Wednesday, February 12, 2014

Lee Ainslie Interview: Columbia Business School's Graham & Doddsville


Columbia Business School is out with the Winter 2014 issue of its Graham & Doddsville investment newsletter.  This time, they feature a rare interview with Maverick Capital's Lee Ainslie. CLICK HERE FOR THE NEWSLETTER.

The hedge fund manager talked about how he's always trying to learn new things and how he's read every investing book he can get his hands on.

Some interesting quotes from the interview:

On portfolio positioning: "In terms of sizing, our average long is roughly twice the size of an average short at Maverick and our long portfolio is more concentrated than our short portfolio.  This construction allows us to maintain net long exposure typically between 30% and 60%.  The greater diversification of our short portfolio reflects the riskier nature of these investments and that these positions turn over more frequently, so having a deeper bench of such investments is helpful."

On valuation:  "So while we place great emphasis on valuation in our investment decisions, valuation alone should never be the driver of either a long or a short investment ... I believe it is important to identify a catalyst that should benefit the valuation ... The most commonly used valuation metric at Maverick is sustainable free cash flow in comparison to enterprise value."

On what he looks for in deep dives: "The most critical factor that we're trying to evaluate is the quality of management - their intelligence, competitiveness and, most importantly, their desire to create shareholder value." 

On what he looks for when hiring: "The most important components we gauge include competitiveness, mental flexibility and emotional consistency - that last trait is surprisingly important."  These are pretty similar to what Julian Robertson looked for when he was hiring or seeding funds.


This issue also highlights talks with Jim Grant of Grant's Interest Rate Observer, Dr. Kenneth Shubin Stein of Spencer Capital and Geoffrey Batt of Euphrates Iraq Fund

Monday, February 10, 2014

Wealthfront Tax Loss Harvesting White Paper - A Case Study In How Not To Calculate Tax Alpha


The benefits of reducing current tax liabilities through tax loss harvesting are widely acknowledged - so much, that the IRS developed the 30-day "wash sale" rules to prevent taxpayers from abusing the strategy. Yet less widely understood is that there's one crucial caveat to tax loss harvesting - that taking advantage of the loss also reduces the cost basis of the investment, potentially exposing the taxpayer to a gain in the future that can wipe out some, most, or all of the tax benefit, and in the extreme with today's four capital gains tax brackets actually drive up future tax rates and leave the investor worse off than having done nothing at all.
Notwithstanding these issues, many investors and advisors continue to overstate the benefits of tax loss harvesting, and now "robo-advisor" Wealthfront is doing so as well, with its "Tax-Loss Harvesting White Paper" that purports Wealthfront can increase an investor's wealth by an extra 1%/year, annualized, indefinitely, through its daily tax loss harvesting strategy. Unfortunately, though, the reality is that in a review of its strategy, Wealthfront - like so many others - is confusing tax savings with tax deferral, and in the process may be drastically overstating its benefits by a factor of 10:1, and for its typical investor the true annual benefit may be a mere 1/25th of what their "white paper" claims purport.
Again, this is not to say that tax-loss harvesting is useless, and in reality while many advisors have been automating tax-loss harvesting just like the robo-advisors for almost a decade, Wealthfront's particular tools to implement loss harvesting are unique, especially in how it is able to quasi-pool investor assets to drive the transaction costs down to nothing for its clients (facilitating tax loss harvesting at very small thresholds on a nearly continuous basis!). Nonetheless, the flaws of the Wealthfront tax-loss harvesting white paper also provide a clear example of the problems with trying to come up with a generalized algorithm for an individual's specific and unique tax circumstances, and overall provides an unfortunate case study in how not to calculate tax alpha and try to apply its benefits for a wide range of clientele.

What Is Tax Alpha

The concept of measuring "tax alpha" - or the value of executing good tax strategy - is not new. In the context of portfolios, we can attribute tax alpha to several strategies, including good asset location, as well as the benefits of tax loss harvesting. So-called "robo-advisor" Wealthfront executes automated tax loss harvesting as a key value proposition, and here's how Wealthfront defines the tax alpha associated with its strategy:
TaxAlpha = (STCL * STTR + LTCL * LTTR) / PortfolioBeginningBalance
Definitions:STCL is the short-term net capital loss realized
STTR is the combined Federal and California state short-term capital gain tax rate. We [Wealthfront] use the maximum federal marginal tax rate of 43.4% (39.6% + 3.8% for tax payers who earn in excess of $200,000) and the maximum California tax rate of 13.3.%
LTCL is the long-term net capital loss realized
LTTR is the combined Federal and California state long-term capital gain tax rate. We [Wealthfront] use the maximum federal tax rate of 23.8% (20% + 3.8% for tax payers who earn in excess $200,000) and the maximum California tax rate of 13.3%
PortfolioBeginningBalance is the value of the portfolio at the beginning of each year
For example, imagine someone bought an investment for $100,000 and it declined by 15% to $15,000. If this is a long-term capital loss, the LTCL is $15,000. Given Wealthfront's 23.8% (Federal) + 13.3% (state) = 37.1% assumed tax rate (LTTR = 37.1%), this results in a tax savings of 37.1% x $15,000 = $5,565. Given a starting balance of $100,000, then $5,565 / $100,000 = a tax alpha of ~5.6%. In other words, the amount of (in this case, long-term capital gains) taxes avoided in the current year is ~5.6% of the original account balance.
Given this framework, Wealthfront has produced a hypothetical backtest of how their daily tax-loss harvesting strategy would have fared since the start of the year 2000. Their illustration assumes a $100,000 starting investment, plus $10,000 per quarter of ongoing contributions. Tax loss opportunities were harvested in accordance with the wash sale rules, where an alternative security was bought for 30 days before switching back to the original (which in some cases produced a short-term gain during the 30-day period). Losses were harvested based on a threshold mechanism that required them to be large enough that the loss wouldn't likely be entirely recovered within a 30-day period (as that would effectively convert an entire long-term loss into a short-term gain when switching back to the original investment), which means a declining investment might be harvested for losses several times as it declines (at lower and lower price points for small incremental losses along the way). Transaction costs appear to have been ignored (ostensibly because Wealthfront can actually implement its trades with any separate transaction costs to its clientele). The results of Wealthfront's backtest in terms of Annual Tax Alpha as reported in its own white paper are shown below:
Annual Tax Alpha w- Daily TLH for Wealthfront
Not surprisingly, the results show that the bulk of tax loss harvesting benefits come during bear markets, as that's when the majority of losses occur. While some small losses might occur amongst the various asset classes in the midst of a bull market, those losses are generally absorbed by ongoing rebalancing (which triggers at least modest gains to net against losses), so all of the tax alpha comes from partial- or full-year market declines in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2008. Notably, the tax alpha is actually negative in 2007 (rebalancing triggered gains and there were no losses left to offset them) and also in 2009 (the market rebounded so quickly that some long-term losses actually were converted into short-term gains, and they show up in different tax years because the losses got harvested at the end of 2008 and the switchback gains landed in early 2009).
Over the entire time period, Wealthfront notes that the average annual tax alpha was 1.14%, through the combination of big good years, some neutral years, and a pair of bad years (although it appears they calculated the mean annual tax alpha, rather than properly calculating the annualized tax alpha, which would have been slightly lower given the volatility, just as the average return of +50% and -33% is 8.5% but the annualized return is 0% because you actually finish with the same dollar amount you started with).

The Problem With [Wealthfront] Tax Alpha

Certainly, taking advantage of tax loss harvesting and the deductions it brings has value. The problem with tax alpha - at least after a review of the way that Wealthfront is calculating it - is that it fails to capture one key issue: the fact that when a loss is harvested, the cost basis of the investment is reset, downwards, which creates greater exposure for capital gains in the future, and means the tax alpha value of capital loss harvesting is being overvalued.
For instance, going back to the earlier example, the investment had declined from $100,000 down to $85,000, resulting in a $15,000 loss, $5,565 of tax savings, and a 5.6% tax alpha.However, going forward this investment now has a cost basis of $85,000 - since the loss was harvested - which means in the future, if/when/as it recovers back to $100,000, there will be a $15,000 gain. At the same 37.1% tax bracket, that results in a $5,565 tax liability, and anegative tax alpha of -5.6%! The net result? The investment is once again worth $100,000, for a total gain/loss of 0%, and the positive 5.6% and negative -5.6% tax alphas cancel each other out entirely. This assumes, of course, that the investment does in fact recover, and is in fact sold at the end. (While appreciated securities can be donated to avoid capital gains, and/or those who buy and hold to the end of life can receive a step-up in basis, given that Wealthfront's clientele are millenials who someday wish to retire, it seems far more likely that as a baseline assumption, investments will be sold for retirement or other spending purposes, or that gains will be recognized through rebalancing, long before these clients donate it all away or die sometime around the end of this century!)
The reality that harvesting losses produces subsequent gains of an offsetting and matching amount, though, presents the first major problem with the Wealthfront analysis; after systematically harvesting losses throughout the time horizon, they fail to account for the huge embedded gain that would be present by the end - especially given the massive bull run in equities since the trough in 2009. Since that time, the S&P 500 is up well over 100%, but Wealthfront only reported the positive tax alpha from the loss harvesting and conveniently fails to acknowledge the huge negative tax alpha embedded in the investments at the end of the time horizon! If the cost basis had really been reset all the way down at the market bottom through daily tax loss harvesting, a gain of 100%+ at their 37.1% tax rate assumptions means there's a -37% tax alpha looming at the end of this chart. Ironically, this much negative tax alpha would actually obliterate the entire value over the time horizon (technically it could actually be worse, as the cumulative tax alpha may well turn out to be negative, given the ongoing systematic investments since 2009 have only net gains and no prior losses to recognize!)! Of course, this reality that the negative tax alpha at the end will offset the positive tax alpha earlier reported is simply a mathematical reality, but one that Wealthfront's methodology implicitly ignores by not adjusting for a growing level of embedded capital gains at the end of the time horizon.

True Value Of Tax Loss Harvesting

To be fair, though, this doesn't mean all is lost for tax loss harvesting. Notwithstanding the flawed Wealthfront tax alpha analysis, there is a value to tax loss harvesting. It's the value of keeping those extra tax dollars that would have gone to Uncle Sam to stay in our pocket (or really, in our portfolio) in the meantime. That still has some true economic value.
For instance, continuing the earlier example, the $15,000 loss resulted in $5,565 of tax savings that could remain invested. Assuming an 8% growth rate, that $5,565 that remained invested would have produced an extra $445.20 of growth. Relative to the original $100,000 investment, this means the true annual economic benefit of tax deferral - essentially, the "time value of money" of having those tax dollars invested on your behalf and paying the bill later - was $445.20 / $100,000 = 0.45%. At least, for the year where a big loss occurred (producing the big tax deduction and tax savings to keep invested). The chart below recreates the Wealthfront "tax alpha" in blue, and then in green shows the true annual economic benefit that the Wealthfront "tax alpha" would have produced, assuming an 8% growth rate on the dollar amount of tax savings (but recognizing the tax savings itself will be repaid in the future when the investment recovers).
Wealthfront Tax Alpha vs True Economic Benefit of Tax Loss Harvesting
In case you're having trouble seeing the "green" parts of the chart that represent the true economic benefit of the tax deferral, you should. They're tiny green bars. Almost by definition, the height of each green bar representing the true economic benefit is 8%, or 1/12th of the blue bar symbolizing tax alpha. Which means that while Wealthfront was claiming an average annual tax alpha of 1.14%, the true economic value of their strategy was closer to 8% of that 1.14%, which is about 0.09%. Or stated another way, Wealthfront was overstating the true economic value of their tax loss harvesting by a factor of about 12:1.
To be fair, it's worth noting that over a 13-year time horizon, this framing will slightly understate the cumulative value of systematic tax loss harvesting, because the harvesting benefits at the beginning do compound over the whole time period (and "fortunately" for the Wealthfront backtest, there are big tax losses to harvest with the tech crash at the beginning, though I'm sure it's no coincidence that Wealthfront chose the peak of the tech bubble as a starting point for their illustration). Of course, the reality is that compounding a 0.09% tax savings won't amount to all that much, and it's even less given that their example assumes ongoing contributions (with a $100,000 starting balance and $520,000 of cumulative contributions dollar-cost-averaged into the market over the span of 13 years, that $445.20 economic value of tax savings just doesn't compound enough to be all that much more material).
On the other hand, while compounding means that just looking at the true one-year economic benefit of tax loss harvesting will slightly understand the compounding cumulative benefits of tax deferral - once properly calculated at about 1/12th the value that Wealthfront claims! - there are also several issues that may still be causing Wealthfront to systematically overstate the realistic value of tax loss harvesting for most [of its] investors.

Further Complications To The Value Of Tax Loss Harvesting

The first additional concern regarding the value of tax loss harvesting emerges with a review of Wealthfront's tax assumptions themselves. To amplify the value of tax deferral, Wealthfront assumes an investor facing the maximum Federal income tax rates, along with living in California with the highest state income tax rate. This is how they reach a whopping 37.1% long-term capital gains assumption.
However, the reality is that in order to reach the top Federal income tax bracket - where the top capital gains rates apply - the investor must have taxable income (that's after all deductions) of $405,100 in 2014 (or $457,600 for a married couple, and a married couple needs more than amillion of income to hit the top California bracket as well!). Given that Wealthfront recently announced they had crossed half a billion of AUM and were up to $538M with 6,000+ clients, some simple napkin math shows that their average investor has around $90,000 of total assets with them. Only 16% of Wealthfront clients even have reported a liquid net worth over $1,000,000, and 58% of Wealthfront clientele are Millenials aged 18 to 35. To say the least, it seems unlikely that the average client being a 20- or 30-something with $90,000 of investments is really staring down annual taxable income in excess of $400,000 to be subject to the top Federal tax rate (and it's over $500,000 to hit the top California rate, or $1,000,000 as a married couple to hit that top bracket!). Granted, Wealthfront does have a techie-centric presumably-high-income professional clientele, and one recent survey indicated the average Silicon Valley software engineer is starting at $165k, but the actual capital gains tax rate for someone at that income level is 15% (and the California rate is only 9.3%, for a total capital gains tax rate of 24.3%).
Unfortunately, though, using a more realistic 24.3% tax rate instead of 37.1% cuts the tax loss harvesting benefit by about 1/3rd, from 0.09% of true economic benefit down to only about 0.06% of annual economic value. And if the investor actually lives in Texas, Nevada, Florida, or some other state without a state income tax, where the capital gains rate is 'just' the Federal 15% with no state income tax? Now the true annual economic benefit of tax loss harvesting is down to an average of about 0.04%, or about 1/25th the value that Wealthfront states in its white paper.
In turn, even that benefit assumes that when a loss occurs, it can actually be used for tax purposes. After all, the capital loss rules limit the deduction to only apply against capital gains (with a small $3,000 ordinary loss for any excess that doesn't amount to much when Wealthfront assumes its typical client earns more than half a million dollars annually!). Thus, given that Wealthfront started its example in 2000, there would be no gains to offset at that time, and the bulk of the losses would actually just manifest as loss carryforwards that wouldn't actually start getting used until rebalancing trades began to trigger material gains in 2004 and beyond. So even when acknowledging the compounding benefit of the tax deferral value, the clock for losses harvested during the tech wreck wouldn't have begun until several years later; in other words, the blue bars in the 2000-2003 time frame should mostly be appearing in 2004-2006 or so, allowing less time for the economic value to compound at all. Of course, a tiny portion of the losses would have been deductible at ordinary income rates, but at the more-realistically-Wealthfront-typical $165k of income the individual's ordinary income bracket would have only been 28% + 9.3% = 37.3% (which means what Wealthfront was assuming for capital losses in the first place should actually have been the ordinary income rate!), and the tax alpha would have been $3,000 x 37.3% = $1,119 or 1.1% calculated Wealthfront's way (assuming the first year where the account balance was still only $100,000 and there weren't more contributions), which again is only about 0.09% when adjusted to account for the true economic benefit of tax deferral at an 8% growth rate.
Another complication of the Wealthfront approach is that systematic loss harvesting can actually create an even more unfavorable result by creating a large deferred tax liability for the future. For a simplified example, assume a scenario where the investor takes a $10,000 loss on a $100,000 portfolio, and with ongoing $40,000/year contributions actually manages to continue to find $10,000 of "temporary" losses to harvest from the portfolio each and every year. For our Wealthfront engineer client facing a 24.3% capital gains rate, this produces $2,430 of tax savings each year (Wealthfront would characterize this as a 2.4% tax alpha). However, if this was done systematically for a decade, by the end of the decade the cost basis through loss harvesting has been so whittled down that there is now an extra $100,000 capital gain looming, as shown below assuming $100k starting balance, $40k end-of-year annual contributions, and 8%/year growth (B&H is for buy-and-hold, TLH assumes annual $10,000 losses being harvested):
Tax Loss Harvesting vs Buy And Hold with Adjusted Cost Basis
As the chart above shows, while the value of the TLH strategy is slightly higher than the value of the B&H scenario, the cost basis of the TLH strategy is materially lower than the B&H scenario, which in turn will chop away most (though not quite all) of what little excess there is for the TLH strategy over just buying and holding. In other words, at the end of the chart, the TLH client is exposed to an extra $100,000 of looming capital gains above and beyond what the B&H investor faces.
Yet the caveat is that in our engineer's situation, the outcome actually is worse, because at his $165k income, liquidating an extra $100,000 of capital gains can actually drive his capital gains rate up, pushing him over the line of the 3.8% Medicare surtax on investment income. As a result, while the engineer was saving $2,430 x 10 = $24,300 in taxes over the decade, liquidating them at 24.3% + 3.8% = 28.1% is a tax liability of $28,100. In other words, the investor is $24,300 (savings) - $28,100 (final taxes) = -$3,800 of taxes in the hole because ofthis "negative tax arbitrage" effect, where systematic loss harvesting produces such large future gains that it actually drives up the future tax bracket, resulting in less wealth through tax loss harvesting.
The effect can be even worse for lower income investors (e.g., those Wealthfront participants who perhaps aren't at the Silicon-Valley-engineer salary level). For married couples whose taxable income after all deductions is below $73,800 (in 2014), the long-term capital gains tax rate is actually 0%! Which means systematic loss harvesting produces a tax savings of... nothing. At all. The tax alpha is zero. You can't get an economic benefit from tax deferral when there is no tax liability to defer! Except it does reduce cost basis, increasing exposure to gains in the future, and potentially turning 0% capital losses into 15%+ capital gains, resulting in a significant destruction of wealth! In such scenarios, the wealth creation strategy is actually not automated loss harvesting at all, but harvesting gains instead.
More broadly, the simple reality is that capital gains tax planning is far more complex than just always harvesting losses to attempt to defer a tax liability, given our current progressive four bracket capital gains tax structure with the new top bracket and the 3.8% Medicare surtax where pushing too many gains out to the future actually leads to a higher tax bracket when they're actually liquidated, and those eligible for 0% rates should actually be harvesting gains to take advantage of their "free" annual step-up in basis!

Overstating Tax Benefits As An Investment Value Proposition

While simply overstating the value of tax deferral in a white paper is one thing, the concern in the context of Wealthfront is that they convert their overstated tax alpha benefit into an actual wealth compounding factor. For instance, the chart below from their website shows an investor who has $52k of greater wealth due to a 0.93% additional compound growth rate on investments due to "tax alpha" for capital loss harvesting - i.e., they literally project future wealth to grow at an extra 0.93%/year of annual return based on their estimated tax alpha.
However, the problem, as we now know, is that they are failing to disclose that the red line in the chart below - the greater value due to systematic loss harvesting - would have a substantially lower cost basis than the blue line and a much larger embedded capital gain that would wipe out virtually all of the differential, as already shown in the figure earlier (in other words, the Wealthfront illustration below only shows the gross value of the two lines and not the different cost bases and significantly different embedded tax liabilities associated with each). And of course, this also ignores the fact that as previously shown, the true economic return differential isn't ~1% of tax alpha in the first place, but closer to 0.09% instead (which is the outcome once the fact that the two lines have substantially different cost bases is accounted for).
Wealthfront Tax Loss Harvesting Mountain Chart
Similarly, the Wealthfront home page explains their economic value as shown below, again implying an additional average annual growth rate of 1.0% attributable to tax loss harvesting, even though the true economic value should be no more than a fraction of that even at top tax brackets, and even less for what Wealthfront itself proclaims is their "typical" investor - a millenial engineer who has $90,000 invested with them... and isn't likely facing a marginal tax anywhere rate near the top tax brackets. And of course, that assumes the investor is using a taxable account in the first place, and not a retirement account where the built-in tax deferral means there is no value to tax-loss harvesting (though Weatlhfront's charts do not exactly make it clear that the benefits apply exclusively to brokerage accounts).
Wealthfront Value-Adds
In addition to all these concerns, there's also the simple fact that the Wealthfront tax loss harvesting alpha is even further overstated by their choice of time horizons for their hypothetical back test. As their own charts show, the bulk of tax loss harvesting value is created in the midst of significant bear markets, while no tax alpha is produced in bull markets (and in fact the tax alpha can even be negative as rebalancing trades trigger capital gains recognition in the midst of an extended bull market with no available losses to harvest). Thus, Wealthfront's backtest starting point of the year 2000 is notable. Had they backed it up to start in the early 1990s instead, nearly doubling the length of the time period but with a long bull market that would have produced negative tax alpha for a decade and few opportunities to produce positive tax alpha, that alone would have cut their annual tax alpha by as much as 50% (as the same benefits from two bear markets would have been averaged over twice as many years), dropping it to little more than 0.50% and the true economic value (still assuming an 8% growth rate) to only about 0.05% (or no more than 0.02% or 0.03% per year with more realistic tax bracket assumptions). Notwithstanding their cherry-picked time horizon, it's also notable that on a net basis, even with their approach and favorably-chosen time period, the tax loss harvesting strategy has actually produced virtually no "tax alpha" since 2004, as the one positive year in the past decade - 2008 - was entirely offset by the negative tax alpha in 2007 and 2009 (because their rebalancing slowly started to force them to recognize some, but still not all, of the giant embedded tax liability their strategy is creating).
In the end, it's worth noting that none of this is meant to suggest that tax loss harvesting is a bad thing to do. With the exception of doing it so extensively that it drives up future tax brackets - or for those who are currently eligible for 0% capital gains rates - it does have some value, especially if it can be implemented systematically and inexpensively (as many advisors have already been doing for a decade on an automated basis with rebalancing software like iRebal and long before that with "manual" spreadsheets). And frankly, Wealthfront's tax loss harvesting capabilities are unique, in that their platform allows daily tax-loss harvesting to be executed without any net transaction costs to investors, a substantial difference from advisors where even low transaction costs do increase the friction of implementing loss harvesting strategies.
Nonetheless, the loss harvesting value must be measured on the basis of the true economic benefit, not the gross tax savings as a misrepresentative form of "tax alpha", should be done with realistic tax assumptions for the client (and not overstated with tax assumptions that clearly exceed what is known to be the average client), and especially should not be converted into an annual return that's assumed to compound for 20 years without accurately characterizing the tax results throughout the time horizon or at the end in the form of the growing embedded gain that the strategy creates.

Where Does Wealthfront Go From Here?

To be fair, the problem of overstating the benefits of tax loss harvesting and tax deferral is not unique to Wealthfront; there are many advisors who do the same thing, which is why this blog includes many cautionary posts that capital loss harvesting may be overvalued. Which means this review of the issues with Wealthfront's tax loss harvesting white paper is far more a case study of the problem than the sole instance of it.
Nonetheless, one might expect that a technology company which is built on the basis of having savvy mathematical algorithms control your portfolio would know how to do the arithmetic of tax and cost basis calculations properly, yet this error has remained in their tax loss harvesting white paper for nearly a year. Perhaps this is the problem with trying to build an "online financial advisor" platform with savvy tax strategies using only an Investment Team and sharp engineers but without actually having a CFP or CPA in a high-level advisory or leadership position? And lest anyone think this is just picking on a robo-advisor out of the blue, it's worth noting that I've pointed this issue out to the Wealthfront leadership repeatedly over the past year to give them a chance to fix it, yet the issue has remained unaddressed and unresolved.
And then again later last year after an article by Felix Salmon that inappropriately extolled their overvalued tax alpha calculations:
Of course, the reality is that Wealthfront can fix this issue, and hopefully will do so sooner rather than later for their own sake (as Ray Lucia found, misstating the projected investment returns of your strategies due to a faulty backtesting white paper can get you banned by the SEC!). And "fixing" the issue of misstating tax loss harvesting benefits will not completely undermine the Wealthfront value proposition, both because their particular no-transaction-cost implementation of loss harvesting is unique, and because as noted above they claim to deliver other benefits as well (though ironically, those Wealthfront benefits almost perfectly mirror the advisor benefits researched by Morningstar's David Blanchett as "advisor Gamma"!).
From a broader perspective, the fact that Wealthfront has been drastically overstating the value of its tax harvesting strategy doesn't make the presence of such "robo-advisors" irrelevant. In fact, I've repeatedly noted that robo-advisors like Wealthfront, along with its similar counterpartBetterment, are steadily commoditizing the core construction of a passive, strategic portfolio for investors, which is a genuine cost-reduction value for consumers and will force advisors to continue to evolve to a more genuinely-personal-advice-centric value proposition. And while the reality is that many advisors have been doing this with their own software for nearly a decade already - no matter what the robo-advisors claim, their implementation of these strategies using technology is not new nor unique - the 'robo-advisors' are finding ways to potentially make it even more efficient, especially through their quasi-pooled investment structures that are allowing them to execute transactions for clients without needing to apply any separate/additional transaction costs (how they actually do this is a conversation for another day).
Yet at the same time, this entire exercise illustrates perhaps the greatest weakness of Wealthfront: that developing broad-based algorithms for investment purposes can miss out on the nuances of individual tax planning - an entirely different core competency that must be integrated into the picture, as advisors routinely do and "robo-advisors" are still struggling to do. The situation is especially true given that Wealthfront will harvest losses for all clients on an ongoing basis, regardless of the fact that for some doing so will eventually drive them into a higher tax bracket and destroy wealth, while for others it should not be done at all because they're young and in the lower tax brackets and eligible for 0% capital gains rates and consequently harvesting gains is the best strategy for them. These are the exact kinds of nuances that good advisors can address when doing client-specific personalized financial advice that is beyond at least today's algorithm-based robo-advisors broad-sweeping investment implementation. In other words, Wealthfront's failings in this regard demonstrate exactly why some investors that need more individually-suited tax-sensitive advice must be cautious of a robo-advisor that looks solely at investments and fails to take into account the whole personal financial planning picture.
But who knows, perhaps this article will just propel Wealthfront forward to improve their offering, and bring even more attention to them, because there's no such thing as bad press, right?

Thursday, February 06, 2014

2013 Hedge Fund Performance Numbers



Some media members have bashed hedge fund performance, but it is worth noting that at least in the long/short equity segment this year, many of these funds captured 2/3rd's of the market upside while only being 30-40% net long.

After all, a true hedge fund is just that, hedged.  There's no question that short selling was tough in 2013 and by definition, many L/S hedge funds won't capture all the upside in big up years (like 2013).

As always, it's worth examining the entire picture (risk, exposure levels, etc) and the entire spectrum of returns.  Undoubtedly, there will be outperformers and underperformers.

Not to mention, it's probably more prudent to fixate on 3-year, 5-year, or even 10-year numbers anyways.  But in the short-term focused world, the 1-year performance number reigns.

The S&P 500 was up 29.6% in 2013.  Here's how prominent hedgies fared.


2013 Hedge Fund Performance Numbers


Glenview Capital Opportunity Fund: 84% (through end of Oct)

Appaloosa Palomino Fund: 42.1%

Bridgewater All Weather: -4%

Bridgewater Pure Alpha: 5.25% 

Paulson Recovery: 63.18%

Paulson Advantage: 26.05%

Paulson Advantage Plus: 27.22% 

Perry Partners: 20.25%

Pershing Square: 9.29%

Trian Partners: 40.06%

Owl Creek: 48%

Millennium: 13.07%

Visium Global: 16.93%

Eton Park: 22.3%

Children's Investment Fund: 47%

Theleme Partners: 19.41% 

Whitebox MultiStrat: 18.09%

Lone Pine Cascade: 30.3%

Lone Pine Cypress: 18% 

Lone Pine Dragon: 9.8%

Conatus Capital: 23.6% 

Farallon: 15.3%

Matrix Capital: 56% 

Elliott International: 11.6%

Discovery Global Opportunity: 27.5%

Marcato International: 26.16%

Luxor Capital: 17.6%

York Investment: 18.27%

Joho Capital: 29.46%

Lansdowne European Equity: 21.51%

Odey European: 25.78%

Kingdon Offshore: 23.69%

Passport Global: 18.98%

Passport LongShort: 19.89%

Passport Special Opportunities: 45.5%

Cobalt Offshore: 8.84%

Elm Ridge Capital: 22.28%

Eminence Capital: 14.64%

Highbridge LongShort: 15.34%

Ivory Capital: 17.07%

Ivory Enhanced Fund: 28.31% 

Omega Advisors: 30.02%

Zweig-DiMenna: 17.33%

Greenlight Capital: 18.7%

Tosca Opportunity: 56%

JAT Capital: 30.6%

Tiger Global: 14%

Maverick Fund: 16.3%

Maverick Long: 32% 

Hound Partners: 16%

Coatue Management: 20%

Viking Global Equities: 22.6%

Viking Long: 38.4% 

Valinor Management: 23.4%

Glade Brook Capital: 19.76%

Falcon Edge Capital: 28%

Glenhill: 28.7% 

Highfields Capital: 27.3%

Bridger Capital's Swiftcurrent Fund: 20.6%

White Elm Capital: 23.6%

MFP: 31.5%

Tybourne Capital: 16.04%

Fairholme: 33% 

Jericho Capital: 33% (through end of Nov)

Beacon Light: 21.13% 



2013 Credit Hedge Fund Performance 

BlueCrest MultiStrat: 8.98%

BlueMountain LongShort Credit: 7.57%

Brevan Howard Credit Catalysts: 12.21%

Ellington Credit Opportunities: 15.55%

Kingdon Credit: 14.58%

Pine River Credit: 13.09%

Saba Capital: -3.61%

Canyon Value: 14.71%

Davidson Kempner: 19.98%

King Street: 11.43%

Monarch Debt Recovery: 16.12%

Paulson Credit Opportunities: 21.8%

Silver Point Capital Offshore: 15.88%



2013 Macro Hedge Fund Performance 

Tudor BVI Global: 13.98% 

Moore Global: 16.99%

Rubicon Global: 18.25% 

Trend Macro: 11.88%


Challenges in Analyzing PIMCO Total Return and Other Liquid Alternatives

Is a given hedge fund manager generating alpha?  Can that alpha be captured through more liquid alternative vehicles?  How can an investor truly reveal a portfolio’s net factor exposures when traditional assets are often being intermingled with credit default swaps, options, futures and leverage?  These questions continue to stymie investors – even though answers may be available right under their noses.  MPI’s patented “Dynamic Style Analysis” (DSA) model has revolutionized the foundations first laid by Nobel laureate Bill Sharpe, moving beyond his groundbreaking returns-based style analysis (RBSA) to reveal exposures in complex funds that are not well explained by traditional RBSA.  Just as RBSA was created to fill in the gaps that result from holdings-based analysis, DSA now serves to provide additional transparency beyond RBSA in a world of increasingly complex investment vehicles.


Extracting exposures in liquid alternatives may seem complex, but our clients have used MPI’s DSA technology for the past decade to provide transparency and risk analysis while meeting compliance standards and staying true to their investment policies.
These clients know that complex problems require powerful tools, and together we have worked to address the issues that will come to an investor’s door time and time again.  Using DSA technology, investors gain transparency despite the presence of derivatives and other fund positions providing only point-in-time or lagged  information; navigate investment flexibility where multi-manager offerings create unintended netting and style overlap; remain in compliance with investment policies while seeking to increase allocation to products that do not offer position-level transparency; and design and rebalance portfolios to achieve optimal blends of assets that run the full spectrum of liquidity.
DSA moves beyond the ability to provide net exposures created by portfolios that combine traditional and complex alternative assets.  The results of DSA analysis may be used in forward-looking simulations and assessing how funds may behave in different market scenarios. Likewise, DSA may reveal how a manager reacted to previous market events.  Lastly, DSA can even provide transparency on funds with very short performance histories.
The Case of PIMCO Total Return
To demonstrate the benefits of our model with liquid alternatives, we analyzed the PIMCO Total Return fund using a set of broad Merrill Lynch fixed income indices (Exhibit 1). In this chart, you can see the resulting exposures at any point in time by looking at each vertical slice, while the short cash position shows the fund’s implied leverage.  We were able to deduce that these factors accurately mimic the portfolio’s returns over the selected time horizon (Exhibit 2).  This is shown below with the green line representing PIMCO TR and the yellow line representing the return of the style portfolio of exposures shown on the graph in Exhibit 1.   Also shown in Exhibit 2 is the R2 of 98.82 and our proprietary Predicted R2 validation statistic which was 96.12 – indicating a very good fit.
Exhibit 1
Exibit 1a - Asset Loadings
Exhibit 2
Exibit 2a - Cum PerformanceExibit 2a - R2

Out of Sample Test
Our next test was to test the predictive ability of our factor exposures by running an out-of-sample test.  To do this, we took the factor exposures from the end of March 2013 and using a simple buy-and-hold strategy attempted to project the fund’s return (Exhibit 3).  Our model was able to predict a good portion of the magnitude and direction of the funds movement during this volatile period of “Taper Talk” and shows how our factor exposures can be used to for risk management
Exhibit 3
Exibit 3a - Returns vs Buy Hold
Common Style
A report at the beginning of the year in Bloomberg revealed that most PIMCO funds invest based on a uniform firm outlook on everything from the global economy to interest rates, but can be altered following economic data releases or new statements from the Federal Reserve.  Our proprietary “Common Style” analysis below, which provides the degree of overlap in returns-based exposures between multiple investment vehicles, confirms these common bets.  This type of analysis across fixed income managers, whether from a single fund family or from multiple providers, provides investors with essential information on diversification within a portfolio or lineup (Exhibit 4).
Exhibit 4
Exibit 5 - Common Style Matrix
Conclusion:
As investors are increasingly eyeing liquid alternatives, they need to use the same techniques that sophisticated investors use to analyze hedge funds.  MPI’s Dynamic Style Analysis can effectively provide them with answers to their questions.  Investors can better assess the way in which managers created their net exposures, receive adequate transparency into these vehicles, employ sound risk management procedures, ensure compliance with  investment guidelines and finally, achieve optimal portfolio rebalancing from both an asset class and liquidity perspective.
Furthermore, investors also need to look at a firm’s macro views when allocating within a fund family or constructing portfolios from multiple management companies to further avoid potential risks.  In testing our approach on PIMCO, it became evident that a number of their funds had common exposures, including highly similar ones to the same fixed-income factors.  Specifically, the highest overlaps were between PIMCO All Asset All Authority and PIMCO High Yield and between PIMCO Total Return and the PIMCO Low Duration.

Tuesday, February 04, 2014

Interesting Stock Market Charts


As many of you have noticed, elevated bullish sentiment and overbought levels reached extremes in November and December of 2013. Eventually, by years end on the 31st of December, the stock market rally peaked out. For the whole of January and the beginning of February stock markets around the world have been correcting. Here are 10 interesting charts I am looking at right now:
Chart 1: Despite optimism, the Dow has made no progress in 8 months!
Dow Jones Source: FinViz (edited by Short Side of Long)
Interestingly enough despite such positive news about the economy, earnings and the stock rally momentum; Dow Jones Industrial is now higher than where it was in May 2013 – believe it or not, more then eight months of no progress whatsoever. If you have carefully read this monthsSentiment Summary, you would have noticed that retail investors have been piling into stocks, via mutual fund flows, over the last 6 to 9 months.
Majority of retail investors usually buy blue chip stocks, like the Dow 30 components, which essentially means that these “Johnny Come Lately’s” have most likely not made any money over the last several quarters.
And since we are talking about the Dow, another observation I would like to make is that the index closed below its 200 day moving average for the first time in over a year, while breaking its December support (as seen in the chart above).
Chart 2: Five out of nine major stock market sectors have broken down
Stock Market Sectors Source: StockCharts (edited by Short Side of Long)
The chart above shows us the internal picture of nine major S&P 500 sectors which include cyclical sectors like Discretionary, Technology, Financials, Industrials, Materials and Energy; together with defensive sectors like Staples, health Care and Utilities (Telecom not included).
First observation I would like to make is that four out of six economically sensitive cyclical sectors have broken down below their long term uptrend lines. These include Distortionary (which lead the overall stock market rally from the beginning), Financials, Materials and Energy. The Industrial sector is now right on support, so any further selling could see it join the party.
Secondly, the  darling favourite blue chip companies (Consumer Staples) have posted a major false breakout on the upside, with a powerful reversal in the opposite direction – not a good sign. Simultaneously defensive sectors like Utilities are breaking out on the upside, signalling risk aversion.
Chart 3: Stock market breadth has started to deteriorate rapidly…
S&P 500 Stocks Above 200 MA Source: Short Side of Long
The rally in the stock market has been deteriorating ever since Mr Bernanke (we really gonna miss you Ben) announced Federal Reserves plans to taper their QE program all the way back in May 2013. We have seen fewer and fewer stocks trade above their respective 200 day moving averages over the course of the last 6 months. Now, we have a condition where more than one third of the S&P 500 is trading below 200 MA.
I know what you’re thinking, and yes I agree… the bearish divergence went on for awhile, didn’t it? Financial markets don’t care about warning signs, until they have to care. And when they do, at times, we can see the whole 6 month rally wiped out in the matter of weeks. This is why they say that markets overshoot on both he upside and the downside. Last three divergences during the current bull market (leading into April 2010 / May 2011 / April 2012), pretty much gave back majority of the gains that occurred the 6 months that proceeded the correction.
Chart 4: Yes, markets can go down even when CBs endlessly print!
Nikkei Correction Source: FinViz (edited by Short Side of Long)
In the first chart, I described how the Dow Jones Industrial has made no progress over the last 8 months. Even more interesting is the fact that Nikkei 225 has now made no progress in 9 months, despite the fact that BoJ isn’t even remotely close to discussing the taper for their own QE program.
The chart above shows how Nikkei 225 staged a false breakout, also known as a 2B pattern, in late December 2013. I actually warned about this setup back in middle of January, just as the sell off was beginning. Usually but not always, when a market does a false break in one direction, there is a violent move in the opposite direction. This is exactly what happened to the Japanese stock market, as it has lost over 2,000 points in one month and is now down 14% from the recent peak.
Chart 5: Emerging Markets peaked in October and have lead the sell off!
Emerging Market Sentiment Source: Short Side of Long
Recent turmoil in the Emerging Markets should not be anything new to investors who closely track the market behaviour. Emerging Market equities (chart above), bonds and currencies have peaked years ago; and have been struggling for awhile already. Emerging Market Index actually peaked in October 2013, well ahead of Developed Markets, and has lead the decline on the downside.
Even though the index has once again reached a well established technical support, this time around, investor sentiment still remains elevated and nowhere near panic territory. Could we bounce from here? Possibly. Will the index eventually break lower? Probably. Keep a close eye on this one, as it continues to form a pattern of lower highs and equal lows.
With market conditions are changing, as volatility across the globe starts rising. This could be a signal that the sell off is now entering a more intense phase. Last weeks breakout in the VIX Index, was  a leading indicator of this weeks breakdown in the S&P 500.
Chart 6: Retail investors aren’t bothered as cash levels remain super low
Retail Cash Allocations Source: Short Side of Long
Recent sell off which started in early parts of January, has not phased the real investor community in the latest February report. A monthly survey conducted by American Association of Individual Investors showed respondents stating that their cash levels remained extremely low, at only 17%. This is one of the lowest readings in over a decade, especially when averaged over a three month (or one quarter) period.
When we compare the current reading with the ones during stages of panic, whether it was early parts of 2009 (cash levels reached 45%) or late parts of 2011 (cash levels reached 26%), we can see that retail investors are remaining foolishly complacent. After all this is a great contrary indicator, where cash piles usually rise rapidly just before a major stock market trough.
Chart 7: Stock market has only been more expensive a handful of times!
Real S&P vs CAPE5 Source: imarketsignals.com
The stock market is overvalued according to various valuation models. One of my favourite is theCAPE10, which is Price to Earnings ratio averaged over 10 years. At the current reading of 25, CAPE10 is in the 91st percentile of the overall data saying back 140 years. In plain English, the US stock market has only been more expensive 9% of the time.
It is also just as smart to look at the CAPE5 (seen in the chart above), as most of the time business cycle last between 5 to 7 years. The chart also illustrates very well how the current level of 26, has only been witnessed on few occasions before. These include: 1929, 1936-37, 1996-01 and 2004-07.
What do we make from these dates? Well firstly, all of them were at or near a major stock market bubble, which eventually crashed by 50% or more. So if history is a guide, something similar awaits us again. The only question is… does it start from the current level or do we take a noise dive from a higher diving platform?

Lunch is for wimps

Lunch is for wimps
It's not a question of enough, pal. It's a zero sum game, somebody wins, somebody loses. Money itself isn't lost or made, it's simply transferred from one perception to another.