in the extreme to make a point. In reality you do have good large cap investors both in the hedge fund and long only space. I just want to focus attention on the difference between complexity and liquidity premiums (beta) as distinct components of the mutual fund value proposition.

AM: But generally speaking you do go against the grain in your book by questioning the value of long-only management. How was this line of argument received by your employer UBS.

I have actually been pleasantly surprised by the intellectual freedom I’ve been given at UBS. I think clients may also be surprised that I am allowed to write what I write. And they appreciate it. It’s extremely important in the institutional investing world to have a sustainable credibility and intellectual integrity. In other words, as an institution you can and should have differing views because no one knows exactly what the future holds. Sure, we have people within UBS that predict what the next five or more years will bring us, but these are just different viewpoints. From a business perspective, contrarian viewpoints need to be taken seriously to provide the business with strategic options no matter how the future unfolds. For example, what if I’m right? As a business, we need create a sort of “optionality” that means we’d already be in the right markets with the right services and investment options in that eventuality.

AM: A lot has been written recently about “130/30″ strategies. What is your take on this trend?

That’s an innovation coming out of traditional asset management which, in my view, is a direct response to absolute return investing. It rests on the argument that constraining a skilled manager is bad for performance. That’s a very powerful argument and cannot be refuted.

AM: In your view, is “30″ a magic number?

No. It started as “120/20″ and morphed into “130/30″. But even that’s not fixed. Some in the hedge funds of funds industry are actually responding by launching their own products called “170/70″!

AM: Is the concept of portable alpha becoming passe?

That term is being somewhat overtaken by other labels. But the ideas remain the same. I’ve always felt that portable alpha clients were our happiest clients. Their returns expectations were almost always met because they expected, say 300-500 basis points from their alpha engine. And guess what, that’s what they got. A lot of other institutions that invested in funds of hedge funds solely to outperform long-only equities starting in, say, 2003 might have been disappointed with their returns relative to long-only equities during this period. But over the long run, funds of hedge funds have outperfomed equities by a mile. In other words, some investors tend to look too closely at the recent past.

AM: Has risk appetite changed over this time period?

Yes. Appetite for volatility has been increasing a lot recently. In fact, I remember a time in 2001 when investors wanted a market neutral product with a volatility of 2.5% and a capital guarantee. Now, they want 130/30 which has equity-like volatility! So within only five or six years we’ve gone from one extreme - volatility of 2.5% with capital protection - to equity-like volatility.

AM: You write quite a bit about behavioral finance in Asymmetric Returns. How do concepts like prospect theory and loss aversion play a role in your thesis?

I included these ideas in the book to challenge the dogma of standard financial theory - to challenge the orthodox economics from Nobel Laureates that is taught at business schools. Over the last 10 years, behavioral finance has emerged to challenge the assumptions behind the existing theories. But unfortunately, behavioral finance does not provide any new all-encompassing theories to take their place.

Still, one of my favorite papers was one written by Andrew Lo of MIT a couple of years ago called the “Adaptive Market Hypothesis“. In it, he argued that one doesn’t actually have to make extreme assumptions like perfect rationality. Instead, argued Lo, economic subjects are driven by their wish to survive - like in nature. This is true regardless of whether you are an employee with a pension, a hedge fund manager, or a corporate investor. So this idea really appealed to me. Is it a widely accepted new theory? No. Not yet. In fact, it might be 10 years before this thinking wanders into the textbooks of a CFA or MBA program.

AM: Do you believe that what you call “subjective economics” is the engine that drives the non-economic players on the other side of various hedge fund trades - the farmers, oil companies, even the lottery players to which you refer in Asymmetric Returns?

One of the assumptions behind efficient markets theory and other orthodox ideas is that everyone has the same time horizon. But a pension fund has a different time horizon than a hedge fund. Because we assume the same time horizons, we conclude that alpha generation is a zero sum game. But if you assume that not everyone has the same time horizon, then everyone can win by synchronizing their portfolios with their own particular objectives. Time horizon would be just one part of this unique list of objectives. Then, in theory, everyone could win by moving their portfolios closer to their own risk objectives.

AM: If hedge funds produce alpha in aggregate, then the universe of non-hedge funds must, in aggregate, give it up. So are hedge funds better structured to harvest this alpha?

I’m actually trying to move away from the term “alpha”. If everyone maximizes their own unique risk & utility functions, then we shouldn’t really be talking about alpha moving from one party to the other. Obviously, in an extreme case such as a mispriced convertible bond, a quantifiable amount of alpha moves from one party to another. But if you move beyond this very constrained model of alpha and beta, then all investors could come out better off.

AM: You refer to hedge fund replication advocates as a “fraternity” in your book. You also say that “the idea of factor modeling is to play around with the data long enough until one finds empirical evidence to prove one’s preconception”. Would you like elaborate on this?

That’s a bit tongue in cheek obviously. But even if it’s not 100% true, it has an element of truth. In finance we get awfully excited if we have r-squareds around 0.5 or 0.6. But natural scientists don’t get excited with anything below 0.95. Some people even call factor modeling “alchemy” or “pseudo-science” because it’s often not very accurate. So I’m not sure if drawing conclusions based on these r-squareds is a very smart thing to do.

AM: You pose the question in your book “If the asymmetric return profiles advocated in this book can be obtained passively, then why pay an active fee?” and then you go on to show that passive replication actually underperforms hedge funds substantially. But research by Professor Harry Kat seems to suggest that a passive replication of hedge funds using dynamic trading strategies actually outperforms hedge funds 80% of the time. What are your opinions on this approach to hedge fund replication?

The problem is that you didn’t have these passive products ten years ago. For example, if you bought an autobiography of Steve Jobs in the mid 1990’s and then programmed a computer to replicate Jobs’ strategic thinking, then your computer would have missed out on the iPod.

Don’t get me wrong, quantitative work is extremely important. It helps you ask questions and it provides performance attribution. But it’s not forward looking.

AM: Lars Jaegar has recently predicted huge growth in the hedge fund replication business. He says that passively replicated hedge funds might make up 40% of the entire hedge fund industry in 5 years. Do you think that’s an exaggeration?

Not necessarily. In the US long-only industry, about 30 to 40 percent of assets are invested in passive strategies. I think he is just applying that logic to the hedge fund space. He could be right. But I wouldn’t go as far as to argue that replicated hedge funds are a better product.

AM: Is the world running out of alpha?

I think the counter argument to the “peak alpha” theory is that we have had a lot of new markets coming on line in the past decade and one could say that opportunity set for risk capital has never been greater.

AM: Final question. In your book you said “in April 2004, we once head someone say at a hedge fund conference that ‘whenever Main Street falls in love with what Wall Street has to sell, there’s a correction in the next 12-36 months’” At the time of writing, you were 24 months on. Now we are 35 months on. Is there a hedge fund bubble that risks being burst?

Sure, there’s an element of cyclicality mixed with a fundamental structural change in the asset management industry. I’m not trying to advocate that human nature doesn’t have a tendency to “overshoot”. But this still leaves us with a paradigm shift in the asset management industry that is changing the way we think about risk and asset allocation. And that’s secular, not cyclical.

Ask Alexander Ineichen

The Alpha Male, at All About Alpha, has caught up with Alexander Ineichen, the UBS hedge fund analyst and author of Asymmetric Returns, to discover, among other things, how to pronounce his name - rhymes with Heineken, for those wondering.

In the book, Ineichen, who back in 2000 and 2001 wrote UBS’s most reprinted pieces of research, The Search for Alpha and The Search for Alpha Continues, argues that the concepts of alpha and beta, and the capital asset pricing model, do not fully capture what alternative investing is all about and questions the value of long-only management.

“Alpha is a term from the 1960’s,” he says in the interview. “It relies on a linear model that is now somewhat outdated. Now we think, model and manage in a non-linear environment. While alpha and beta are convenient, I think perhaps we need to move on. Asymmetric Returns attempts to define this space beyond the CAPM…..we need to move beyond orthodox finance which argues that markets are perfectly efficient and random. That is so untrue it hurts.”

Ineichen wants to move away from the term alpha. We here at FT Alphaville won’t take it personally - here are a few other highlights:

AM: A lot has been written recently about “130/30″ strategies. What is your take on this trend?

That’s an innovation coming out of traditional asset management which, in my view, is a direct response to absolute return investing. It rests on the argument that constraining a skilled manager is bad for performance. That’s a very powerful argument and cannot be refuted.

AM: In your view, is “30″ a magic number?

No. It started as “120/20″ and morphed into “130/30″. But even that’s not fixed. Some in the hedge funds of funds industry are actually responding by launching their own products called “170/70″!

AM: Is the concept of portable alpha becoming passe?

That term is being somewhat overtaken by other labels. But the ideas remain the same. I’ve always felt that portable alpha clients were our happiest clients. Their returns expectations were almost always met because they expected, say 300-500 basis points from their alpha engine. And guess what, that’s what they got. A lot of other institutions that invested in funds of hedge funds solely to outperform long-only equities starting in, say, 2003 might have been disappointed with their returns relative to long-only equities during this period. But over the long run, funds of hedge funds have outperformed equities by a mile. In other words, some investors tend to look too closely at the recent past.

AM: Has risk appetite changed over this time period?

Yes. Appetite for volatility has been increasing a lot recently. In fact, I remember a time in 2001 when investors wanted a market neutral product with a volatility of 2.5% and a capital guarantee. Now, they want 130/30 which has equity-like volatility! So within only five or six years we’ve gone from one extreme - volatility of 2.5% with capital protection - to equity-like volatility.

AM: In your book you said “in April 2004, we once head someone say at a hedge fund conference that ‘whenever Main Street falls in love with what Wall Street has to sell, there’s a correction in the next 12-36 months’” At the time of writing, you were 24 months on. Now we are 35 months on. Is there a hedge fund bubble that risks being burst?

Sure, there’s an element of cyclicality mixed with a fundamental structural change in the asset management industry. I’m not trying to advocate that human nature doesn’t have a tendency to “overshoot”. But this still leaves us with a paradigm shift in the asset management industry that is changing the way we think about risk and asset allocation. And that’s secular, not cyclical.

Tuesday, March 06, 2007

N.Y. firm sets Catalyst on new course

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N.Y. firm sets Catalyst on new course

With its two top executives bailing out, losses in 19 of the last 20 quarters, and a ranking as a small producer in a shrinking industry, Catalyst Paper hardly appears to be a candidate for investor confidence.

The company's record gives most shareholders the shivers, but not New York investment fund manager Amit Wadhwaney.

He thrives on the bad news. That's what got him involved in the Canadian forest products sector in the first place.

Wadhwaney manages Third Avenue Management LLP's $4-billion international value fund and when he looked at the Canadian forest sector he saw energy costs were rising, the high-flying Canadian dollar was hurting producers in this country and readers were abandoning newsprint for the Internet.

"I thought 'fascinating' -- something bad must be happening here," he said in a recent Barron's interview. All that bad news meant there must be opportunity somewhere.

Third Avenue bought Norwegian giant Norske Skog's 19.8 per cent stake in Catalyst Paper in February 2006 when Norske sold its Canadian properties. Third Avenue also bought just under 20 per cent of Canfor Corp.

"You buy these things when they are cheap and nobody believes there is any light at the end of the tunnel, and hopefully, if we haven't made a foolish decision, things work out," Wadhwaney said in an interview with The Vancouver Sun Friday.

Catalyst, with four paper mills and a recycled newsprint mill in B.C., had struggled with two other absentee owners -- first Fletcher Challenge of New Zealand and then the Norwegians -- before it became a fully independent company in 2006. It was believed within Catalyst that both those companies placed their own interests first.

When Third Avenue Management announced it intended to increase its stake to 38 per cent July 25, it was history repeating itself; only this time, instead of a foreign forest company, it was U.S. financiers stepping in.

Catalyst's board didn't like what they saw in Third Avenue's bid, specifically that the Third Avenue offer didn't reflect the value of the company. And its intentions, in gaining effective control without taking up all the shares, were unclear. They called it a hostile takeover and launched a 60-day poison pill while a board committee looked in vain for another buyer. Relations were strained between the board and the company's largest shareholder.

"Because we weren't invited into the club, we were called hostile bidders," Wadhwaney said of the fight to increase his stake.

By early October, it was apparent there was no other buyer.

"Given the difficult industry conditions," said Catalyst chairman Keith Purchase in a release to shareholders, "the board has concluded that an attractive alternative transaction is not available at this time"

"They looked high and low and apparently found rather a lack of interest in buying those assets," Wadhwaney said. "They have lost money in 19 of the last 20 quarters. That certainly isn't a compelling record, is it?"

Wadhwaney acknowledged that it was tough global market conditions and a higher Canadian dollar that affected the company's earnings, factors that served Third Avenue well.

Third Avenue succeeded in increasing its stake in October after investors tendered 53 million shares. Third Avenue needed only 39 million.

Wadhwaney celebrated his triumph by immediately launching a recruiting drive for new directors drawn from both the financial and pulp sectors. His intention: to rebuild both the board and the company, hand-picking people and then letting them set a new strategic direction.

"This is a company that's going to be run for shareholders for a change," he said Friday. "All this grousing about taking control of the company on the cheap was, perhaps, a way of saying 'We may not be board members for very much longer.' "

Third Avenue wanted to exercise "oversight" over Catalyst, he said.

"The question is, how does one have an appropriate degree of oversight. You want the people who run the company to run the company, but you have to have some degree of oversight."

To exercise that oversight, he wants directors with knowledge of the industry and finances that is separate and distinct from management. They will be active and involved in the company, he said.

On Dec. 1, he succeeded in getting four new directors appointed, including himself. Two others had extensive restructuring and distress investing experience: Benjamin Duster IV of Atlanta and Neil Goldman of New York. Duster, who is chairman of Algoma Steel, worked with Goldman's firm, MacKay Shields on restructuring of Algoma. Business consultant Jeff Marshall of Toronto was the fourth.

A fifth director, Denis Jean, formerly a director with SFK Pulp Fund, was nominated this week after Wadhwaney talked him into leaving SFK for Catalyst.

With Third Avenue taking such an active role in reshaping Catalyst, it was only a matter of time before senior executives left.

On Jan. 15 chief executive officer Russell Horner and chief financial officer Ralph Leverton announced they would be resigning March 28, the day Catalyst holds its annual shareholders meeting. Catalyst is now being run by a four-member committee while the search for a successor to Horner is underway. There's no guarantee the search will be complete by the March 28 annual general meeting, Wadhwaney said.

The company also announced it was laying off 350 people, the last major decision developed by Horner's team.

Today there is a very different board up for nomination at Catalyst, one Wadhwaney calls "engaged." The company's Feb. 26 prospectus provides a closer look: Current chair Purchase, who has a long history in the B.C. forest industry, did not put his name forward.

Eight directors are to be elected March 28. Only three are from the old regime: business consultant Thomas Chambers, former B.C. finance minister Gary Collins and former Donohue CEO Michel Desbiens. The rest were those recruited by the new owners.

Shareholders will be asked to approve a resolution changing the pay structure for directors, giving them more cash and opportunities to participate in the growth of the company. In return, they are expected to be more involved.

Wadhwaney says Catalyst is going to be the last man standing in an industry that is struggling to adjust to shrinking demand for its products. He is convinced more pulp and paper mills are going to close as demand for newsprint shrinks.

"I have time horizons that go on for quite some time. The government can step in with little Band-Aids here or there," he said in reference to bailouts offered the industry in Eastern Canada. "But what are they going to do when newsprint consumption keeps going down five to 10 per cent as it did last year? Something's going to have to give."

How the new board intends to make Catalyst the last man standing, however, remains unclear, other than Wadhwaney wants to keep all mills operating.

"We have to adapt in every which way to figure out how we are going to deal with this asset base, with our workers, to make sure everything is okay. We have to have some sort of plan for moving forward," he said.

"When times are tough, people make tough decisions. Industry adapts. It's like an organism, it adapts to different circumstances and this industry is in the process of adapting to permanently lower levels of demand for its products."

ghamilton@png.canwest.com

© The Vancouver Sun 2007

Lunch is for wimps

Lunch is for wimps
It's not a question of enough, pal. It's a zero sum game, somebody wins, somebody loses. Money itself isn't lost or made, it's simply transferred from one perception to another.